Experts: What do the European elections mean for EU climate action?

Tuesday 11 June 2024

Simon Evans

This week’s European parliamentary election results saw parties on the populist right making big gains in France and Germany, while the historic “green wave” of 2019 receded.

Despite polling showing a large majority of EU voters are in favour of continued or strengthened climate action, the results have “raised concerns” over the future of the bloc’s climate ambition.

The Green Deal package of EU laws passed during the past five years are expected to be “hard to undo”. However, these laws will need to be fully implemented in order to meet EU climate targets.

Moreover, while centrist parties continue to hold a majority in the new European parliament, the stronger presence of right-wing parties could make ambitious new laws harder to pass.

Carbon Brief has asked a range of policy experts what they think the European election results will mean for EU climate action over the next five years.

These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:

At least two results of the European Parliament (EP) elections will have important implications for Europe’s climate policy.

The first one is the self-evident main election outcome at the aggregate level. The right and far-right European party families – the governing European People’s Party and the European Conservatives and Reformists, plus the NI group – visibly increased their vote share, while the more progressive Renew Europe liberal party and, in particular, the Greens lost significantly.

[See Carbon Brief’s EU elections manifesto tracker for more on the party groupings.] 

Whereas this is less of a gain of extreme-right populism as some had predicted, it is still a clear ideological shift from left to right. This is climate news because more progressive left-leaning parties have so far championed the urgency of climate change mitigation and adaptation, so the composition of the new EP will threaten the political momentum of the EU climate policy agenda.

Some expression of continuity with past policies will remain, both because the historical EPP-S&D balance remains relatively strong, and also because [current European Commission president Ursula] Von Der Leyen will probably continue heading the commission.

However, we should expect a rhetorical downscaling of the relevance of climate action. Whether this also means a substantive downscaling of the Green Deal depends on whether the EU will be looking at climate as a social redistributive agenda or a geopolitical security one.

There is also another electoral result that deeply affects the future of Europe’s climate policy, namely that this shift is particularly determined by the French and German EP elections. This is important as it is not a result observed in other comparably large countries.

In the short term, this result could have some negative impacts. France and Germany are the largest European economies, where much of decarbonisation should take place. Despite their controversial policies, political leaders from both countries – Emmanuel Macron in France and Robert Habeck in Germany – have championed climate action in the past, and these voices are being traded with more ambiguous – if not openly sceptical – views.

At the same time, this could be the opportunity to rethink how climate issues can enter the heart of mainstream parties – in France and Germany, but also across Europe – that want to distinguish themselves and credibly compete with the far right. The Socialists and Democrats (S&D) from across the board now have a big chance to appropriate the climate issue and push the EP towards more progressive climate action. 

In the run up to the European elections there has been substantial speculation about the future of the Green Deal, with some pointing at its potential being dismantled following an eventual dramatic surge in far-right parties.

The good news for Europe, and for the world, is that this scenario has been avoided: as the pro-European centre has retained its majority of seats in the European Parliament, Europe is not going to reverse course on the green transition.

However, business-as-usual is not an option, either. The elections have unveiled an important sense of unease in our societies – and in the case of Germany and France, even more than largely anticipated – that must be taken seriously and duly addressed, also when it comes to climate policy.

The Green Deal has come a long way since it was conceived five years ago, and these elections mark a new beginning for this agenda rather than its dismissal. It must now restart with a new agenda focused on green investments, green social support and green industrial policy. Decarbonisation is the only route for Europe to get to resilience and competitiveness. The new majority in the European Parliament has the responsibility to drive it, by avoiding futile shortcuts.

While it’s correct that the European Parliament elections hit Green parties hard, it’s simply not the case that this means EU climate legislation and plans will be undone. We’ve seen a lot of – quite frankly – lazy analysis to this effect, but what matters here are the numbers across parliament and capitals in the European Council.

One: the European Green Deal still has a majority in the house. The appetite for any roll-backs of laws is really low, especially given the uncertainty of how the French parliamentary elections will affect majorities in Council. European industry knows it risks losing ground to China and the US in the clean energy transition and investors crave policy certainty.

Two: while climate may be less explicitly referenced by the Commission it will still be central. We can expect that many new initiatives under the next Commission will be about strengthening industrial competitiveness and energy security. The high geopolitical and economic cost of being dependent on gas, oil and coal imports remains a major challenge for the competitiveness of the economy and energy bills. 

Three: energy prices are still two times higher in the EU than in the US. The answer to this is to invest in resilient and secure clean energy and storage systems that can offer the continent long term security and lower risks of Russia exerting leverage over gas-dependent members. While the threat from Moscow lingers we can expect Brussels to back its Green Deal – even if it’s sold as a weapon against Putin.

The results are a strong wake up call for climate action compared to the euphoria of 2019. The low turnout and the increasing dissatisfaction with established parties in many countries are yet a further symptom of the distrust of many towards the current political offer – both in terms of representatives and policy.

The politics of climate action needs to be reengineered and reconnected with the needs of society. While the desirability of the transition remains high, politics is failing to make it more accessible and tangible for the most.

At citizens’ level, one of the main tasks should be to design and offer concrete solutions for different social classes. At the economic level, we need to see bolder plans for mobilising the capital needed and directing it to the industrial players that want to invest in innovation.

European leaders and ministers now need to work together to build an agenda and design policy that can bridge the gap between long-term targets and everyday needs and desires.

Although far-right gains have garnered significant attention, a large majority of Europeans supported centrist parties that have committed to continuing the green transition.

It depends on the largest pro-democracy political forces of social democrats, liberals – and particularly the centre-right – how much influence they allow the far right to have on the EU’s climate agenda for the next five years.

Sustained climate action and a predictable regulatory framework towards climate neutrality are crucial to deliver on electoral promises made by pro-European political families for more security, competitiveness and strategic autonomy.

The upcoming negotiations on the next European Commission president and her/his policy agenda will be decisive for Europe’s capacity to address the severe impacts and risks of climate change for Europe and EU’s global climate leadership.

The European Council and political groups in the European Parliament should prioritise a science-based green transition, integrating a strong and global dimension to ensure Europeans feel the benefits of it domestically and to increase the EU’s trust and credibility internationally.

The results will complicate EU climate politics, primarily due to developments in a few major countries. In France and Germany, Green parties suffered losses, which will substantially reduce the number of Green lawmakers in the European Parliament. Additionally, these countries, along with Italy, contributed to a strengthening of far-right groups.

Although left-wing and green parties did unexpectedly well in Denmark and Sweden, the overall shift is likely to dampen enthusiasm for ambitious climate policies in parliament and could deter member states in the European Council from adopting new measures.

However, the next phase of the Green Deal will focus on implementation. The key question is, therefore, whether the EU will stick to its existing policies or unravel its landmark green legislation. The latter option seems unlikely. To secure a second term, Ursula von der Leyen will need the support of the Social Democrats. To avoid risks in her confirmation vote, she may also seek backing from the remaining Green forces. This will limit the scope for a big and official role-back.

But still, there is plenty of room to throw sand in the wheels of execution. Two key aspects are therefore crucial to watch. First, how the European People’s Party (EPP) will interpret its mandate on climate. The party may seek to dilute implementation by forming issue-specific alliances with the far-right. Our research suggests that this would be at odds with its electorate’s preferences, but recent months have already shown a willingness to pursue this approach. Second, it will be crucial to see how the next Commission integrates climate goals into less controversial areas where progress is still possible such as industrial policy, competitiveness and economic resilience.

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