WAYS AND MEANS: The future of Joe Biden’s signature climate policy, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), is in doubt after Republicans on two key Congressional committees passed budget proposals that “would effectively kill” it, reported Heatmap News. The proposals would end clean-energy tax credits and rebates for electric vehicle (EV) purchases, “claw back” climate grants and “slash” related spending, said Reuters.
DEFENCE DOUBTS: While a “small subset” of House Republicans have been trying to defend the IRA, it is unclear if they would block passage of the wider budget bill to get their way, according to E&E News. In the Senate, Politico said “some” Republicans are “pushing back” on the current proposals. A New York Times feature said Republican districts “have the most to lose” if all of the IRA tax credits are repealed. Semafor reported Republicans were “wrestling with possible failure” of the bill, in the face of opposition from Democrats and their own ranks. (Law firm Grant Thornton said policymakers were hoping to pass the bill by 4 July.)
SOCIAL COST: Meanwhile, a new White House memo directed US government agencies to disregard economic damages from climate change, reported E&E News. Under a headline asking, “What’s the cost of pollution? Trump says zero”, the New York Times explained that the “social cost of carbon” had been used for more than two decades to help weigh the costs and benefits of federal policies and regulations. It said the move could face legal challenges.
The yearly rise in EV sales in emerging markets in Asia and Latin America in 2024, according to new data from the International Energy Agency.
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
For the first time on record, China’s CO2 emissions have fallen as a result of clean energy expansion rather than weak growth in electricity demand, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief. The analysis, which has been covered by outlets including AFP, Semafor and the New York Times, found that China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement fell 1.6% in the first quarter of 2025 and are now 1% below the peak reached in March 2024. The months ahead will be critical for what comes next, as Beijing is working to finalise its next international climate pledge for 2035 and its five-year plan for 2026-2030.
This week, Carbon Brief reports on coal falling to barely half of Poland’s power supplies.
The first round of Poland’s presidential election is on Sunday and Rafał Trzaskowski, from prime minister Donald Tusk’s centre-right party Civic Platform, is favoured to win.
Long seen as one of the world’s most coal-reliant countries, Poland’s electricity system is in the midst of dramatic and increasingly rapid change.
When Poland joined the EU in 2004, coal-fired power stations supplied 93% of the country’s electricity. Coal accounted for more than three-quarters of the total as recently as 2018, the year the country hosted COP24 in Katowice.
Since then, a gradual shuffle away from coal has turned to a sprint.
In 2024, coal generated little more than half of Poland’s electricity, according to data from thinktank Ember – and a coal power phaseout by 2035 is now seen as a realistic prospect.
While the topic has not played a big role in the election campaign, there is now broad public acceptance that “coal is over in Poland”, said Joanna Maćkowiak-Pandera, president of Polish thinktank Forum Energii. She told Carbon Brief:
“The extreme rightwing tries to claim that coal is the future and there is coal for [another] 400 years…[But] even the coal-mining sector does not believe it.”
As of 2024, coal contributed just 53.5% of electricity generation in Poland, with wind and solar making up 23.5%, gas power 12.1% and other renewables another 6.3%.
The “death spiral” for coal power is due to the high cost of coal mining in Poland, the old age of coal power plants, pressure from climate policies such as the EU emissions trading system (EUETS) and a loss of market share to renewables, said Maćkowiak-Pandera:
“You can be pro-coal, but you will not change the economics, physics, geology and the reality of the financial market.”
Until 2023, the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) had held the reins of government, having won the 2015 election after promising to protect the coal industry.
Following power cuts that summer, however, PiS increasingly accepted that renewbles – particularly solar power – could support energy security, explained Maćkowiak-Pandera.
(Renewables enjoy broad public support and are associated with energy security, she said.)
With backing from government policy, Poland’s solar capacity leapt from just 200 megawatts in 2015 to more than 20 gigawatts in 2024 – a 100-fold increase.
Still, PiS strongly resisted calls to phase out coal. In 2020, it struck a deal with unions to subsidise the Polish coal-mining industry until 2049. The subsidies remain in place.
After winning parliamentary elections in 2023, Tusk promised a “much faster energy transition” based on renewables and nuclear power, said Maćkowiak-Pandera.
While utility firms would “really love” to phase out coal plants within as little as three to five years, there is a growing consensus around 2035 as a more achievable end date, she said:
“It’s really not controversial any more…I speak with politicians, with utilities, with [electricity] transmission system operators, even with miners. Everybody is aware of the situation.”
Instead, there is a practical conversation around how best to replace coal at the lowest cost, explained Maćkowiak-Pandera.
This will mean more renewables, but also the flexible capacity needed to manage the grid – including some new gas-fired power plants – as well as energy storage and market reforms, she said.
Poland’s rapid transition may not have made many headlines, but other major coal-burning countries are starting to pay attention.
Maćkowiak-Pandera has welcomed delegations from China, South Africa, Mexico and Brazil, eager to learn about Poland’s experience. She added:
“For Chinese partners, it’s interesting because they like [our] pragmatic approach…they like that Poland [is] sometimes not mentioning climate, [but] is doing it anyhow.”
CHINESE CROWING: A widely shared blog post on nationalist media outlet Guancha said China was taking climate action to “win the future energy revolution” and, among other things, to “save at least $600bn” on imported oil by shifting to EVs.
‘RUNNING BLIND’: For the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, climate scientist Peter Gleick said the Trump administration’s “purges” of climate research were “threats to national security”.
‘REALISM’ REJECTED: The Wicked Problems podcast discussed the “defeatism” behind a recent initiative calling for “climate realism”, as well as the “abundance agenda”.
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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In 2020, BII committed to “aligning” its “future” investments with the Paris Agreement and since then it has doubled its renewable-energy funding.
But, as of 2023, the last year for which data is available, it also still had a large portfolio of gas-fired power plants across Africa and south Asia.
Multiple freedom of information (FOI) requests by Carbon Brief reveal fossil-fuel energy and related projects worth nearly $700m (£526m) on BII’s books, which represents about 6% of its assets in 2023.
The FOI results also show that, at the end of last year, BII still had $70m (£53m) of unspent funds earmarked for foreign fossil-fuel companies in the coming years.
BII has not breached its own investment guidelines and says its fossil-fuel exposure fell further in 2024 as it aims to “manage and responsibly exit” these assets.
However, MPs and campaigners have criticised BII’s legacy fossil-fuel investments for “conflicting” with UK climate goals and diverting increasingly scarce aid resources.
BII is the UK’s development finance institution (DFI), a publicly owned, for-profit company that invests in businesses in developing countries.
These investments are meant to promote economic development, especially via projects – including new energy infrastructure – deemed “too risky” for private investors.
BII largely supports itself using financial returns from its existing portfolio, which was worth approximately £7.3bn ($9.2bn) in 2023.
However, the UK government has also provided BII with billions of pounds from its aid budget. This support has grown even amid massive cuts to UK aid, with BII receiving an extra £400m last year due to reduced government spending on housing asylum seekers.
The government has also been leaning more on BII to reach its international climate finance goals.
Despite being wholly owned – and partly funded – by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), BII has an “arm’s length” relationship with the UK government and makes its own investment decisions.
In 2020, the previous Conservative government committed the UK to ending new overseas fossil-fuel funding beyond March 2021.
This came after BII – then known as CDC Group – had pledged in its 2020 climate strategy that it would not make any new investments that were “misaligned with the Paris Agreement”, based on a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures framework.
Then-chief executive Nick O’Donohoe stated that the climate strategy would “shape every single investment decision we make moving forward”.
This was hailed as an end to fossil-fuel financing by the institution, despite some remaining “loopholes”. Notably, its fossil-fuel policy allowed for new investments in gas projects if they were deemed “consistent with a country’s pathway to net-zero by 2050”.
Since making its pledge, BII has repeatedly come under fire from MPs and campaigners for continuing to hold “active investments” in fossil-fuel companies.
BII says that its fossil-fuel portfolio, which mainly consists of gas-fired power plants in “power-constrained” African nations, “has been on a steady downward trajectory since 2020”.
However, the company has not released data on the value of its fossil-fuel assets since 2021, citing “commercial sensitivities”.
In September 2024, Carbon Brief filed an FOI request with BII to obtain data on the company’s fossil-fuel and renewable-energy investments, as well as their asset value.
Following more than six months of back-and-forth – including Carbon Brief requesting an internal review of its FOI request – the company provided much of the information that was originally requested at the end of March 2025.
This included annual data on projects that BII has already committed to support, such as the Sirajganj 4 gas plant in Bangladesh and the Amandi Energy gas plant in Ghana.
As the chart below shows, BII’s cumulative commitments to fossil-fuel companies have remained roughly the same since its climate strategy in 2020. This is in line with its pledge to provide no “new commitments” to most fossil-fuel projects.
One exception is an extra $20m (£15m) in 2021 for Globeleq, a company controlled by BII that primarily supports gas power in Africa. An investment in a Mozambique gas project that year by Globeleq was deemed “Paris-aligned” and, therefore, allowed under BII’s rules.
Meanwhile, BII’s total commitments to renewable energy projects have more than doubled, from $894m (£672m) to $2.1bn (£1.6bn), between 2020 and 2024.
Once funds have been “committed”, they can remain “undrawn” for many years. This means that money committed before 2020 can still be distributed without breaching BII’s pledge. Carbon Brief asked BII how much of these “commitments” remained undrawn each year.
This revealed that BII has continued sending money to fossil-fuel projects since its 2020 pledge, disbursing around $57m (£43m) over this period. At the end of 2024, there was still $67m (£50m) of “undrawn” fossil-fuel finance waiting to be spent.
BII tells Carbon Brief that, as “commitments” are legal contracts, it is obliged to provide these funds as and when they are required.
Beyond “direct” investments in energy projects, BII has also made “indirect” commitments to fossil fuels via private financial institutions. The company tells Carbon Brief it does not have details of how much these third-party funds invest in fossil-fuel projects.
Daniel Willis, finance campaign manager at the NGO Recourse, points to examples such as Gigajoule and Ademat, companies that have received new finance injections for fossil-fuel projects beyond the 2020 date, on BII’s behalf. (Again, this is allowed under BII’s guidelines.)
Willis tells Carbon Brief that these investments and the continued payments from existing commitments “clearly go against the spirit of the UK government’s fossil fuel policy”.
BII initially rejected Carbon Brief’s request for the “net asset value” of every fossil-fuel investment in its portfolio. It argued that disclosure could weaken its commercial position.
However, the company eventually agreed to disclose the aggregate value of its fossil-fuel assets for the period 2020-2023.
The data reveals that, as of 2023, BII still owned $591m (£444m) worth of gas-fired power plants and other fossil-fuel energy assets, rising to $676m (£508m) when indirect assets are included. This amounts to around 6% of BII’s assets.
While BII declined to provide Carbon Brief with the 2024 figures, a company spokesperson tells Carbon Brief that they plan to release them “this summer”, adding:
“Our 2024 annual report and accounts…will show that our exposure to fossil-fuels assets has fallen 39% since 2020 and now makes up just 6% of our total portfolio. Over the same period, the value of our climate-finance portfolio has increased by 122% to $2.5bn [£1.9bn] and now accounts for 26% of our total portfolio.”
As the chart below shows, there has already been a gradual drop in the value of BII’s direct fossil-fuel energy investments since 2020. The decline can likely be attributed to investees paying off debts to BII, fossil-fuel assets losing value and – to some extent – BII exiting smaller investments.
With evidence that BII’s fossil-fuel portfolio is declining in value, Sandra Martinsone, policy manager at the international development network Bond, tells Carbon Brief that “sooner or later” these will likely become stranded assets:
“The longer BII holds on to these fossil-fuel investments, the higher the risk of losing the invested aid pounds.”
The drop in the value of BII’s indirect fossil-fuel and “other carbon-related” assets – which includes non-energy companies that serve fossil-fuel companies – has been sharper. This can be largely attributed to BII ending support for fossil-fuel trade and supply chains in 2022.
In its FOI response, BII says that it “seeks to manage and responsibly exit fossil-fuel assets”. However, NGOs and politicians have raised concerns about the pace of change.
Natalie Jones, a policy advisor specialising in fossil-fuel phaseout at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), tells Carbon Brief that while BII has not breached its own climate guidelines:
“The fact that fossil fuel investments remain on BII’s books is not a good look for the organisation, bearing in mind its 2020 commitment to aligning its activities and investments with the Paris Agreement and the UK’s 2021 policy to end all international public support for fossil fuels.”
Civil-society groups have repeatedly called for BII to set a timeline for divesting from fossil fuels. They have even argued that, in the context of “drastic” UK aid cuts, BII should not receive more aid funding and instead reinvest funds from some of its existing assets.
Criticism of BII’s approach to fossil fuels is captured in a 2023 report by the International Development Committee of MPs. It refers to BII legacy investments “conflicting” with UK policies, including the alignment of all aid with the Paris Agreement.
The report also notes that there “does not appear to be a definitive path for BII exiting those fossil-fuel investments or transitioning its existing investment portfolio to green energy”.
Committee chair and Labour MP, Sarah Champion, says that, while the most recent data is not yet publicly available, the figures released to Carbon Brief point to a “worrying trajectory” in BII’s fossil-fuel investments. She tells Carbon Brief:
“It appears that BII has stayed on this worrying trajectory. This must change: as the government proposes a new strategic direction for UK aid spending, focusing on poverty reduction and genuinely responsible investment must be BII’s number one priority.”
In a statement alongside its FOI response, BII says that “forced divestment increases the likelihood that buyers of such assets would be less responsible owners, thereby increasing the future risk of negative climate impact”.
It also says that “being viewed as a forced seller” could reduce the value BII could obtain from those assets. This position was supported by the previous Conservative government.
Jones tells Carbon Brief that concerns about the responsibility of new owners are legitimate:
“However, it would be great to see from BII a plan to responsibly exit or, even better, decommission their fossil fuel assets. There is a case to be made for a responsible exit that would free up funds for much-needed climate finance.”
BII argues that, with around 600 million Africans still lacking access to electricity, gas power remains “essential” for providing “baseload” power to many nations on the continent.
This position has been supported by a number of African governments. However, many civil-society groups, both in Africa and around the world, argue that developed countries should focus financial resources on expanding clean power capacity in developing countries.
Nick Dearden, director of Global Justice Now, which has previously questioned the legality of the BII-controlled Globeleq supporting gas power in Africa, tells Carbon Brief it is “inappropriate” for aid money to be spent this way:
“It’s also trapping the countries that are building this stuff into a type of energy which is on its way out.”
Dieback would see large numbers of trees die, shifting the lush rainforest into a dry savannah.
The research, published in Nature Climate Change, assesses the impact of “overshooting” the aspirational goal of the Paris Agreement on the Amazon and Siberian forests.
Overshoot would see warming surpass 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in the coming decades, before being brought back down before 2100 through large-scale carbon dioxide removal.
Using hundreds of climate-model simulations, the authors assess the influence of the “sensitivity” of the climate – a measure of the planet’s temperature response to a given increase in atmospheric CO2.
Across all simulations where global warming in 2100 surpasses 1.5C, 37% show “some amount of dieback”, the study says.
However, the risk increases further in the long term, with “55% of simulations exhibiting dieback by 2300”.
One author tells Carbon Brief that the study highlights that overshooting 1.5C leaves forest ecosystems “exposed to more risk than [they] need to be”.
The findings show that “we can’t afford complacency”, he warns.
As the planet warms, there is an increasing risk that parts of the Earth system will cross “tipping points” – critical thresholds that, if exceeded, could push a system into an entirely new state.
For example, a seminal 2022 study warned that five tipping elements – including the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet and abrupt permafrost thaw – are already within reach, while others are becoming increasingly more likely as temperatures rise.
One way to limit warming to 1.5C by the end of the century involves initially overshooting the threshold. However, research published last year warns that the longer the 1.5C threshold is breached – and the higher the peak temperature – the greater the risk of crossing tipping points.
The new study uses modelling to investigate the risks of overshoot for the Amazon and Siberian forests.
The paper considers three illustrative mitigation pathways taken from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) mitigation report from its sixth assessment cycle, which was published in 2022.
Gregory Munday is an applied scientist at the UK Met Office Hadley Centre and lead author on the study. He tells Carbon brief that the authors selected “optimistic” pathways that “each have different relationships to the Paris Agreement goals”.
For each scenario, the authors assess a range of different climate sensitivities – a measure of the planet’s temperature response to a given increase in atmospheric CO2. The average outcome of each pathway is:
The authors run the emissions pathways through a simple climate “emulator” model, which calculates the global temperatures associated with each emission pathway.
The charts below show cumulative CO2 emissions (left), atmospheric CO2 concentration (middle) and changes in global average surface temperature compared to the pre-industrial level (right), for the renewables (green), negative emissions (purple) and gradual strengthening (yellow) pathways until the year 2300.
The authors then use a different modelling framework to project the impacts of each emissions scenario.
Study author Dr Chris Jones leads the UK Met Office Hadley Centre’s research into vegetation and carbon cycle modelling and their interactions with climate. He tells Carbon Brief that the new study is the first application of this modelling framework, which he describes as a “rapid response tool”.
He says the tool was developed to “rapidly look at a range of climate outcomes, both global and local, for new scenarios”, adding that it provides a “pretty good approximation” of what traditional global climate models would do.
Munday adds that the framework is able to produce results within days or weeks, rather than taking “months and months”.
Finally, the authors use land surface model JULES to assess forest health under the different scenarios. Overall, the authors produce 918 simulations each of Amazon and Siberian forest health.
The authors assess forest health using two metrics. The first is the forest growth metric “net primary productivity”, a measure of the rate that energy is stored as biomass by plants, which can indicate forest productivity. The second metric, forest cover, is a way of measuring the forest’s long-term response.
The models show that rising CO2 levels causes net primary productivity to increase, due to the CO2 fertilisation effect, driving more rapid forest growth. Conversely, many of the impacts of climate change, such as increased heat and changes to rainfall patterns, can be detrimental to forests, damaging or killing trees.
To identify the impacts of overshooting 1.5C on the Amazon and Siberian forests, the authors compare the “renewables” and “negative emissions” pathways. Both of these scenarios reach a similar global average temperature by the year 2100, but the former does so without overshoot, while the latter overshoots 1.5C before temperatures come back down.
The maps below show the difference in net primary productivity in the Amazon (left) and Siberian forests (right) between the two scenarios in the year 2100. Brown shading indicates that net primary productivity was higher in the non-overshoot scenario, while blue indicates that it was higher in the overshoot scenario.
The maps show that “large areas of both Amazonian and Siberian forest show reduced net primary productivity” by 2100 due to overshoot, compared to a scenario with no overshoot, the paper says.
From the three pathways, the authors generate 918 simulations of future climate and corresponding Amazon forest health.
The authors use these results to identify which future temperature and rainfall conditions result in net forest “dieback”. This is when large numbers of trees die, shifting the rainforest into a dry savannah.
The plots below show which simulations result in Amazon dieback by the year 2100 (left) and 2300 (right), for different amounts of rainfall and temperature levels in the year 2100. Each graph is divided into four sections – hot and wet (top right), hot and dry (bottom right), cold and wet (top right) and cold and dry (bottom right). These sections are based on average regional temperature and rainfall in the year 2100.
Coloured dots indicate scenarios that see forest dieback. These are coloured by pathway, for renewables (green), negative emissions (purple) and gradual strengthening (yellow). Grey dots indicate scenarios without Amazon dieback. The red lines indicate “high-risk climatic zones”, above which there is “a significant risk of dieback”.
The study finds that most Amazon dieback scenarios happen in hot, dry conditions, the authors note.
Across all simulations where warming in 2100 is above 1.5C, 37% show “some amount of dieback” the study says. However, in these model runs, the risk increases further in the long term, the study notes, with “55% of simulations exhibiting dieback by 2300”.
Prof Nico Wunderling is a professor of computational Earth system science at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and was not involved in the new research. He tells Carbon Brief it is significant that, according to this study, the Amazon will face impacts from climate change below the tipping point threshold of 2-6C, as assessed in the landmark 2022 tipping points paper.
The authors also carry out this analysis for Siberian forests. Instead of a drop in tree cover, they find a change in the composition of trees. Munday tells Carbon Brief that the vegetation shifts “from grassy surface types to lots more trees and shrubs” in a process called “woody encroachment”.
Woody encroachment can have significant negative impacts on terrestrial carbon sequestration, the hydrological cycle and local biodiversity.
“The Siberian forest is probably committed to a long-term, and possibly substantial, expansion of tree cover,” the authors write.
The greatest uncertainty in this study comes from the spread of climate sensitivities, Munday tells Carbon Brief.
He elaborates:
“This means that although we simulate the impacts from extremely optimistic mitigation scenarios, there is a chance that the Earth’s climate sensitivity is much higher than we expect, and so, small but significant risks of short- and long-term forest ecosystem impacts exist in spite of the choice of these strong-mitigation scenarios.”
In other words, if climate sensitivity is higher than expected, forests could face harmful impacts even under low emissions scenarios.
Dr David McKay – a lecturer in geography, climate change and society at the University of Sussex – is the lead author of the 2022 study. He tells Carbon Brief that the new paper “shows the value in focusing not just on model averages, but also exploring a wide range of possible futures to capture potential ‘low probability, high impact’ outcomes”. He adds:
“[The study shows] how negative emissions to reduce warming might help restabilise these forests in future if we do overshoot 1.5C, but as such large-scale CO2 removal remains hypothetical, we shouldn’t assume we can rely on this in practice.”
However, McKay also notes some uncertainties in the models used. Mckay tells Carbon Brief that the vegetation model used in this study doesn’t include fire and “has some limitations around soil moisture stress and vegetation in the tundra”. These are “likely important for resolving potential tipping points in these biomes”.
Therefore, he adds, the study “doesn’t show how regional tipping points could potentially further amplify and lock-in these future forest shifts, even with negative emissions”.
Dr David Lapola is researcher at the University of Campinas in Brazil and was not involved in the study. He also warns that vegetation models provide a “poor representation of how CO2 may affect these forests directly”. Lapola argues that scientists must “collect field data to make any new advancement with models”.
Nevertheless, Lapola tells Carbon Brief that studies such as this will be “extremely useful” for the IPCC’s upcoming seventh assessment cycle, which will include a dedicated chapter on tipping points and other “low-likelihood high impact events” for the first time.
Study author Jones tells Carbon Brief that overshooting 1.5C leaves forest ecosystems “exposed to more risk than [they] need to be”. The findings show that “we can’t afford complacency”, he warns.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
STRUCTURAL DECLINE: China’s clean power generation growth has, for the “first time”, been the driver of a fall in the nation’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions levels, new analysis for Carbon Brief found. CO2 emissions were down 1.6% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025 and have fallen 1% over the last 12 months, it added, driven by decreasing power sector emissions – all despite rapid electricity demand growth. This could mark a “potentially significant turning point” in China’s emissions trajectory, the analysis said.
BOOMING INDUSTRIES: China’s clean-energy sectors have been “developing rapidly”, China’s tax bureau said, with the sectors’ sales revenue growing 13.6% year-on-year – “11.5 percentage points higher than the national average”, according to industry news outlet China Energy News. Analysis by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies noted “production of the ‘three new’ industries was strong” in the first quarter of 2025. More than 3m workers were employed in the “ecological and environmental protection sector” in China in 2024, Chinese financial news outlet Yicai said. Meanwhile, Chinese finance news outlet Caixin reported on Shandong and Guangdong becoming the first two provinces in China to issue “market-based pricing rules for wind and solar power”, in a policy push that is expected to create short-term uncertainty for clean-energy industries.
COAL ASSETS: China’s fossil fuel sector emitted “nearly 25m tonnes of methane” in 2024 – the vast majority of which came from coal mines, including abandoned mines, a new report by the International Energy Agency said. It added that fossil-fuel methane emissions in China are set to fall by nearly 15% by 2030 and by around 30% by 2035. Elsewhere, carbon offsetting company Verra has developed a new methodology that could “channel more private capital toward the early phase out of coal-fired power plants” in Asia, Bloomberg said. However, Yan Qin, principal analyst at ClearBlue Markets, told Carbon Brief that Chinese stakeholders are “unlikely” to use the credits as they are not recognised in China’s voluntary carbon market. The state-run newspaper China Daily reported that China developed a “deep-sea vault” for greenhouse gases in the South China Sea, designed to store 1.5m tonnes of CO2 annually.
DROUGHT: Severe drought has hit several provinces across China, including Henan, Jiangsu and Shaanxi, with high temperatures and low rainfall “affecting local farming and water resources”, Yicai reported. Bloomberg noted that the “hot and dry weather is threatening wheat production, potentially disrupting output”. One trading firm has trimmed its forecast of China’s wheat production for 2025, Reuters reported. Upcoming summer monsoonal rains, known as meiyu (梅雨), “could help ease concerns over crop development”, Bloomberg said, although it added that global warming appeared to be driving “wild swings” in rainfall patterns during the season.
PESTS: A new study from Peking University, covered by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP), found that migratory pests from southeast Asia are “partially driving rice yield losses in southern China”. The researchers added that “continued global warming” will likely increase how often issues with crop pests arise, “posing a major obstacle to stabilising food production”. China has released a plan for disaster prevention during 2025’s flood season in order to ensure a “bumper harvest”, which includes measures to prevent damage from floods, drought, heat, typhoons and pests, the state-run newspaper China Daily said.
POLLEN: Meanwhile, Beijing’s forestation drive has led to a rise in cases of hay fever, Bloomberg reported, noting that trees commonly used in the programme, such as “willows and poplar trees”, have high pollen output. It added that, according to environmental experts, China “didn’t have a better choice of plants when it started the forestation campaign” – quoting one saying that the country’s goal was to “get green first, and then to consider other things”.
RENEWABLES TO AFRICA: New research by UK-based thinktank ODI Global has found that solar and wind power projects accounted for 59% of China’s energy investments in Africa in 2024, SCMP said. South African policymakers travelled to China to discuss “large-scale renewable energy”, “clean coal” and “grid management” with Chinese counterparts and industry representatives, according to the Communist party-affiliated newspaper People’s Daily. Elsewhere, Nigeria “recently floated, and then quickly walked back, a proposed ban on imported solar panels” as the country tries to develop its own local solar industry, the China Global South Project reported.
MONEY TO CELAC: Meanwhile, representatives of Latin American and Caribbean countries travelled to Beijing for a forum hosted by China, in which President Xi Jinping pledged to provide “66bn yuan ($9bn) in credit” and expand cooperation in “clean energy” with the region, SCMP reported. The “Beijing declaration” issued after the forum emphasised the need for “all parties to consider acceding to international instruments on climate change…and avoiding the creation of new trade barriers”.
LULA TO CHINA: Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was also in China on a state visit, the New York Times said, noting that Lula was seeking “gains in new technologies, including…green energy”. His visit culminated in Chinese companies announcing $5bn in investments in Brazil, Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paulo reported, including in “sustainable aviation fuel”, “electric and hybrid cars” and other energy-related projects. A joint statement issued by the two countries stated that they will “deepen cooperation” on the energy transition and stated China will “send a high-level delegation” to COP30.
XI TO RUSSIA: Earlier, Xi made a state visit to Russia, during which Chinese and Russian policymakers discussed “Chinese companies’ involvement in Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects”, Reuters reported. A joint statement, published by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pledged to implement projects “in the fields of oil, gas, LNG, civilian nuclear energy, coal, electricity [and] renewable energy”. State broadcaster CGTN called the China-Russia east-route gas pipeline, which began operating last December, a “landmark” in energy cooperation “benefiting about 450m people along its route”. Oleg Deripaska, chairman of the ecological committee of the China-Russia Friendship Committee for Peace and Development, told the People’s Daily: “Russia can learn from China’s experience of supply-side structural reforms to promote the creation of a mature green energy market.”
China currently has 161m tonnes (Mt) per year of electric arc furnace (EAF) steelmaking capacity and is building another 55Mt, according to a new data analysis tool developed by energy thinktank Global Energy Monitor. However, it noted, China “exhibits substantial gaps in data availability”, with feedstock information available for less than 8% of its EAF capacity.
A new survey of Shanxi residents, exploring attitudes to climate change and “just transition”, offers a rare insight into the views of Chinese people on the frontline of the energy transition in the country’s largest coal-producing province.
In this issue, Carbon Brief interviews Tom Wang, one of the organisers of the survey, about its key findings. Wang is executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, a climate advocacy group.
This interview was edited for length and clarity. A full version is available on Carbon Brief’s website.
Carbon Brief: Why did you want to conduct this survey?
Tom Wang: I’m from Shanxi province. I grew up thinking that coal was a necessary part of life. But I also lost quite a lot of people in my family to coal-mine accidents or air pollution.
Shanxi province is the world’s largest coal producer. [Note: The province’s coal output reached 1.3bn tonnes in 2024.] We contribute around one-third of [China’s] coal. Millions of people rely on coal-related jobs.
[But China’s climate policies mean] Shanxi cannot depend on the coal economy. Shanxi province’s own policies have also covered the energy transition. These policies [are not] being translated into something more tangible to people’s lives. People are not prepared.
That is why we wanted to do this survey. We ask two simple questions: do you know about and support the energy transition – and are you prepared?
CB: What do people in Shanxi think about the energy transition, climate change and climate policy?
TW: When it comes to climate change, awareness levels are very different between different demographic groups. For example, government workers and people with higher income or education levels know about climate change.
Some could identify things happening around them, such as warmer temperatures every year, longer drought periods and not having any snow last winter. Some even mentioned extreme weather, including heatwaves and a week-long rainstorm that ruined a lot of Shanxi’s ancient temples.
However, the most vulnerable communities, by which I basically mean the coal community, don’t really know about climate change. They know about [climate] buzzwords, but they don’t really understand them.
CB: Why is that?
TW: Most state-owned media talk a lot about climate change. However, they do not explain what that means for people’s everyday lives.
When we explain the energy transition means we are going to use less coal, they can understand…and feel the impact on their lives quite sharply.
CB: The survey also asked people what they would like to see prioritised in a just transition away from coal. What did respondents say was important to them?
TW: We all know JET-P, the Just Energy Transition Partnership. However, in Shanxi province, what we really need is the JET-B, a Just Energy Transition Brotherhood.
Rich provinces in China relied heavily on Shanxi’s coal to develop their economies. [The JET-B calls on them to] support Shanxi with its energy transition. Many [respondents] agreed with this!
Also, the people of Shanxi are actually willing to change or improve their own skill-sets. They know how dangerous it is to work in the coal industry. There is a high awareness of the lack of a future for the coal industry among respondents. People are quite happy to move on, if they are provided with good training and strong support to help that transition go smoothly.
CB: According to the survey, just over a quarter of Shanxi’s young people felt they did not have the skills they needed for a clean-energy economy. Around half were worried about the closure of coal mines and coal-power plants. What can be done to address their concerns?
TW: In Shanxi province we have universities that are dedicated to the coal industry. We have spent so much energy and resources on preparing our young people for the coal industry, instead of preparing them for the transition away from coal.
Young people don’t know how to prepare for the energy transition. And then there’s the current job market. Shanxi’s economy is so weak – in 2024, our province had the lowest economic growth rate in China.
Shanxi is not very good at setting up new industries. We have all of this potential but we are not really translating it into jobs. That’s why the young generation doesn’t feel confident.
CB: What lessons should be taken away from the survey?
TW: We need to prepare…the coal community and the young generation today. We cannot afford to wait any longer. We need to tangibly start to train people and raise new sectors.
Communications are also critical. We need to inspire people. Young people and the coal community are feeling lost.
We need to highlight that all these [possibilities] are out there. That’s what I would like our policymakers, investors and NGOs to tell people. And richer provinces should step up and say: “Now it’s time for us to help you.”
CLIMATE SCIENCE: The Science and Technology Daily interviewed Prof Liu Congqiang, founding dean of the School of Geosystem Science of Tianjin University, on how the earth systems discipline emerged in China and how it contributes to researching climate change.
NEW STRATEGIES: The Diplomat examined how ambitious climate diplomacy can be sustained without high-level climate cooperation between the US and China.
CLIMATE LEADER: Global Solutions published an article by Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of the influential thinktank Center for China and Globalization, on how China can “leverage” its energy transition successes to advance “global climate mitigation”.
ELECTROSTATE: The Financial Times explored how China’s growing electrification helps it overcome a number of geopolitical, security and supply chain “vulnerabilit[ies]”.
Nature Food
China’s agricultural machinery emissions have increased nearly sevenfold since 1985, new research has shown, adding that if they continue to grow they could “hinder” the country’s ability to reach its carbon-neutrality targets. The study, covered by Carbon Brief, used data from the China “statistical yearbook” to calculate the emissions of four types of farm equipment. Prof Zhangcai Qin, a professor at Sun Yat-sen University who was not involved in the new study, told Carbon Brief that disaggregating the emissions of agricultural machinery from food systems more broadly “allow[s] policymakers to design targeted interventions without compromising agricultural productivity”.
Communications Earth & Environment
A new study found that China’s “young natural forests” currently store more above-ground carbon than comparable “young planted forests” – mainly due to differences in tree density. The authors mapped the “aboveground carbon accumulation rates” for China’s young “natural” and “planted” forests in 2020. They found that planted forests sequester carbon more quickly than natural forests. However, they projected that by 2060, natural forests will still hold more above-ground carbon than planted forests.
A new study used machine learning to calculate a possible carbon emissions trajectory for China through to 2030. It mapped China’s carbon
China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
“Solar geoengineering” refers to methods that aim to address some of the impacts of a warming climate by reflecting away more sunlight from the Earth.
The programme, spearheaded by the Advanced Research and Invention Agency (Aria), will fund 21 projects globally.
This includes small-scale outdoor experiments, involving attempts to thicken Arctic sea ice and brighten clouds above Australia’s Great Barrier Reef to reflect away sunlight.
The news was reported breathlessly by the UK media, with some outlets conjuring images of the government one day “dimming the sun” or trying to modify the weather and others focusing on the “secretive” nature of Aria and its research.
The reaction was even more exaggerated on social media, where anonymous accounts seized upon the news to spread misinformation about existing “secret” government schemes to “control” the weather.
At the same time, the programme – first reported last year – has sparked legitimate debate among climate scientists, who have long held diverging views on whether more research funding should be channelled into solar geoengineering.
Below, Carbon Brief explains what the new solar geoengineering research programme consists of and explores the social and ethical concerns surrounding the technology.
Solar geoengineering is a term used to describe a group of hypothetical technologies that could, in theory, counteract temperature rise by reflecting more sunlight away from the Earth’s surface. (It is also sometimes called “solar radiation modification”.)
The most commonly proposed idea is to introduce reflective aerosols high up into the stratosphere, which would lower global temperatures in a similar way to a volcanic eruption.
Other ideas include deliberately modifying clouds to make them more reflective or sending giant mirrors into space.
The proposals may sound futuristic, but the notion of engineering the climate in order to limit sunlight has been debated by scientists and politicians for more than 50 years.
However, these debates have always proved controversial, meaning – apart from studies based on computer simulations – little field research into solar geoengineering has been carried out. (See: How does this compare to past solar geoengineering efforts in the UK and globally?)
Aria’s new research programme aims to invest £57m in 21 solar geoengineering research projects globally.
This – along with a separate £10m scheme from the UK Research and Innovation body – means the UK is now one of the world’s biggest funders of solar geoengineering research.
Announcing the details of the scheme, Aria said its motivation for launching the research programme was “the possibility of encountering damaging climate tipping points”.
Out of the £57m, around £24.5m ($33m) will be spent on “controlled, small-scale outdoor experiments”, according to Aria.
These include attempts to thicken Arctic sea ice, brighten clouds above Australia’s Great Barrier Reef and to float weather balloons containing natural minerals high in the stratosphere, which will be retrieved after “hours or weeks”.
All outdoor experiments will be “scrutinised” by an oversight committee chaired by Prof Piers Forster, a leading climate scientist who is the founding director of the Priestley Centre for Climate Futures at the University of Leeds.
In a note released alongside news of the research funding, the oversight committee said it does “not exist to legitimise this programme”, adding:
“We advise Aria on the risks and benefits of supporting proposed creator projects and how best to work with and across creator teams to support learning and to help ensure that findings are contextualised and communicated appropriately alongside [climate] mitigation and adaptation options.”
Aria is a “high-risk, high-reward” government research agency that was formally established through an act of parliament in 2023.
It was originally conceptualised by Dominic Cummings, a controversial former adviser of then prime minister Boris Johnson.
According to Nature, Aria was modelled on the “famed US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, which helped to pioneer some of the world’s most consequential technologies, including the internet and personal computers”.
In its recent coverage, the Daily Telegraph described Aria as a “secretive government unit”.
Aria itself has said that it aims to be fully transparent about its solar geoengineering programme, which was its motivation for publicly announcing its spending on the 21 projects involved.
As mentioned above, the idea of solar geoengineering has been debated for more than 50 years. However, its controversial nature has meant that, until now, very few field experiments have been carried out.
In 2010, there was an attempt to carry out field research in the UK by the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project, which was headed by Dr Matthew Watson at the University of Bristol and involved scientists from the University of Oxford, the University of Cambridge and the University of Edinburgh.
The project aimed to “investigate the effectiveness” of solar geoengineering, in part by releasing the equivalent of a bathtub of water high into the atmosphere above Norfolk.
However, it was met with fierce opposition by some campaign groups. In 2012, the team ended the project, citing issues with intellectual property and discomfort with the current lack of regulation and governance of solar geoengineering research.
(Watson is one of the recipients of Aria’s new research programme. His team has been awarded £4.3m ($5.7m) to build specialised drones to study emissions from regularly erupting volcanoes in Guatemala, Montserrat and Chile.)
Outside of the UK, another high-profile solar geoengineering experiment headed by researchers at Harvard University, called the Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (Scopex), was also forced to disband following public disapproval.
In the private sector, a US start-up called Make Sunsets has begun releasing high-altitude balloons containing sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere, in an attempt to geoengineer the planet. It funds its activities by selling “cooling credits”.
The company has been banned in Mexico, where it previously launched balloons, and is currently being investigated by the US Environmental Protection Agency.
According to the online publication SRM360, funding for solar geoengineering has increased from $34.9m in 2010-14 to $112.1m in 2020-24. The vast majority of funding is concentrated in global-north countries and about half of all funding comes from philanthropic sources.
This week, scientists and policymakers are meeting in Cape Town, South Africa for the largest summit to date on the scientific, social and political implications of solar geoengineering.
Countries have agreed to a de facto moratorium on large-scale solar geoengineering under the Convention on Biological Diversity, a UN treaty that aims to protect biodiversity. (However, it is not legally binding.)
Scientists agree that cutting global greenhouse emissions as soon as possible is key to tackling climate change.
But global emissions are still rising – and the prospect of limiting global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, the ambition of the landmark Paris Agreement, without first “overshooting” the target is fast vanishing.
This has led some scientists to call for more research into solar geoengineering ideas, including through small-scale experiments and trials.
Research based on computer modelling indicates that artificially cooling the planet by releasing reflective aerosols into the stratosphere using specialised planes could be effective at offsetting a range of climate impacts, such as more intense heatwaves and flooding, melting sea ice and higher tropical storm risk.
(One solar geoengineering scientist has estimated that halving global warming with reflective aerosols would involve a specialised fleet of about 100 planes releasing 1m tonnes of sulfuric acid each year by 2070.)
However, this type of solar geoengineering would not address rising CO2 levels, which are causing oceans to become more acidic and crops to become less nutritious, among other issues.
Some scientists have raised concerns that, if aerosols were used to address global warming, the world could be left at risk of a “termination shock”. That is, if aerosols were released and then suddenly stopped – as a result of political disagreement or a terrorist attack, for example – global temperatures could rapidly rebound.
This sharp temperature change could be “catastrophic” for wildlife, modelling studies have suggested. However, other research argues that the likelihood of a termination shock has been “overplayed” and that measures could be put in place to ensure that the risk is minimised.
There is also a risk that deploying aerosols from just one spot on Earth could cause uneven impacts for people. One research paper based on modelling found that releasing aerosols in just the northern hemisphere could lead to a decrease in rainfall – and, therefore, an enhanced drought risk – in India and the African Sahel.
Ultimately, advocates of solar geoengineering research tend to argue that the only way to understand more about the efficacy and risks of the technology is to study it further, whereas opponents say more research could be a “slippery slope” towards deployment.
A new survey of Shanxi residents, exploring attitudes to climate change and the “just transition”, offers a rare insight into the views of Chinese people on the frontline of this policy drive.
While the province has installed significant new clean energy capacity, coal-related industries contributed around 80% of the province’s tax revenues and 55% of its jobs in 2022.
Indeed, Shanxi could lose more than 240,000 coal jobs by 2050 as China’s energy transition continues, according to energy thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM).
In an April 2025 speech, Chinese president Xi Jinping said the energy transition needed to “strike a balance between multiple goals including environmental protection, economic growth, job creation and poverty alleviation”.
So far, however, provincial policies relating to the energy transition have not been translated into “something…tangible to peoples’ lives”, says Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, a climate advocacy group and one of the groups who designed, carried out and helped analyse the results of the recent survey.
The survey asked almost 10,000 people in Shanxi about their views on China’s climate policies, the impacts on their local economy and whether they felt prepared for the energy transition. A detailed methodology can be found at the end of the article.
In this interview, Wang discusses the motivations for carrying out the survey and outlines its key findings.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Carbon Brief: Why did you want to conduct this survey? Why did you want to focus on Shanxi?
Tom Wang: I always say working on coal is my job, but, at the same time, it’s a personal issue for me, because I’m from Shanxi province. I grew up with coal, thinking that it was a necessary part of life. We burned coal for cooking, heating and even festival celebrations. But I also lost quite a lot of people in my family – my cousins and uncles, who were coal miners or working for coal-fired power plants – either because of coal-mine accidents or air pollution.
Shanxi province is the world’s largest coal producer. [Note: The province’s coal output reached 1.3bn tonnes in 2024.]…Every year, whether China’s economy is performing well or badly, we contribute around one-third of its coal. Millions of people and their families rely on coal-related jobs, such as coal miners, coal-truck drivers, coal power plant workers or coal-washing workers. Around you, your cousins, classmates or friends [are working in the coal industry].
Even in my first job as a teacher, part of my pay would come from money made from coal. So it was a big part of my life. That’s why we have to address coal in China, including – or even starting with – Shanxi.
And then there is the bigger context. Internationally, after COP28 and COP29, we talk about a coal phase-down, if not a coal phase-out. Then, domestically, China is working towards its dual-carbon goals – targeting a carbon emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060…This means we have five years to achieve a carbon emission peak and it also means that coal consumption should start to decline next year.
Therefore, Shanxi cannot depend on the coal economy. We have been relying so heavily on coal mining, coal sales and coal exports to other provinces. That income-generating industry is going to disappear very soon…which means millions of people’s jobs and livelihoods will undergo dramatic changes.
For more than a decade, Shanxi province’s own policies have also covered the energy transition. It’s worrisome that these policies have remained [high-level], without being translated into something more tangible to people’s lives.
People are not prepared. Coal miners are not prepared. Their wives are not prepared. The coal-truck drivers are not prepared. The metallurgical coal industry is not prepared. That’s why we wanted to do this survey and interview as many people as possible. We ask two simple questions: do you know about and support the energy transition – and are you prepared?
CB: What do people in Shanxi think about the energy transition, climate change and climate policy?
When it comes to climate change, awareness levels are very different between different demographic groups. For example, government workers and people with higher income or education levels know about climate change.
Some people [in the survey] could identify things happening around them, such as temperatures getting warmer every year, drought periods getting longer, how last winter we didn’t have any snow – and they found these worrisome, based on their own experiences of how the province should be.
Some people even mentioned extreme weather events, including heatwaves and a week-long rainstorm that ruined a lot of Shanxi province’s ancient temples – the most valuable thing that we have.
However, the most vulnerable communities, by which I basically mean the coal community, don’t really know about climate change. They know about the energy transition, they know a little bit about big policies, such as the dual-carbon goals – they say they know about these buzzwords, but they don’t really understand them.
CB: In the survey, people would say they supported the ‘dual-carbon goals’ when asked about them specifically, but then were not as supportive of implementation measures, such as closing coal mines or coal-fired power plants. Why is that?
TW: This is uniquely Chinese, because most state-owned media talk a lot about climate change, peaking carbon emissions, renewable energy, the energy transition and so on. The visibility of all these ‘big words’ is really high.
However, the media does not explain what that means for people’s everyday lives. They are just copy-pasting [readouts of] policies from the State Council into their newspaper. For them, that’s ‘job done’, but it doesn’t really make sense to ordinary people. That’s how Chinese media works.
That is why the survey finds that, although more than 70% of people are aware of words like carbon emissions peak, or that they’re aware of the energy transition, it doesn’t mean they know what these words mean or how to interpret them.
But when we interpret these policies for them and explain that the energy transition means we are going to use less coal, they can understand…and feel the impact on their lives quite sharply.
That’s why there’s such a gap. [People say they] support everything the government does, whether or not they understand what that means. However, when you ask if they support something that would change their life completely – for the better or for the worse – they have to think twice.
CB: The survey also asked people what they would like to see prioritised in a just transition away from coal. What did respondents say was important to them?
TW: Two things stood out to me. First, I often talk about a mechanism called JET-B. We all know JET-P, the Just Energy Transition Partnership. However, in Shanxi province, what we really need is the JET-B, a Just Energy Transition Brotherhood.
The rich provinces in China, which are mostly along the east coastline – for example, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong – relied heavily on Shanxi’s coal in the past decades to develop their economies. [The JET-B calls on them to] support Shanxi with its energy transition.
Many [respondents] agreed with this! They expect other richer provinces to support us, because the whole province knows that we have been providing so much coal to other provinces, instead of using it ourselves.
Also, the people of Shanxi are actually willing to change or improve their own skill-sets. They know how dangerous it is to work in the coal industry, both because of accidents and because of pollution. There is a high awareness of the lack of a future for the coal industry among respondents. People are quite happy to move on, if they are provided with good training and strong support to help that transition go smoothly.
CB: In the report, you chose to pull out the responses from coal sector workers and young people as special focus areas. Why?
TW: Almost a half of [Shanxi’s] population works one way or another in or for the coal industry – they would have been a huge part of the survey whether we focused on them or not. But we did want to find out particularly how the coal community feels, because they will be the community who are most directly and immediately impacted by the energy transition.
Their responses are very important as an indicator to policymakers. They will have to be the very first group of people to be retrained and they should be supported in the transition into a cleaner and healthier future.
Prospects for the young generation are also a huge concern in Shanxi. We are losing many young people to other provinces – like a talent drain. Also, the energy transition and climate change are always about the future generations. I wanted young people to feel ownership over this topic and I wanted to hear about their [feelings towards their] own province. Do they want to stay here? Do they want to leave? What is keeping them here, or what is pushing them away?
These answers are valuable for policymakers because young people are leaving and trying to make a living [in other provinces]. Ironically, historically, we have a reputation of being the “stubborn province” – a community of people who refuse to leave their hometowns, because we are so attached to this place.
I don’t know why this is! I guess [the community feels] we have such a beautiful history, beautiful nature and lovely people. There are many reasons to be proud of being from Shanxi, but we are losing so many young people.
2025 and 2026 will be two critical years for this province. They will be when we make our next five-year plan, the 15th five-year plan, which will cover 2026-2030. This will also be the five years we start to physically see the job losses in the coal mining industry, because of China’s overall climate policies.
At the same time, in late 2024 and early 2025, Shanxi was put into the spotlight for its rich tourism opportunities. I’m not sure how familiar you are with the area?
CB: I have been to Shanxi before – to Datong, Pingyao and a couple of other areas…
TW: …so you saw the beautiful grottos in Datong and the ancient temples? When I was talking about [the week-long] rainstorm in 2021 that damaged our ancient cities and towns, I was talking about Pingyao!
I would feel so guilty if we weren’t able to hand down a beautiful Shanxi province to future generations. That is why the voice of the young generation is so interesting to me.
CB: It struck me how young people in Shanxi responded to the questions. Just over a quarter felt they did not have the skills they needed for a clean-energy economy and around half were worried about the closure of coal mines and coal-power plants. What can be done to address their concerns?
TW: In Shanxi province we have universities that are dedicated to the coal industry. These young people are trained to become engineers, coal miners, metallurgical coal factory technicians or steel factory workers. We have spent so much energy and resources on educating and preparing our young people for the coal industry, instead of preparing them for the transition away from coal.
Young people don’t know how to prepare for the energy transition. And then there’s the current job market. Shanxi’s economy is so weak – in 2024, our province had the lowest economic growth rate in China.
Shanxi is not supposed to have the weakest growth, theoretically speaking – we have both heavy industry and a services industry. But we didn’t do very well last year because coal prices were rising and falling and China was importing a lot of coal from other countries, which meant Shanxi lost market share for coal in 2024.
At the same time, Shanxi is not very good at setting up new industries. For example, China’s AI industry is getting stronger. Shanxi province is full of mountainous regions that could provide natural cooling environments for big data centres.
Data centres require two things: cooling and energy. Shanxi has both: natural cooling and energy, including a lot of renewable energy – curtailment is a big problem for us.
We have all of this potential but we’re not translating it into good, decent, healthy, strong, futuristic, sustainable jobs. That’s why the young generation doesn’t feel confident.
CB: What lessons should be taken away from the survey?
TW: We need to prepare our two communities – the coal community and the young generation – today. We cannot afford to wait any longer. We need to tangibly start to train people and raise new sectors, or at least raise incomes.
Communications are also critical. We, as communicators, know the importance of communications, but policymakers – and sometimes even China’s journalists – do not know that yet. I want to see more opinion leaders or TikTok influencers from my province [talking about Shanxi’s transition away from coal].
Wouldn’t it be beautiful to see a coal miner from Datong [which was once China’s largest coal production and export base] become a tour guide on TikTok and show that he can still make decent money without coal?
We need to inspire people. Young people and the coal community are feeling lost and sad, they don’t know what to do. We need to find the different seeds of possibilities and highlight that all these doors are out there. They might look as if they’re closed, but with a little pushing they will open.
That’s what I would like our policymakers and investors, as well as NGOs – although we don’t have many of them! – to say. And the [richer] provinces should step up and say: “Look, brothers, you have supported our economies and now it’s time for us to help you.” Not necessarily even with money, it could be with technology.
For example, once, I almost cried when I was visiting a museum in another province, because it was so well set-up and curated. As a tourist, I really appreciated its beauty.
The subject the exhibition was focused on was only 300 years old, whereas in Shanxi province so many of our artifacts are more than 500 years old. But we don’t have the investors and technologies, or even the awareness, to make our museums that attractive.
Having artists, professors, historians or curators come from these rich provinces and make our heritage stay here and shine [would be helpful] – it doesn’t have to be financial support that they send! We have this piece of gold but it isn’t shining because our policymakers aren’t doing their jobs and our people aren’t aware of its value.
As a final thought, a speaker at one of our recent conferences was a coal miner who was also a poet. One of his collections was called “Seeking starlight in the coal pit”.
That metaphor reminded me about an English poem I had read. The UK was probably the world’s very first coal-mining country and there’s a lot of poetry and poets that came out of the UK’s coal community as well. And it just so happened that a UK coal-miner poet also wrote a very similar poem. [The poem is titled “The stars are twinkling”.]
It is beautiful that two coal miners from two different centuries, countries and language groups both became poets who wrote about standing in a coal mine and seeing the stars.
Note on the survey methodology: According to the survey report, the findings of the report were primarily sourced from a survey, supplemented by in-depth interviews with 30 individuals representing a range of industries.
The survey was hosted on Credamo, an online survey website, and was open from 17 July 2024 to 18 August 2024. The survey organisers recruited 201 students from universities in Shanxi province as volunteers to promote the survey and gather responses. Volunteers were asked to ensure that at least one of every three responses they gathered was collected in-person.
In total, 9,776 complete responses were gathered. Respondents who responded to control questions incorrectly, or took less than seven minutes to complete the survey, had their responses removed, leaving 6,035 valid responses.
Among the respondents with valid responses, 44% were men, 54% were women, with 2% selecting ‘other’. Respondents were located in 11 towns or cities across Shanxi province: Changzhi (25%), Taiyuan (15%), Linfen (10%), Yuncheng (9%), Datong (7%), Jincheng (7%), Shuozhou (6%), Lüliang (6%), Xinzhou (5%), Jinzhong (5%) and Yangquan (3%). The survey respondents skewed young, with 55% aged 24 years old or younger. 57% of respondents completed a university degree.
The interview was conducted by Anika Patel on 2 April 2025 via Zoom.
]]>The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that China’s emissions were down 1.6% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025 and by 1% in the latest 12 months.
Electricity supply from new wind, solar and nuclear capacity was enough to cut coal-power output even as demand surged, whereas previous falls were due to weak growth.
The analysis, based on official figures and commercial data, shows that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable, or falling, for more than a year.
However, they remain only 1% below the latest peak, implying that any short-term jump could cause China’s CO2 emissions to rise to a new record.
Other key findings include:
If sustained, the drop in power-sector CO2 as a result of clean-energy growth could presage the sort of structural decline in emissions anticipated in previous analysis for Carbon Brief.
The trend of falling power-sector emissions is likely to continue in 2025.
However, the outlook beyond that depends strongly on the clean energy and emissions targets set in China’s next five-year plan, due to be published next year, as well as the economic policy response to the Trump administration’s hostile trade policy.
Over the past decade, China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement have risen by nearly a fifth, but there have been ups and downs along the way.
The shallow decline in 2015 and 2016 was due to a slump that followed a round of stimulus measures, while zero-Covid controls caused a sharper fall in 2022. Overall, however, emissions have continued to increase, pausing only during periods of economic stress.
More recently, there have been signs that China’s CO2 emissions could be close to reaching a peak and plateau, or even a period of structural decline.
The latest data, for the first quarter of 2025, shows that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for more than a year, as shown in the figure below.
However, with emissions remaining just 1% below the recent peak, it remains possible that they could jump once again to a new record high.
Therefore, the future path of China’s CO2 emissions hangs in the balance, depending on trends within each sector of its economy, as well as China’s response to Trump’s tariffs.
These sectoral trends are explored further in the sections below, along with signals on what could be coming next from Chinese policymakers as they consider the country’s international climate pledge for 2035 and the five-year plan for 2026-2030.
The reduction in China’s first-quarter CO2 emissions in 2025 was due to a 5.8% drop in the power sector. While power demand grew by 2.5% overall, there was a 4.7% drop in thermal power generation – mainly coal and gas.
Increases in solar, wind and nuclear power generation, driven by investments in new generating capacity, more than covered the growth in demand. The increase in hydropower, which is more related to seasonal variation, helped push down fossil power generation.
Power-sector emissions fell by more than total generation from fossil fuels, as the share of biomass and gas increased, while average coal power plant efficiency improved.
Specifically, the average amount of coal needed to generate each unit of electricity at coal-fired power plants fell by 0.9% year-on-year.
The first-quarter reduction in CO2 emissions from coal use in the power sector is shown at the bottom of the figure below, below CO2 changes in other sectors.
Outside of the power sector, emissions increased 3.5%, with the largest rises in the use of coal in the metals and chemicals industries.
The coal-to-chemicals industry is undergoing rapid expansion, driven by concerns about dependence on imported oil and gas. During the first quarter of 2025, it was also benefiting from more favourable economics due to lower coal prices and relatively high oil prices.
Crude steel production increased 0.6% year-on-year, metal products output by 6% and non-ferrous metals production by 2%. All of these increases were mainly due to a jump in March. Metals demand was boosted by the bump in exports ahead of the tariffs, but high output has continued well into April.
Real-estate construction “starts” fell by 24% and sales of new properties by 3%, indicating that the demand for cement, steel and glass from the construction sector continues to decline.
In contrast, economic output in vehicle and machinery production increased by 12% and 13%, respectively, signalling increased demand for metals.
Cement production fell by 1.4%, a slower rate of decrease than in previous years, likely due to an earlier start to weather-dependent construction activity thanks to warm weather.
Gas consumption increased by an estimated 6% in the power sector, due to a 14% increase in gas-fired power generation capacity, even as the average utilisation of the plants fell. However, gas consumption fell in other sectors, outweighing the increase for power.
Oil products consumption increased slightly, as shown by the bar at the top in the figure above. Warmer weather meant that weather-dependent construction and agricultural activity rose earlier in the year than usual.
However, structural factors, particularly vehicle electrification and the shift to liquified natural gas (LNG) in the freight sector, point to continued declines in oil demand.
Following the 1.6% decline in the first quarter of 2025, China’s emissions have now been stable or falling for more than a year, starting from the beginning of March 2024.
However, emissions in the 12 months to the end of March 2025 were down only 1% from their recent peak, implying that any short-term jump could lead to a new record high.
After the sharp reduction in the first quarter, emissions from power generation are now down year-on-year for the most recent 12 months.
This has happened four times before over the past four decades – in 2009, 2012, 2015 and 2022. However, the current drop is the first time that the main driver is growth in clean power generation.
The falls in 2009 and 2012 were related to the global financial crisis and the Euro area crisis, while the drop in 2015 was driven by the construction and industrial sector slump that followed the 2008-12 stimulus program.
These economic shocks resulted in the sharp reduction in electricity demand shown in the figure below. The drop in 2022 was a combination of slow power demand growth due to strict “zero-Covid” measures and relatively strong clean-power additions.
Importantly, the growth in clean power generation in the first quarter of 2025 was not only larger than the rise in demand overall, it was also higher than the average increase in demand over the past 15 years, marked by the dashed line in the figure above.
Moreover, hydropower has been stable year-on-year in the past six months, implying that the clean-energy growth has been driven by increases in solar, wind and nuclear power capacity, not year-to-year variation in hydropower output.
Looking beyond electricity generation, all sectors registered a fall in emissions over the most recent four months from December 2024 to March 2025, except for coal-to-chemicals.
In order for China’s emissions overall to peak and then start declining, CO2 cuts in declining sectors will need to outweigh continued growth elsewhere.
For example, process emissions from cement production peaked in 2021 and have declined by 27% since then, as shown in the top left chart in the figure below.
Coal use outside the power and chemicals sectors peaked at the same time as cement, but has been rebounding since then and is now close to previous peak levels.
The China Coal Association expects coal use in the steel and building materials industries to fall, while coal consumption in the chemical industry is projected to continue growing.
Hopes of future growth in demand for coal are pinned on the chemical sector, described as a shift from using coal primarily as a fuel to a role as both a fuel and a raw material.
The association also believes that coal-fired power generation will resume growth – at least in the short term – but it recently revised down its projections for 2025 compared with the outlook at the end of 2024.
The tariff “war” may have affected expectations. One analysis suggests a 0.5 to 1 percentage point reduction in China’s GDP growth rate due to the tariffs could result in a similar reduction in demand for thermal coal – mainly used at power stations.
Oil product consumption has been declining since the post-Covid rebound ended in March 2024, falling 2% from its peak. The long-term trend is expected to be downwards, due to the electrification of transportation, despite rising demand for chemicals and aviation.
Gas use has been falling for a few months, but the trend is likely still increasing.
The table below lists the 12-month periods with the highest emissions for each sector, as well as the reduction since the latest peak in each case.
| Sector | Date of highest emissions | Reduction since peak |
|---|---|---|
| Cement | April 2021 | -28.2% |
| Coal and gas: Power | November 2024 | -1.7% |
| Coal-to-chemicals | March 2025 | Still increasing |
| Coal: Other sectors | April 2021 | -3.0% |
| Gas: Other sectors | December 2024 | -0.8% |
| Oil products | April 2024 | -1.0% |
| Total CO2 | February 2024 | -0.8% |
For all of the sectors other than cement production, it is too early to declare a definitive peak in emissions. Still, there are signs that other sectoral peaks could be past their peak, too.
Indeed, for oil products consumption and steel production, industry projections indicate that the future trend is likely to be falling.
For the power sector, clean-energy additions at or above current levels would likely lead to a structural peak, as clean-energy growth would more than cover electricity demand growth.
Together, these sectors cover more than 80% of China’s total emissions. If all of them enter a structural decline, then total emissions are very likely to do so too.
The economic and emissions outlook for this year and beyond will be affected by the Trump administration’s unprecedented trade tariffs – and China’s counter-measures.
The initial impact was a drop in emissions due to lower factory output in export-oriented coastal provinces and possible knock-on impacts on investment and consumer spending.
Conversely, the temporary easing of tariffs for 90 days will lead to a rush of orders from the US to make up for the short-lived slowdown in trade and to stockpile goods before the relief ends.
China’s reactions to the tariffs focused on counteracting the economic impacts with stimulus.
An anonymous comment piece in People’s Daily, the main Communist party affiliated newspaper, says the country should “strive to make consumption the main driving force and ballast stone of economic growth”, leveraging China’s large domestic market.
(The piece has the byline “People’s Daily commentator”, which implies that it is written by someone with authority.)
The article says that this will involve increasing consumer income, while easing financial and social burdens to boost purchasing power and willingness to consume.
While the temporary easing of tariffs will reduce the urgency of these measures, the US tariff rate on China, at 40%, remains much higher than it was before Trump’s presidency – and China’s leaders will likely want to prepare against the risk of renewed tariff hikes.
The focus will be creating domestic markets for the products China exports to the US. The long-held aim of rebalancing China’s economy towards consumption could finally become reality as a result. A successful rebalancing could mean less energy-intensive growth.
China’s response also includes redoubling its focus on “new quality productive forces”, a concept that emphasises new technology.
The concept includes the clean-energy industry, which has become such an important economic driver in China that it would be hard to leave out of stimulus plans.
A new list of low-carbon demonstration projects, published by the National Development and Reform Commission, provides a look at China’s priorities for clean-energy investment. Green hydrogen, energy storage, “virtual power plants” and industrial decarbonisation based on hydrogen are new growth areas.
In terms of the emissions implications of China’s response to Trump’s tariffs, the big question is whether stimulus focused at these favoured sectors – including the new low-carbon focus areas and other clean-energy industries – is deemed sufficient.
Some traditional recipients of stimulus spending, such as shipbuilding and public infrastructure, have already posted strong growth in the first quarter of this year as a result of stimulus measures announced in 2024.
An additional source of uncertainty for China’s emissions comes in the form of its new electricity pricing policy for renewable energy, which enters into force in June.
The new policy removes price guarantees pegged to coal-power prices, with new wind and solar projects supposed to secure direct contracts with electricity buyers. This is likely to lead to lower prices being paid to new wind and solar projects.
However, it offers more favourable pricing – via “contracts for difference” – to the amount of new capacity needed to meet central government energy targets.
The immediate effect of the policy will likely be a rush of projects rushing to complete installation before the June deadline, so as to secure guaranteed prices.
This rush was already apparent in the latest data: 23 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 13GW of wind was added in March alone, up 80% and 110% from previous records for the month.
Furthermore, this year’s installations are likely to be very strong, even topping last year’s record, as a lot of centralised solar power and wind-power projects are racing to complete before the end of the 14th five-year plan period.
The China Wind Energy Association expects a new record of 105-115GW installed this year across onshore and offshore wind projects – up from the record-breaking 80GW last year – based on very active bidding last year. It also expects volumes to stay at that level even in 2026 and to then grow further towards 2030.
The China Electricity Council predicts an even larger wind-power capacity addition of 120GW in 2025. Another analyst projects a 20% drop in wind-power capacity additions in 2026, but after an even steeper increase in 2025 to 120-130GW of capacity added. So he also expects 2026 installations to be far above the current record year of 2024.
For solar, the China Photovoltaic Industry Association forecasts a drop in installations of 8-23% this year, from the staggering record of 278GW last year. Even the low end of this projection would see installations stay at 2023 levels in 2025 and then recover from there. The China Electricity Council’s projection for solar additions in 2025 matches the low end of the industry association’s forecast.
The figure below, based on these various projections, shows that additional electricity generation from new clean power capacity is expected to remain above last year’s record-breaking levels in both 2025 and 2026.
The projections shown in the figure above illustrate that the energy industry expects to be able to navigate the new renewable pricing policy and to maintain a high level of wind and solar additions over the next two years.
The policy has, however, created a lot more uncertainty. The stop-go cycle of a flood of installations in the first half of this year and then a slowdown in the second half – likely especially in the distributed solar segment – is likely to be a tough time for the industry.
The uncertainty relates above all to two things. First is the local implementation of the policy, as provincial governments have a lot of leeway here. Given the economic significance of clean energy for many provinces, they can be expected to seek to implement the policy in a way that minimises disruptions to the industry.
The other source of uncertainty is central government targets. The pricing policy ties the availability of more favorable pricing to central government energy targets, after clean-energy growth outpaced those targets by a wide margin in the past few years.
This emphasises the importance of the targets set for the next five year plan. The National Energy Administration (NEA) is targeting “more than 200GW” per year of clean-energy capacity added, which is far lower than the 360GW added last year.
The effect of the pricing policy also depends on market conditions, of course, with a risk of oversupply of coal-fired power due to the ongoing rapid addition of new coal-fired power plants.
China’s nuclear construction also keeps accelerating, with another 10GW of reactor projects approved in April, on top of 10GW approved in each of the previous two years. These projects will contribute to clean power supply towards 2030 as they are completed.
The uncertainty around wind and solar expansion also has implications for China’s international climate pledges under the Paris Agreement.
After exceptionally slow progress in 2020-23, China is significantly off track for its 2030 commitment to reduce carbon intensity – the emissions per unit of economic output. It is almost certain to miss its 2025 target. Carbon intensity fell by 3.4% in 2024, falling short of the rate of improvement needed to meet the 2025 and 2030 targets.
The government work plan for 2025 did not set a carbon intensity target. It only included a target for reducing the intensity per unit of GDP for energy supply from fossil fuels by 3%, excluding use for raw materials.
This provides an indirect indication of the targeted improvement in carbon intensity. In 2024, carbon intensity fell by 3.4%, while fossil energy intensity fell by 3.8%. If the ratio is similar in 2025, then carbon intensity would need to fall by around 2.5% at a minimum, allowing CO2 emissions to increase by more than 2%, if the target for 5% GDP growth is also met.
The absence of a carbon intensity target and the lack of emphasis on reducing carbon intensity also signals that meeting the target is not seen as a priority at the moment.
The government work plan emphasised the “dual-carbon” goals of peaking CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.
However, these goals allow CO2 emissions to continue to increase until the end of the decade, implying the potential for a significant absolute emission increase from 2024 levels by 2030. The “dual-carbon” goals, even if met, therefore do not guarantee the delivery of China’s current key international climate commitment, the 2030 carbon-intensity target.
Even if emissions fell this year, improvements to carbon intensity would need to accelerate sharply in the next five years to meet China’s 2030 Paris commitment.
If China remains committed to its 2030 pledge, then this acceleration would need to be reflected in the targets set in the country’s next five-year plan.
The past 12 months mark a potentially significant turning point for China’s CO2 emissions, with clean-energy growth for the first time outpacing demand growth and displacing fossil fuel use in the power sector.
Record-breaking clean energy additions expected in 2025, despite new pricing policy uncertainties, suggest that the trend will continue this year.
The longer-term trajectory depends heavily on the targets set in the upcoming five-year plan and on the economic policy response to US tariffs and other economic headwinds.
In the short term, the US tariffs will dampen energy demand growth and emissions. Economic policy designed to offset the impacts of Trump’s tariffs will likely boost the clean-energy sector further and might lead to a shift towards domestic consumption as an economic driver, implying lower energy consumption growth relative to GDP.
On the other hand, previous rounds of economic stimulus in China have led to sharp increases in emissions. If China is to deliver stimulus that targets consumption and new technology, rather than emissions-intensive construction and heavy industry, then it will require a significant break with earlier patterns.
Whether power-sector emissions have peaked will be determined by a race between growth in clean energy supply and total power demand growth.
The new renewable electricity pricing policy, which ties the volume of “contracts for difference” given out to new solar and wind projects to national clean energy targets, further increases the importance of target-setting in China’s upcoming 2035 climate targets under the Paris Agreement and in the next 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030.
Sector-by-sector analysis suggests that, in addition to the power sector, emissions have likely also peaked in the building materials and steel sectors, as well as oil products consumption.
These sectors together represent over 80% of China’s fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions. However, there are uncertainties and potential for short-term rebound in all of these sectors.
The sector with remaining potential for substantial emissions growth is coal-to-chemicals. The drop in oil prices after US tariff announcements will undermine the profitability of this sector and likely lead to lower utilisation of plants, even as more capacity is added. China’s counter-tariffs on imports of petrochemical products from the US could have benefited the industry – but these have reportedly been waived.
All of this suggests that there is potential for China’s emissions to continue to fall and for the country to achieve substantial absolute emissions reductions over the next five years.
However, policy choices working in the opposite direction could just as easily see emissions increase further towards 2030.
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.
Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.
The study, published in Nature Food, finds that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from agricultural machinery have increased approximately seven-fold in the country since 1985.
Using government statistics on the quantity of farm equipment over time, researchers calculate the changes in CO2 emissions and other air pollutants between 1985 and 2020.
They find that CO2 emissions from farm equipment have grown, on average, by nearly 6% annually since 1985.
Based on “anticipated trends”, they say, increased mechanisation of agriculture could account for 21% of China’s total emissions in 2050, under a pathway to its 2060 net-zero goal.
This could make it harder for China to meet its emissions reduction goals, as well as “degrade” its air quality, the authors say.
However, the study also finds that widespread adoption of machinery powered with renewable energy could mitigate 65-70% of these emissions.
One expert, who was not involved in the research, tells Carbon Brief that the work is “valuable”, although she adds that farm machinery would likely not reach such a large proportion of total emissions:
“If China is making rapid progress in reducing emissions from other emitters…then I expect it will have made significant progress in the decarbonisation of agricultural machinery too.”
The researchers also break the emissions down to the province level, finding a large range of agricultural machinery emissions – from 0.1MtCO2 for the lowest-emitting provinces to 17.5MtCO2 for the highest emitters.
They find that five provinces in eastern and north-eastern China – Shandong, Henan, Heilongjiang, Hebei and Anhui – account for more than 40% of agricultural machinery emissions. Together, those provinces contain one-third of the country’s cropland area and about 46% of the total engine power.
However, even between these high-emitting regions, the makeup of the machinery was different, with some provinces more dependent on large tractors and some more dominated by field-management machinery.
The sub-national emissions analysis is one of the key advances of the new research, says Dr Hannah Ritchie, deputy editor at Our World in Data. Ritchie, who was not involved in the study, explains:
“This spatial resolution of emissions estimates is valuable, because there is such large [variety] across a country of China’s size. It also offers important insights into potential emissions pathways in the future, under different rates of mechanisation and low-carbon technology uptake.”
The researchers identify four socioeconomic factors contributing to the rise in emissions: population growth, changes in per-capita cropland area, level of mechanisation and emissions intensity.
The chart below shows the change in CO2 emissions (black) due to changes in emission intensity (dark blue), level of mechanisation (light blue), per-capita cropland area (yellow) and population (orange).
Of those, the increasing level of mechanisation “dominate[s]” the change in emissions, the paper says. It notes that these changes alone were responsible for around a 100% increase in emissions over 1985-2000.
Population growth was another large driver of increasing farm equipment emissions over the early part of the study period, the study notes, but it has been less of a factor since 2000.
In contrast, increasing emissions intensity uniformly acted to decrease emissions, the authors say, while “tillage pressure” increased emissions early on in the study period, but decreased emissions since 2000.
Under current policies, China aims to “achieve comprehensive mechanisation in major crop production processes by 2035”, the authors note.
Therefore, unabated continued growth of agricultural mechanisation could compromise China’s efforts to achieve its “dual-carbon” goals, they warn.
(The term “dual-carbon” goals refers to the country’s pledge to reach peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.)
They write that effective mitigation of these emissions will require different strategies in the short- and long-term future, noting that near-term availability means that “biofuels and natural gas [will] play an important role over the coming decade”.
In the longer term, they say, renewable energy sources, as well as green hydrogen, “have the largest mitigation potential”. Previous work has shown that using automated equipment, electric tractors and renewable energy sources can reduce agricultural emissions by 90%.
Ritchie says she is “a bit sceptical that the relative contributions of agricultural machinery will be as high as 20% in 2050”. She adds:
“This rests on the assumption that these emissions go mostly unabated, while most other sectors rapidly decline. If China is making rapid progress in reducing emissions from other emitters, including larger on-road transport, such as trucks and other agricultural emissions…then I expect it will have made significant progress in the decarbonisation of agricultural machinery too.”
That is the headline finding of our new study, published in Nature Climate Change, on how European cities are – or are not – preparing for a warming world.
We find that nearly half of the 327 cities that we assess have not published an adaptation plan, leaving us unsure as to whether or how they are trying to reduce climate threats.
For the 167 cities that do have adaptation plans – ranging from Alborg and Aarhus in Denmark through to Zilona Gorá in Poland and Zaragoza in Spain – we find that the climate-related measures within them are often inconsistent.
In other words, their climate risk assessments, policy goals, adaptation measures and monitoring programmes are not aligned.
For example, 81 plans identified the increased risk of storms and winds from climate change, but only 23 of these plans (28%) mentioned increasing resilience to such severe weather events as a specific policy goal.
These inconsistencies contribute to a “gap” that the UN has identified between the adaptation goals that societies have adopted and the measures they have implemented to try and meet them.
Our study finds that Nuremberg in Germany has the largest gap in its adaptation plan, with Stuttgart and Schwerin in Germany and Birmingham in the UK close behind.
The gap is particularly alarming because Europe is warming twice as fast as any other continent – and it is a continent that has had considerable financial and institutional support for adaptation for decades.
Much of the existing research into the “adaptation gap” focuses on the difference between the climate measures a city needs and what action has actually been taken.
But there is another key part of the adaptation gap – whether the policies and measures are actually internally consistent.
Ideally, we would expect adaptation efforts to be “joined-up” along the policy chain.
For example, where climate risk assessments suggest that a city faces specific threats from storms, flash flooding, heatwaves, forest fires or drought, these vulnerabilities should be linked directly to the municipality’s adaptation goals, policies and the monitoring and evaluation processes.
Additionally, we might hope that city governments would involve those at risk from severe climate impacts, such as vulnerable population groups, industries and sectors of the economy, in decisions as to how they will be protected.
If these different phases of adaptation management are misaligned and inconsistent, we can see how cities and societies are less likely to deal with the impact of severe weather events effectively.
We developed a series of “consistency checks” to identify the extent to which different stages of the adaptation management process are aligned.
These include:
We use these checks to assess the adaptation strategies of European cities. For this, we use an existing dataset of the local adaptation plans of more than 300 cities.
(The dataset covers the 27 member countries of the EU, plus the UK. It aims to cover around 20% of the population of each country and include national and regional capitals where possible. In general, it covers large cities with more than 250,000 people and medium-size urban areas with more than 50,000 people.)
We find that nearly half (49%) of the plans do align climate risks with climate goals. Slightly more than half (52%) align identified sectoral risks with respective measures, but only regarding specific economic sectors and industries.
For example, 68 cities (77%) identify particular risks for buildings, while 70 cities (80%) highlight risks to the water industry and include details of measures to protect these sectors.
However, identified risks for vulnerable groups, such as risks for older people, those on low-incomes and ethnic minorities, were only followed-up with consistent measures in 43% of the plans.
Also, only 4% of cities consider or involve vulnerable groups in monitoring and evaluation (if they identified these groups at risk) – and only 1% of cities were effectively engaging vulnerable communities in plan development.
Given that the least powerful members of society are often the most vulnerable to climate change, there is a real risk that they will be further exposed to severe weather events.
Overall, when assessing each of the five consistency checks in all 167 plans, we find inconsistencies in more than two-thirds (70%). This is despite the fact that adaptation planning in Europe has improved over time – as we highlighted in a previous Carbon Brief article.
The findings are illustrated in the map below, which shows the 167 cities with adaptation plans. The coloured dots indicate the extent to which each city’s plan is inconsistent (indicating a potential adaptation gap) – taken as an average across the five checks set out in our study.
Green dots indicate plans that are fully consistent, with a sliding scale of inconsistency through yellow, orange and red. The maximum inconsistency identified in the study is an adaptation gap of 79.6% – found in Nuremberg, Germany. But Stuttgart and Schwerin in Germany and Birmingham in the UK are close behind, with an average “gap” score of more than 78%.
Significantly, our research finds that only 167 of the 327 cities – just over half of those in the database – had even produced a climate adaptation plan by the study’s cut-off date of December 2020.
As such, we were unable to assess how a huge number of places across Europe are planning to deal with climate threats – regardless of whether their activities are misaligned or not.
(Although many cities will have published adaptation plans since this date, it is not clear how coherent their activities are likely to be, nor whether they take sufficient account of the needs of vulnerable groups.)
Overall, our research suggests a greater need for city and national governments to base their adaptation policies on robust risk assessments and to monitor progress accordingly – particularly with the most vulnerable social groups in society in mind.
Our findings highlight the importance of focusing on those who are most vulnerable to climate change, by involving them in decision-making and targeting specific measures at these groups.
CLIMATE PROMISE: Australia’s Labor party has secured a second term in power following a landslide election victory, reported CNN. Prime minister Anthony Albanese “reiterated his commitment to climate action” and his government’s target to reach net-zero by 2050, added the outlet. Bloomberg said Albanese’s “next campaign” is to stave off Turkey to secure hosting the COP31 climate summit, along with Pacific nations, in 2026.
PUBLIC SUPPORT: The Conversation said that Australia now has “five huge climate opportunities”, including setting an ambitious new international climate pledge for 2035. Columnist David Fickling wrote in Bloomberg that the “historic” victory of the Labor party proved the right-wing opposition party’s plan to replace “renewables-focused climate targets with a switch to nuclear energy” was not widely supported. Guardian Australia’s climate and environment editor Adam Morton said that the country “backed a rapid shift to renewable energy”.
RUSSIAN GAS: The European Commission published a “roadmap” for ending reliance on Russian energy, which includes a ban on all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, BBC News reported, adding that the bloc hopes to move away by “accelerating the deployment of renewable energy”. Meanwhile, Chinese president Xi Jinping was expected to talk about the China-Russia Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which could send 50bn cubic metres of gas to China, during his visit to Moscow this week, the Guardian reported.
SPAIN’S TRANSITION: Following last week’s blackout in Spain and Portugal, the Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez said that he will not deviate a “single millimetre” from his commitment to renewable energy, calling it “our country’s energy future” and “our only and best option”, reported the Financial Times. Sanchez rejected nuclear-power advocates, saying the blackout was used as an excuse for a “gigantic manipulation exercise”, reported the Daily Telegraph.
DISASTERS DELETED: The New York Times reported that the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has announced that it will stop tracking the cost of the country’s most expensive disasters – defined as those that cause at least $1bn in damage. The newspaper described this as the “latest effort from the Trump administration to restrict or eliminate climate research”.
MORE TRUMP: The Trump administration also proposed to cut more than $21bn in climate-related funding, including $15bn for carbon capture and renewable energy and $6bn for electric-vehicle chargers, reported Reuters. Elsewhere, two major science unions pledged to produce “over 29 peer-reviewed journals that will cover all aspects of climate change” after the administration dismissed a “key Congress-mandated report on climate”, reported the Guardian.
The proportion of global warming from 1990-2020 that the “wealthiest 10%” of people are “responsible” for, according to research covered by Carbon Brief.
For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Children born in 2020 – of which there are about 124 million – will face “unprecedented exposure” to extreme weather events, even if global warming is limited to 1.5C by the end of the century, according to a new study published in Nature and covered by Carbon Brief. The chart above illustrates how many millions of children born in 2020 are expected to face a range of extremes, from heatwaves to tropical cyclones, throughout their lifetime at 1.5C (dark blue), compared to even higher levels of warming. Limiting global warming to 1.5C could save 77.2 million children from exposure to extremes, the research concluded.
This week, Carbon Brief examines what Taiwan’s decision to phase out nuclear power means for its climate policies.
Taiwan will shut down its last nuclear power reactor on 17 May.
Nuclear has played an important role in Taiwan’s energy supply, which is 97% imported.
Nuclear provided 12% of electricity in 2016, according to the Taiwanese Energy Administration. In 2025, it accounted for about 3% of the electricity supply, while gas contributed 46%, coal 34% and renewable energy 15%.
In 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an anti-nuclear party, won the presidential election. Then-president Tsai Ing-wen launched her “nuclear-free homeland policy”, with a pledge to avoid nuclear incidents similar to the Fukushima disaster in Japan.
The DPP has said that going “nuclear-free” is part of its “net-zero” transition. The party aims to have 50% of its electricity generated from gas, 30% from coal and 20% from renewable sources by 2025.
Nevertheless, its nuclear-free policy faces pressures from the opposition parties, as well as the public.
The Taipei Times, a Taiwanese newspaper, reported that 48% of the public was “dissatisfied” with the plan in 2017.
Protests against the plan continued until May 2025, with many people citing worries about having a stable electricity supply.
Seeking to reassure the public, the government’s Energy Administration said that the need to source more electricity to replace nuclear has “already been included in the long-term electricity development plan” and that “there will be no power shortage”.
The environmental impact of the government’s “long-term power electricity plan” has also been under scrutiny.
The Taipei Times said the plan is “substituting nuclear sources of energy with coal-fired sources”.
A study in Energy Strategy Review found that the plan “lack[s]” a “coal phase-out schedule”, which may “render Taiwan’s energy transition unjust”.
In 2016, about 45.9% of electricity supply was from coal, while gas and renewable energy accounted for 31.5% and 4.8% respectively.
Rather than gradually reducing coal-fired power as the DPP planned, the share of coal increased to more than 47% in 2018, which then fell back to 45% in 2020, due to the temporary increase of nuclear power, said the study.
The growth of gas and renewable sources did not go as fast as the DPP predicted, according to the study, making the nuclear-free energy transition “unlikely to be achieved”.
As of today, only 14.6% of electricity in Taiwan is from renewable sources, far behind its goal of 20%.
Meanwhile, burning gas, which is the main energy source under the plan, releases carbon emissions, making it harder for the island to achieve net-zero.
Focus Taiwan said the move could promote the use of fossil fuels to as high as 84%.
The official nuclear research institute National Atomic Research Institute in Taiwan refused a request to comment.
WEATHER AND PANGOLINS: A TEDxLondon podcast focused on how crop failure, drought and extreme weather are damaging the livelihood of pangolins.
DEEP DIVE: A new feature-length documentary “Ocean With David Attenborough” is in cinemas now.
US AND CLIMATE: An editorial in the Break-Down, a new publication focusing on the “political economy of climate and ecological crisis”, dissects “this moment in climate politics”.
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