§ Key developments

China’s CO2 emissions down

STRUCTURAL DECLINE: China’s clean power generation growth has, for the “first time”, been the driver of a fall in the nation’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions levels, new analysis for Carbon Brief found. CO2 emissions were down 1.6% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025 and have fallen 1% over the last 12 months, it added, driven by decreasing power sector emissions – all despite rapid electricity demand growth. This could mark a “potentially significant turning point” in China’s emissions trajectory, the analysis said.

BOOMING INDUSTRIES: China’s clean-energy sectors have been “developing rapidly”, China’s tax bureau said, with the sectors’ sales revenue growing 13.6% year-on-year – “11.5 percentage points higher than the national average”, according to industry news outlet China Energy News. Analysis by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies noted “production of the ‘three new’ industries was strong” in the first quarter of 2025. More than 3m workers were employed in the “ecological and environmental protection sector” in China in 2024, Chinese financial news outlet Yicai said. Meanwhile, Chinese finance news outlet Caixin reported on Shandong and Guangdong becoming the first two provinces in China to issue “market-based pricing rules for wind and solar power”, in a policy push that is expected to create short-term uncertainty for clean-energy industries.

COAL ASSETS: China’s fossil fuel sector emitted “nearly 25m tonnes of methane” in 2024 – the vast majority of which came from coal mines, including abandoned mines, a new report by the International Energy Agency said. It added that fossil-fuel methane emissions in China are set to fall by nearly 15% by 2030 and by around 30% by 2035. Elsewhere, carbon offsetting company Verra has developed a new methodology that could “channel more private capital toward the early phase out of coal-fired power plants” in Asia, Bloomberg said. However, Yan Qin, principal analyst at ClearBlue Markets, told Carbon Brief that Chinese stakeholders are “unlikely” to use the credits as they are not recognised in China’s voluntary carbon market. The state-run newspaper China Daily reported that China developed a “deep-sea vault” for greenhouse gases in the South China Sea, designed to store 1.5m tonnes of CO2 annually.

Drought hit China’s breadbasket

DROUGHT: Severe drought has hit several provinces across China, including Henan, Jiangsu and Shaanxi, with high temperatures and low rainfall “affecting local farming and water resources”, Yicai reported. Bloomberg noted that the “hot and dry weather is threatening wheat production, potentially disrupting output”. One trading firm has trimmed its forecast of China’s wheat production for 2025, Reuters reported. Upcoming summer monsoonal rains, known as meiyu (梅雨), “could help ease concerns over crop development”, Bloomberg said, although it added that global warming appeared to be driving “wild swings” in rainfall patterns during the season.

PESTS: A new study from Peking University, covered by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP), found that migratory pests from southeast Asia are “partially driving rice yield losses in southern China”. The researchers added that “continued global warming” will likely increase how often issues with crop pests arise, “posing a major obstacle to stabilising food production”. China has released a plan for disaster prevention during 2025’s flood season in order to ensure a “bumper harvest”, which includes measures to prevent damage from floods, drought, heat, typhoons and pests, the state-run newspaper China Daily said.

POLLEN: Meanwhile, Beijing’s forestation drive has led to a rise in cases of hay fever, Bloomberg reported, noting that trees commonly used in the programme, such as “willows and poplar trees”, have high pollen output. It added that, according to environmental experts, China “didn’t have a better choice of plants when it started the forestation campaign” – quoting one saying that the country’s goal was to “get green first, and then to consider other things”. 

Global south policymakers in Beijing

RENEWABLES TO AFRICA: New research by UK-based thinktank ODI Global has found that solar and wind power projects accounted for 59% of China’s energy investments in Africa in 2024, SCMP said. South African policymakers travelled to China to discuss “large-scale renewable energy”, “clean coal” and “grid management” with Chinese counterparts and industry representatives, according to the Communist party-affiliated newspaper People’s Daily. Elsewhere, Nigeria “recently floated, and then quickly walked back, a proposed ban on imported solar panels” as the country tries to develop its own local solar industry, the China Global South Project reported.

MONEY TO CELAC: Meanwhile, representatives of Latin American and Caribbean countries travelled to Beijing for a forum hosted by China, in which President Xi Jinping pledged to provide “66bn yuan ($9bn) in credit” and expand cooperation in “clean energy” with the region, SCMP reported. The “Beijing declaration” issued after the forum emphasised the need for “all parties to consider acceding to international instruments on climate change…and avoiding the creation of new trade barriers”.

LULA TO CHINA: Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was also in China on a state visit, the New York Times said, noting that Lula was seeking “gains in new technologies, including…green energy”. His visit culminated in Chinese companies announcing $5bn in investments in Brazil, Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paulo reported, including in “sustainable aviation fuel”, “electric and hybrid cars” and other energy-related projects. A joint statement issued by the two countries stated that they will “deepen cooperation” on the energy transition and stated China will “send a high-level delegation” to COP30.

XI TO RUSSIA: Earlier, Xi made a state visit to Russia, during which Chinese and Russian policymakers discussed “Chinese companies’ involvement in Russian liquefied natural gas  (LNG) projects”, Reuters reported. A joint statement, published by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pledged to implement projects “in the fields of oil, gas, LNG, civilian nuclear energy, coal, electricity [and] renewable energy”. State broadcaster CGTN called the China-Russia east-route gas pipeline, which began operating last December, a “landmark” in energy cooperation “benefiting about 450m people along its route”. Oleg Deripaska, chairman of the ecological committee of the China-Russia Friendship Committee for Peace and Development, told the People’s Daily: “Russia can learn from China’s experience of supply-side structural reforms to promote the creation of a mature green energy market.” 

§ Captured

China currently has 161m tonnes (Mt) per year of electric arc furnace (EAF) steelmaking capacity and is building another 55Mt, according to a new data analysis tool developed by energy thinktank Global Energy Monitor. However, it noted, China “exhibits substantial gaps in data availability”, with feedstock information available for less than 8% of its EAF capacity.

§ Spotlight 

What China’s coal country thinks about climate change

A new survey of Shanxi residents, exploring attitudes to climate change and “just transition”, offers a rare insight into the views of Chinese people on the frontline of the energy transition in the country’s largest coal-producing province.

In this issue, Carbon Brief interviews Tom Wang, one of the organisers of the survey, about its key findings. Wang is executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, a climate advocacy group.

This interview was edited for length and clarity. A full version is available on Carbon Brief’s website.

Carbon Brief: Why did you want to conduct this survey?

Tom Wang: I’m from Shanxi province. I grew up thinking that coal was a necessary part of life. But I also lost quite a lot of people in my family to coal-mine accidents or air pollution. 

Shanxi province is the world’s largest coal producer. [Note: The province’s coal output reached 1.3bn tonnes in 2024.] We contribute around one-third of [China’s] coal. Millions of people rely on coal-related jobs. 

[But China’s climate policies mean] Shanxi cannot depend on the coal economy. Shanxi province’s own policies have also covered the energy transition. These policies [are not] being translated into something more tangible to people’s lives. People are not prepared.

That is why we wanted to do this survey. We ask two simple questions: do you know about and support the energy transition – and are you prepared? 

CB: What do people in Shanxi think about the energy transition, climate change and climate policy? 

TW: When it comes to climate change, awareness levels are very different between different demographic groups. For example, government workers and people with higher income or education levels know about climate change.

Some could identify things happening around them, such as warmer temperatures every year, longer drought periods and not having any snow last winter. Some even mentioned extreme weather, including heatwaves and a week-long rainstorm that ruined a lot of Shanxi’s ancient temples.

However, the most vulnerable communities, by which I basically mean the coal community, don’t really know about climate change. They know about [climate] buzzwords, but they don’t really understand them.

CB: Why is that? 

TW: Most state-owned media talk a lot about climate change. However, they do not explain what that means for people’s everyday lives. 

When we explain the energy transition means we are going to use less coal, they can understand…and feel the impact on their lives quite sharply. 

CB: The survey also asked people what they would like to see prioritised in a just transition away from coal. What did respondents say was important to them?

TW: We all know JET-P, the Just Energy Transition Partnership. However, in Shanxi province, what we really need is the JET-B, a Just Energy Transition Brotherhood. 

Rich provinces in China relied heavily on Shanxi’s coal to develop their economies. [The JET-B calls on them to] support Shanxi with its energy transition. Many [respondents] agreed with this! 

Also, the people of Shanxi are actually willing to change or improve their own skill-sets. They know how dangerous it is to work in the coal industry. There is a high awareness of the lack of a future for the coal industry among respondents. People are quite happy to move on, if they are provided with good training and strong support to help that transition go smoothly.

CB: According to the survey, just over a quarter of Shanxi’s young people felt they did not have the skills they needed for a clean-energy economy. Around half were worried about the closure of coal mines and coal-power plants. What can be done to address their concerns?

TW: In Shanxi province we have universities that are dedicated to the coal industry. We have spent so much energy and resources on preparing our young people for the coal industry, instead of preparing them for the transition away from coal.

Young people don’t know how to prepare for the energy transition. And then there’s the current job market. Shanxi’s economy is so weak – in 2024, our province had the lowest economic growth rate in China. 

Shanxi is not very good at setting up new industries. We have all of this potential but we are not really translating it into jobs. That’s why the young generation doesn’t feel confident. 

CB: What lessons should be taken away from the survey?

TW: We need to prepare…the coal community and the young generation today. We cannot afford to wait any longer. We need to tangibly start to train people and raise new sectors. 

Communications are also critical. We need to inspire people. Young people and the coal community are feeling lost. 

We need to highlight that all these [possibilities] are out there. That’s what I would like our policymakers, investors and NGOs to tell people. And richer provinces should step up and say: “Now it’s time for us to help you.” 

§ Watch, read, listen

CLIMATE SCIENCE: The Science and Technology Daily interviewed Prof Liu Congqiang, founding dean of the School of Geosystem Science of Tianjin University, on how the earth systems discipline emerged in China and how it contributes to researching climate change. 

NEW STRATEGIES: The Diplomat examined how ambitious climate diplomacy can be sustained without high-level climate cooperation between the US and China. 

CLIMATE LEADER: Global Solutions published an article by Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of the influential thinktank Center for China and Globalization, on how China can “leverage” its energy transition successes to advance “global climate mitigation”. 
ELECTROSTATE: The Financial Times explored how China’s growing electrification helps it overcome a number of geopolitical, security and supply chain “vulnerabilit[ies]”.

§ New science 

Agricultural machinery could contribute 20% of total carbon and air pollutant emissions by 2050 and compromise carbon neutrality targets in China

Nature Food

China’s agricultural machinery emissions have increased nearly sevenfold since 1985, new research has shown, adding that if they continue to grow they could “hinder” the country’s ability to reach its carbon-neutrality targets. The study, covered by Carbon Brief, used data from the China “statistical yearbook” to calculate the emissions of four types of farm equipment. Prof Zhangcai Qin, a professor at Sun Yat-sen University who was not involved in the new study, told Carbon Brief that disaggregating the emissions of agricultural machinery from food systems more broadly “allow[s] policymakers to design targeted interventions without compromising agricultural productivity”.

China’s naturally regenerated forests currently have greater aboveground carbon accumulation rates than newly planted forests

Communications Earth & Environment

A new study found that China’s “young natural forests” currently store more above-ground carbon than comparable “young planted forests” – mainly due to differences in tree density. The authors mapped the “aboveground carbon accumulation rates” for China’s young “natural” and “planted” forests in 2020. They found that planted forests sequester carbon more quickly than natural forests. However, they projected that by 2060, natural forests will still hold more above-ground carbon than planted forests.

A new study used machine learning to calculate a possible carbon emissions trajectory for China through to 2030. It mapped China’s carbon

China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

§ What is the UK’s new solar geoengineering research programme?

Solar geoengineering is a term used to describe a group of hypothetical technologies that could, in theory, counteract temperature rise by reflecting more sunlight away from the Earth’s surface. (It is also sometimes called “solar radiation modification”.)

The most commonly proposed idea is to introduce reflective aerosols high up into the stratosphere, which would lower global temperatures in a similar way to a volcanic eruption.

Other ideas include deliberately modifying clouds to make them more reflective or sending giant mirrors into space.

The proposals may sound futuristic, but the notion of engineering the climate in order to limit sunlight has been debated by scientists and politicians for more than 50 years.

However, these debates have always proved controversial, meaning – apart from studies based on computer simulations – little field research into solar geoengineering has been carried out. (See: How does this compare to past solar geoengineering efforts in the UK and globally?)

Aria’s new research programme aims to invest £57m in 21 solar geoengineering research projects globally.

This – along with a separate £10m scheme from the UK Research and Innovation body – means the UK is now one of the world’s biggest funders of solar geoengineering research.

Announcing the details of the scheme, Aria said its motivation for launching the research programme was “the possibility of encountering damaging climate tipping points”.

Out of the £57m, around £24.5m ($33m) will be spent on “controlled, small-scale outdoor experiments”, according to Aria.

These include attempts to thicken Arctic sea ice, brighten clouds above Australia’s Great Barrier Reef and to float weather balloons containing natural minerals high in the stratosphere, which will be retrieved after “hours or weeks”.

All outdoor experiments will be “scrutinised” by an oversight committee chaired by Prof Piers Forster, a leading climate scientist who is the founding director of the Priestley Centre for Climate Futures at the University of Leeds.

In a note released alongside news of the research funding, the oversight committee said it does “not exist to legitimise this programme”, adding:

“We advise Aria on the risks and benefits of supporting proposed creator projects and how best to work with and across creator teams to support learning and to help ensure that findings are contextualised and communicated appropriately alongside [climate] mitigation and adaptation options.” 

Aria is a “high-risk, high-reward” government research agency that was formally established through an act of parliament in 2023.

It was originally conceptualised by Dominic Cummings, a controversial former adviser of then prime minister Boris Johnson.

According to Nature, Aria was modelled on the “famed US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, which helped to pioneer some of the world’s most consequential technologies, including the internet and personal computers”.

In its recent coverage, the Daily Telegraph described Aria as a “secretive government unit”. 

Aria itself has said that it aims to be fully transparent about its solar geoengineering programme, which was its motivation for publicly announcing its spending on the 21 projects involved.

§ How does this compare to past solar geoengineering efforts in the UK and globally?

As mentioned above, the idea of solar geoengineering has been debated for more than 50 years. However, its controversial nature has meant that, until now, very few field experiments have been carried out.

In 2010, there was an attempt to carry out field research in the UK by the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project, which was headed by Dr Matthew Watson at the University of Bristol and involved scientists from the University of Oxford, the University of Cambridge and the University of Edinburgh.

The project aimed to “investigate the effectiveness” of solar geoengineering, in part by releasing the equivalent of a bathtub of water high into the atmosphere above Norfolk.

However, it was met with fierce opposition by some campaign groups. In 2012, the team ended the project, citing issues with intellectual property and discomfort with the current lack of regulation and governance of solar geoengineering research.

(Watson is one of the recipients of Aria’s new research programme. His team has been awarded £4.3m ($5.7m) to build specialised drones to study emissions from regularly erupting volcanoes in Guatemala, Montserrat and Chile.)

Outside of the UK, another high-profile solar geoengineering experiment headed by researchers at Harvard University, called the Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (Scopex), was also forced to disband following public disapproval.

In the private sector, a US start-up called Make Sunsets has begun releasing high-altitude balloons containing sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere, in an attempt to geoengineer the planet. It funds its activities by selling “cooling credits”.

The company has been banned in Mexico, where it previously launched balloons, and is currently being investigated by the US Environmental Protection Agency.

According to the online publication SRM360, funding for solar geoengineering has increased from $34.9m in 2010-14 to $112.1m in 2020-24. The vast majority of funding is concentrated in global-north countries and about half of all funding comes from philanthropic sources.

This week, scientists and policymakers are meeting in Cape Town, South Africa for the largest summit to date on the scientific, social and political implications of solar geoengineering.

Countries have agreed to a de facto moratorium on large-scale solar geoengineering under the Convention on Biological Diversity, a UN treaty that aims to protect biodiversity. (However, it is not legally binding.)

§ Why do some scientists say solar geoengineering research is needed?

Scientists agree that cutting global greenhouse emissions as soon as possible is key to tackling climate change.

But global emissions are still rising – and the prospect of limiting global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, the ambition of the landmark Paris Agreement, without first “overshooting” the target is fast vanishing.

This has led some scientists to call for more research into solar geoengineering ideas, including through small-scale experiments and trials.

Research based on computer modelling indicates that artificially cooling the planet by releasing reflective aerosols into the stratosphere using specialised planes could be effective at offsetting a range of climate impacts, such as more intense heatwaves and flooding, melting sea ice and higher tropical storm risk.

(One solar geoengineering scientist has estimated that halving global warming with reflective aerosols would involve a specialised fleet of about 100 planes releasing 1m tonnes of sulfuric acid each year by 2070.)

However, this type of solar geoengineering would not address rising CO2 levels, which are causing oceans to become more acidic and crops to become less nutritious, among other issues.

Some scientists have raised concerns that, if aerosols were used to address global warming, the world could be left at risk of a “termination shock”. That is, if aerosols were released and then suddenly stopped – as a result of political disagreement or a terrorist attack, for example – global temperatures could rapidly rebound.

This sharp temperature change could be “catastrophic” for wildlife, modelling studies have suggested. However, other research argues that the likelihood of a termination shock has been “overplayed” and that measures could be put in place to ensure that the risk is minimised.

There is also a risk that deploying aerosols from just one spot on Earth could cause uneven impacts for people. One research paper based on modelling found that releasing aerosols in just the northern hemisphere could lead to a decrease in rainfall – and, therefore, an enhanced drought risk – in India and the African Sahel.

Ultimately, advocates of solar geoengineering research tend to argue that the only way to understand more about the efficacy and risks of the technology is to study it further, whereas opponents say more research could be a “slippery slope” towards deployment.

§ Why are there social and ethical concerns around solar geoengineering?

As well as scientific uncertainties, experts have long warned that solar geoengineering poses large social, ethical and governance challenges.

Some scientists and campaigners are fundamentally opposed to the idea of manipulating the climate further in order to try to repair some of the damage caused by fossil-fuel emissions.

Writing in the Guardian, climate scientists Prof Raymond Pierrehumbert and Dr Michael Mann described Aria’s research programme as “like using aspirin for cancer”.

Indigenous groups have strongly opposed the idea of solar geoengineering and its research, often arguing it goes against their beliefs about living in harmony with nature.

Some scientists and campaign groups also believe that solar geoengineering could be viewed by politicians and the public as a quick “technofix” to climate change. If more research and development is channelled into these techniques, they argue, people may start to backpedal on their promises to cut their emissions.

This is often referred to as the “moral hazard” dilemma.

But other researchers have urged caution on this idea. One reason for this is that social experiments conducted with members of the public have found little evidence of the moral hazard problem existing in practice.

Advocates of solar geoengineering research say it should be viewed as a “supplement” to climate mitigation efforts rather than a “substitute” or “quick fix”.

However, many experts and commentators have pointed out that the technology presents a very large global governance challenge. 

A fair and just deployment of solar geoengineering would require agreement between countries, experts have reasoned. At present, it is difficult to picture a global forum that could garner such collaboration, they say.

Prof Alan Robock, a professor in the department of environmental sciences at Rutgers University, summarised this issue neatly in a conversation with Carbon Brief in 2018, when he said:

“You’re asking if the world can come together and agree on geoengineering without agreeing on mitigation. I think the answer is for us to agree on mitigation. Paris is the first step, the pledges made there aren’t enough but have got to increase.”

Another concern is the “free-driver problem”, an idea that refers to the potential for a single country, group or even individual to unilaterally deploy solar geoengineering, even if it might cause negative impacts for others. This concern arises from the fact that solar geoengineering would be relatively cheap to carry out. 

It has been argued that the free-driver problem poses a larger concern than ever in today’s increasingly polarised world, where lone politicians and billionaires hold large amounts of power.

These serious social and governance issues prompt some experts to say solar geoengineering should not be researched at all, but others to say it should be researched to try to address concerns.

Out of Aria’s £57m for solar geoengineering research, around £2.8m ($3.7m) is earmarked for governance and ethics projects.

In its latest assessment for how the world can address climate change, the world’s authority on climate science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), notes that there is “high agreement” among research papers that solar geoengineering “cannot be the main policy response to climate change and is, at best, a supplement to achieving sustained net-zero”.

The assessment also notes that solar geoengineering “may introduce novel risks for international collaboration and peace”.

§ China’s emissions decline due to clean power

Over the past decade, China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement have risen by nearly a fifth, but there have been ups and downs along the way.

The shallow decline in 2015 and 2016 was due to a slump that followed a round of stimulus measures, while zero-Covid controls caused a sharper fall in 2022. Overall, however, emissions have continued to increase, pausing only during periods of economic stress.

More recently, there have been signs that China’s CO2 emissions could be close to reaching a peak and plateau, or even a period of structural decline.

The latest data, for the first quarter of 2025, shows that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for more than a year, as shown in the figure below.

However, with emissions remaining just 1% below the recent peak, it remains possible that they could jump once again to a new record high.

Therefore, the future path of China’s CO2 emissions hangs in the balance, depending on trends within each sector of its economy, as well as China’s response to Trump’s tariffs.

These sectoral trends are explored further in the sections below, along with signals on what could be coming next from Chinese policymakers as they consider the country’s international climate pledge for 2035 and the five-year plan for 2026-2030.

§ Power-sector emissions fall while other sectors rebound

The reduction in China’s first-quarter CO2 emissions in 2025 was due to a 5.8% drop in the power sector. While power demand grew by 2.5% overall, there was a 4.7% drop in thermal power generation – mainly coal and gas.

Increases in solar, wind and nuclear power generation, driven by investments in new generating capacity, more than covered the growth in demand. The increase in hydropower, which is more related to seasonal variation, helped push down fossil power generation.

Power-sector emissions fell by more than total generation from fossil fuels, as the share of biomass and gas increased, while average coal power plant efficiency improved.

Specifically, the average amount of coal needed to generate each unit of electricity at coal-fired power plants fell by 0.9% year-on-year.

The first-quarter reduction in CO2 emissions from coal use in the power sector is shown at the bottom of the figure below, below CO2 changes in other sectors.

Outside of the power sector, emissions increased 3.5%, with the largest rises in the use of coal in the metals and chemicals industries.

The coal-to-chemicals industry is undergoing rapid expansion, driven by concerns about dependence on imported oil and gas. During the first quarter of 2025, it was also benefiting from more favourable economics due to lower coal prices and relatively high oil prices.

Crude steel production increased 0.6% year-on-year, metal products output by 6% and non-ferrous metals production by 2%. All of these increases were mainly due to a jump in March. Metals demand was boosted by the bump in exports ahead of the tariffs, but high output has continued well into April.

Real-estate construction “starts” fell by 24% and sales of new properties by 3%, indicating that the demand for cement, steel and glass from the construction sector continues to decline.

In contrast, economic output in vehicle and machinery production increased by 12% and 13%, respectively, signalling increased demand for metals.

Cement production fell by 1.4%, a slower rate of decrease than in previous years, likely due to an earlier start to weather-dependent construction activity thanks to warm weather.

Gas consumption increased by an estimated 6% in the power sector, due to a 14% increase in gas-fired power generation capacity, even as the average utilisation of the plants fell. However, gas consumption fell in other sectors, outweighing the increase for power.

Oil products consumption increased slightly, as shown by the bar at the top in the figure above. Warmer weather meant that weather-dependent construction and agricultural activity rose earlier in the year than usual.

However, structural factors, particularly vehicle electrification and the shift to liquified natural gas (LNG) in the freight sector, point to continued declines in oil demand.

§ Have China’s emissions peaked?

Following the 1.6% decline in the first quarter of 2025, China’s emissions have now been stable or falling for more than a year, starting from the beginning of March 2024.

However, emissions in the 12 months to the end of March 2025 were down only 1% from their recent peak, implying that any short-term jump could lead to a new record high.

After the sharp reduction in the first quarter, emissions from power generation are now down year-on-year for the most recent 12 months.

This has happened four times before over the past four decades – in 2009, 2012, 2015 and 2022. However, the current drop is the first time that the main driver is growth in clean power generation.

The falls in 2009 and 2012 were related to the global financial crisis and the Euro area crisis, while the drop in 2015 was driven by the construction and industrial sector slump that followed the 2008-12 stimulus program.

These economic shocks resulted in the sharp reduction in electricity demand shown in the figure below. The drop in 2022 was a combination of slow power demand growth due to strict “zero-Covid” measures and relatively strong clean-power additions.

Importantly, the growth in clean power generation in the first quarter of 2025 was not only larger than the rise in demand overall, it was also higher than the average increase in demand over the past 15 years, marked by the dashed line in the figure above.

Moreover, hydropower has been stable year-on-year in the past six months, implying that the clean-energy growth has been driven by increases in solar, wind and nuclear power capacity, not year-to-year variation in hydropower output.

Looking beyond electricity generation, all sectors registered a fall in emissions over the most recent four months from December 2024 to March 2025, except for coal-to-chemicals.

In order for China’s emissions overall to peak and then start declining, CO2 cuts in declining sectors will need to outweigh continued growth elsewhere.

For example, process emissions from cement production peaked in 2021 and have declined by 27% since then, as shown in the top left chart in the figure below.

Coal use outside the power and chemicals sectors peaked at the same time as cement, but has been rebounding since then and is now close to previous peak levels.

The China Coal Association expects coal use in the steel and building materials industries to fall, while coal consumption in the chemical industry is projected to continue growing.

Hopes of future growth in demand for coal are pinned on the chemical sector, described as a shift from using coal primarily as a fuel to a role as both a fuel and a raw material.

The association also believes that coal-fired power generation will resume growth – at least in the short term – but it recently revised down its projections for 2025 compared with the outlook at the end of 2024.

The tariff “war” may have affected expectations. One analysis suggests a 0.5 to 1 percentage point reduction in China’s GDP growth rate due to the tariffs could result in a similar reduction in demand for thermal coal – mainly used at power stations.

Oil product consumption has been declining since the post-Covid rebound ended in March 2024, falling 2% from its peak. The long-term trend is expected to be downwards, due to the electrification of transportation, despite rising demand for chemicals and aviation.

Gas use has been falling for a few months, but the trend is likely still increasing.

The table below lists the 12-month periods with the highest emissions for each sector, as well as the reduction since the latest peak in each case.

For all of the sectors other than cement production, it is too early to declare a definitive peak in emissions. Still, there are signs that other sectoral peaks could be past their peak, too.

Indeed, for oil products consumption and steel production, industry projections indicate that the future trend is likely to be falling.

For the power sector, clean-energy additions at or above current levels would likely lead to a structural peak, as clean-energy growth would more than cover electricity demand growth.

Together, these sectors cover more than 80% of China’s total emissions. If all of them enter a structural decline, then total emissions are very likely to do so too.

§ China pushes domestic demand in response to US tariffs

The economic and emissions outlook for this year and beyond will be affected by the Trump administration’s unprecedented trade tariffs – and China’s counter-measures.

The initial impact was a drop in emissions due to lower factory output in export-oriented coastal provinces and possible knock-on impacts on investment and consumer spending.

Conversely, the temporary easing of tariffs for 90 days will lead to a rush of orders from the US to make up for the short-lived slowdown in trade and to stockpile goods before the relief ends.

China’s reactions to the tariffs focused on counteracting the economic impacts with stimulus.

An anonymous comment piece in People’s Daily, the main Communist party affiliated newspaper, says the country should “strive to make consumption the main driving force and ballast stone of economic growth”, leveraging China’s large domestic market.

(The piece has the byline “People’s Daily commentator”, which implies that it is written by someone with authority.)

The article says that this will involve increasing consumer income, while easing financial and social burdens to boost purchasing power and willingness to consume.

While the temporary easing of tariffs will reduce the urgency of these measures, the US tariff rate on China, at 40%, remains much higher than it was before Trump’s presidency – and China’s leaders will likely want to prepare against the risk of renewed tariff hikes.

The focus will be creating domestic markets for the products China exports to the US. The long-held aim of rebalancing China’s economy towards consumption could finally become reality as a result. A successful rebalancing could mean less energy-intensive growth.

China’s response also includes redoubling its focus on “new quality productive forces”, a concept that emphasises new technology.

The concept includes the clean-energy industry, which has become such an important economic driver in China that it would be hard to leave out of stimulus plans.

A new list of low-carbon demonstration projects, published by the National Development and Reform Commission, provides a look at China’s priorities for clean-energy investment. Green hydrogen, energy storage, “virtual power plants” and industrial decarbonisation based on hydrogen are new growth areas.

In terms of the emissions implications of China’s response to Trump’s tariffs, the big question is whether stimulus focused at these favoured sectors – including the new low-carbon focus areas and other clean-energy industries – is deemed sufficient.

Some traditional recipients of stimulus spending, such as shipbuilding and public infrastructure, have already posted strong growth in the first quarter of this year as a result of stimulus measures announced in 2024.

§ New wind and solar pricing policy increases uncertainty

An additional source of uncertainty for China’s emissions comes in the form of its new electricity pricing policy for renewable energy, which enters into force in June.

The new policy removes price guarantees pegged to coal-power prices, with new wind and solar projects supposed to secure direct contracts with electricity buyers. This is likely to lead to lower prices being paid to new wind and solar projects.

However, it offers more favourable pricing – via “contracts for difference” – to the amount of new capacity needed to meet central government energy targets.

The immediate effect of the policy will likely be a rush of projects rushing to complete installation before the June deadline, so as to secure guaranteed prices.

This rush was already apparent in the latest data: 23 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 13GW of wind was added in March alone, up 80% and 110% from previous records for the month.

Furthermore, this year’s installations are likely to be very strong, even topping last year’s record, as a lot of centralised solar power and wind-power projects are racing to complete before the end of the 14th five-year plan period. 

The China Wind Energy Association expects a new record of 105-115GW installed this year across onshore and offshore wind projects – up from the record-breaking 80GW last year – based on very active bidding last year. It also expects volumes to stay at that level even in 2026 and to then grow further towards 2030. 

The China Electricity Council predicts an even larger wind-power capacity addition of 120GW in 2025. Another analyst projects a 20% drop in wind-power capacity additions in 2026, but after an even steeper increase in 2025 to 120-130GW of capacity added. So he also expects 2026 installations to be far above the current record year of 2024.

For solar, the China Photovoltaic Industry Association forecasts a drop in installations of 8-23% this year, from the staggering record of 278GW last year. Even the low end of this projection would see installations stay at 2023 levels in 2025 and then recover from there.  The China Electricity Council’s projection for solar additions in 2025 matches the low end of the industry association’s forecast.

The figure below, based on these various projections, shows that additional electricity generation from new clean power capacity is expected to remain above last year’s record-breaking levels in both 2025 and 2026.

The projections shown in the figure above illustrate that the energy industry expects to be able to navigate the new renewable pricing policy and to maintain a high level of wind and solar additions over the next two years.

The policy has, however, created a lot more uncertainty. The stop-go cycle of a flood of installations in the first half of this year and then a slowdown in the second half – likely especially in the distributed solar segment – is likely to be a tough time for the industry. 

The uncertainty relates above all to two things. First is the local implementation of the policy, as provincial governments have a lot of leeway here. Given the economic significance of clean energy for many provinces, they can be expected to seek to implement the policy in a way that minimises disruptions to the industry.

The other source of uncertainty is central government targets. The pricing policy ties the availability of more favorable pricing to central government energy targets, after clean-energy growth outpaced those targets by a wide margin in the past few years. 

This emphasises the importance of the targets set for the next five year plan. The National Energy Administration (NEA) is targeting “more than 200GW” per year of clean-energy capacity added, which is far lower than the 360GW added last year. 

The effect of the pricing policy also depends on market conditions, of course, with a risk of oversupply of coal-fired power due to the ongoing rapid addition of new coal-fired power plants.

China’s nuclear construction also keeps accelerating, with another 10GW of reactor projects approved in April, on top of 10GW approved in each of the previous two years. These projects will contribute to clean power supply towards 2030 as they are completed.

§ China faces widening gap to Paris pledge

The uncertainty around wind and solar expansion also has implications for China’s international climate pledges under the Paris Agreement.

After exceptionally slow progress in 2020-23, China is significantly off track for its 2030 commitment to reduce carbon intensity – the emissions per unit of economic output. It is almost certain to miss its 2025 target. Carbon intensity fell by 3.4% in 2024, falling short of the rate of improvement needed to meet the 2025 and 2030 targets.

The government work plan for 2025 did not set a carbon intensity target. It only included a target for reducing the intensity per unit of GDP for energy supply from fossil fuels by 3%, excluding use for raw materials.

This provides an indirect indication of the targeted improvement in carbon intensity. In 2024, carbon intensity fell by 3.4%, while fossil energy intensity fell by 3.8%. If the ratio is similar in 2025, then carbon intensity would need to fall by around 2.5% at a minimum, allowing CO2 emissions to increase by more than 2%, if the target for 5% GDP growth is also met.

The absence of a carbon intensity target and the lack of emphasis on reducing carbon intensity also signals that meeting the target is not seen as a priority at the moment.

The government work plan emphasised the “dual-carbon” goals of peaking CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.

However, these goals allow CO2 emissions to continue to increase until the end of the decade, implying the potential for a significant absolute emission increase from 2024 levels by 2030. The “dual-carbon” goals, even if met, therefore do not guarantee the delivery of China’s current key international climate commitment, the 2030 carbon-intensity target.

Even if emissions fell this year, improvements to carbon intensity would need to accelerate sharply in the next five years to meet China’s 2030 Paris commitment.

If China remains committed to its 2030 pledge, then this acceleration would need to be reflected in the targets set in the country’s next five-year plan.

§ Outlook for 2025 and beyond

The past 12 months mark a potentially significant turning point for China’s CO2 emissions, with clean-energy growth for the first time outpacing demand growth and displacing fossil fuel use in the power sector.

Record-breaking clean energy additions expected in 2025, despite new pricing policy uncertainties, suggest that the trend will continue this year.

The longer-term trajectory depends heavily on the targets set in the upcoming five-year plan and on the economic policy response to US tariffs and other economic headwinds.

In the short term, the US tariffs will dampen energy demand growth and emissions. Economic policy designed to offset the impacts of Trump’s tariffs will likely boost the clean-energy sector further and might lead to a shift towards domestic consumption as an economic driver, implying lower energy consumption growth relative to GDP. 

On the other hand, previous rounds of economic stimulus in China have led to sharp increases in emissions. If China is to deliver stimulus that targets consumption and new technology, rather than emissions-intensive construction and heavy industry, then it will require a significant break with earlier patterns.

Whether power-sector emissions have peaked will be determined by a race between growth in clean energy supply and total power demand growth. 

The new renewable electricity pricing policy, which ties the volume of “contracts for difference” given out to new solar and wind projects to national clean energy targets, further increases the importance of target-setting in China’s upcoming 2035 climate targets under the Paris Agreement and in the next 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030.

Sector-by-sector analysis suggests that, in addition to the power sector, emissions have likely also peaked in the building materials and steel sectors, as well as oil products consumption.

These sectors together represent over 80% of China’s fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions. However, there are uncertainties and potential for short-term rebound in all of these sectors.

The sector with remaining potential for substantial emissions growth is coal-to-chemicals. The drop in oil prices after US tariff announcements will undermine the profitability of this sector and likely lead to lower utilisation of plants, even as more capacity is added. China’s counter-tariffs on imports of petrochemical products from the US could have benefited the industry – but these have reportedly been waived.

All of this suggests that there is potential for China’s emissions to continue to fall and for the country to achieve substantial absolute emissions reductions over the next five years.

However, policy choices working in the opposite direction could just as easily see emissions increase further towards 2030.

§ About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.

§ Machinery-related emissions

Food systems are responsible for around one-third of human-driven greenhouse gas emissions. 

This figure includes everything associated with producing food – from the emissions caused by deforestation or other land-use changes to the methane belched by cows or off-gassed from manure.

In the new study, researchers rely on data from the China Statistical Yearbook, which provides annual statistics on a wide range of socioeconomic indicators. From the yearbook, the researchers use data on both the quantity and power of agricultural machinery in use in the country, as well as the properties of the fuel used in the machinery, cultivated land area, population and more. 

In addition to CO2 emissions, the researchers calculate the machinery-related emissions of three types of air pollutants: fine particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and total hydrocarbons (THC). 

They divide the equipment into four categories: small tractors, large tractors, field-management machinery and harvest machinery. Then, they calculate the CO2, PM2.5, NOx and THC emissions for each type of machinery in each year.

The chart below shows the CO2 emissions for the study period of 1985 to 2020. The bars show emissions resulting from harvesting machinery (light blue), field-management machinery (pink), small tractors (light green) and large tractors (dark green). 

They find that the total farm equipment CO2 emissions have increased from around 23m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) in 1985 to nearly 160MtCO2 in 2020, growing annually by a rate of 5.7%. 

This is equivalent to around 1.5% of the country’s total emissions in 2020. While this is only a small percentage, the amount of CO2 actually exceeds the annual emissions of entire countries – such as the Netherlands, the Philippines and Nigeria, the authors note.

In particular, the emissions contribution of large tractors has increased steadily since 2005. The authors attribute this to a “series of policies to promote large-scale machinery”. 

Disaggregating the emissions of agricultural machinery from food systems more broadly “provides a unique perspective”, says Prof Zhangcai Qin, from Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China. Qin, who was not involved in the new study, says that doing so “allow[s] policymakers to design targeted interventions without compromising agricultural productivity”.

§ Regional breakdown

The researchers also break the emissions down to the province level, finding a large range of agricultural machinery emissions – from 0.1MtCO2 for the lowest-emitting provinces to 17.5MtCO2 for the highest emitters.

They find that five provinces in eastern and north-eastern China – Shandong, Henan, Heilongjiang, Hebei and Anhui – account for more than 40% of agricultural machinery emissions. Together, those provinces contain one-third of the country’s cropland area and about 46% of the total engine power. 

However, even between these high-emitting regions, the makeup of the machinery was different, with some provinces more dependent on large tractors and some more dominated by field-management machinery.

The sub-national emissions analysis is one of the key advances of the new research, says Dr Hannah Ritchie, deputy editor at Our World in Data. Ritchie, who was not involved in the study, explains: 

“This spatial resolution of emissions estimates is valuable, because there is such large [variety] across a country of China’s size. It also offers important insights into potential emissions pathways in the future, under different rates of mechanisation and low-carbon technology uptake.”

§ Growth factors

The researchers identify four socioeconomic factors contributing to the rise in emissions: population growth, changes in per-capita cropland area, level of mechanisation and emissions intensity. 

The chart below shows the change in CO2 emissions (black) due to changes in emission intensity (dark blue), level of mechanisation (light blue), per-capita cropland area (yellow) and population (orange). 

Of those, the increasing level of mechanisation “dominate[s]” the change in emissions, the paper says. It notes that these changes alone were responsible for around a 100% increase in emissions over 1985-2000. 

Population growth was another large driver of increasing farm equipment emissions over the early part of the study period, the study notes, but it has been less of a factor since 2000. 

In contrast, increasing emissions intensity uniformly acted to decrease emissions, the authors say, while “tillage pressure” increased emissions early on in the study period, but decreased emissions since 2000.

§ Carbon goals

Under current policies, China aims to “achieve comprehensive mechanisation in major crop production processes by 2035”, the authors note.

Therefore, unabated continued growth of agricultural mechanisation could compromise China’s efforts to achieve its “dual-carbon” goals, they warn. 

(The term “dual-carbon” goals refers to the country’s pledge to reach peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.)

They write that effective mitigation of these emissions will require different strategies in the short- and long-term future, noting that near-term availability means that “biofuels and natural gas [will] play an important role over the coming decade”. 

In the longer term, they say, renewable energy sources, as well as green hydrogen, “have the largest mitigation potential”. Previous work has shown that using automated equipment, electric tractors and renewable energy sources can reduce agricultural emissions by 90%.

Ritchie says she is “a bit sceptical that the relative contributions of agricultural machinery will be as high as 20% in 2050”. She adds:

“This rests on the assumption that these emissions go mostly unabated, while most other sectors rapidly decline. If China is making rapid progress in reducing emissions from other emitters, including larger on-road transport, such as trucks and other agricultural emissions…then I expect it will have made significant progress in the decarbonisation of agricultural machinery too.”

§ Consistent and coherent

Much of the existing research into the “adaptation gap” focuses on the difference between the climate measures a city needs and what action has actually been taken.

But there is another key part of the adaptation gap – whether the policies and measures are actually internally consistent.

Ideally, we would expect adaptation efforts to be “joined-up” along the policy chain. 

For example, where climate risk assessments suggest that a city faces specific threats from storms, flash flooding, heatwaves, forest fires or drought, these vulnerabilities should be linked directly to the municipality’s adaptation goals, policies and the monitoring and evaluation processes. 

Additionally, we might hope that city governments would involve those at risk from severe climate impacts, such as vulnerable population groups, industries and sectors of the economy, in decisions as to how they will be protected. 

If these different phases of adaptation management are misaligned and inconsistent, we can see how cities and societies are less likely to deal with the impact of severe weather events effectively.

§ ‘Consistency checks’

We developed a series of “consistency checks” to identify the extent to which different stages of the adaptation management process are aligned.

These include: 

1. Consistency between hazards identified in a risk assessment and a city’s adaptation goals.
2. Consistency between the risks to specific sectors and detailed policy measures.
3. Consistency between the risks faced by vulnerable groups and detailed policy measures.
4. Consistency between the policy measures targeted at vulnerable groups and monitoring and evaluation processes to ensure they are being implemented.
5. Consistency between the risks faced by vulnerable groups and their involvement in decision-making.

We use these checks to assess the adaptation strategies of European cities. For this, we use an existing dataset of the local adaptation plans of more than 300 cities.

(The dataset covers the 27 member countries of the EU, plus the UK. It aims to cover around 20% of the population of each country and include national and regional capitals where possible. In general, it covers large cities with more than 250,000 people and medium-size urban areas with more than 50,000 people.)

We find that nearly half (49%) of the plans do align climate risks with climate goals. Slightly more than half (52%) align identified sectoral risks with respective measures, but only regarding specific economic sectors and industries.

For example, 68 cities (77%) identify particular risks for buildings, while 70 cities (80%) highlight risks to the water industry and include details of measures to protect these sectors.

However, identified risks for vulnerable groups, such as risks for older people, those on low-incomes and ethnic minorities, were only followed-up with consistent measures in 43% of the plans. 

Also, only 4% of cities consider or involve vulnerable groups in monitoring and evaluation (if they identified these groups at risk) – and only 1% of cities were effectively engaging vulnerable communities in plan development.  

Given that the least powerful members of society are often the most vulnerable to climate change, there is a real risk that they will be further exposed to severe weather events. 

Overall, when assessing each of the five consistency checks in all 167 plans, we find inconsistencies in more than two-thirds (70%). This is despite the fact that adaptation planning in Europe has improved over time – as we highlighted in a previous Carbon Brief article.

The findings are illustrated in the map below, which shows the 167 cities with adaptation plans. The coloured dots indicate the extent to which each city’s plan is inconsistent (indicating a potential adaptation gap) – taken as an average across the five checks set out in our study.

Green dots indicate plans that are fully consistent, with a sliding scale of inconsistency through yellow, orange and red. The maximum inconsistency identified in the study is an adaptation gap of 79.6% – found in Nuremberg, Germany. But Stuttgart and Schwerin in Germany and Birmingham in the UK are close behind, with an average “gap” score of more than 78%.

§ Lack of adaptation plans

Significantly, our research finds that only 167 of the 327 cities – just over half of those in the database – had even produced a climate adaptation plan by the study’s cut-off date of December 2020. 

As such, we were unable to assess how a huge number of places across Europe are planning to deal with climate threats – regardless of whether their activities are misaligned or not. 

(Although many cities will have published adaptation plans since this date, it is not clear how coherent their activities are likely to be, nor whether they take sufficient account of the needs of vulnerable groups.)

Overall, our research suggests a greater need for city and national governments to base their adaptation policies on robust risk assessments and to monitor progress accordingly – particularly with the most vulnerable social groups in society in mind. 

Our findings highlight the importance of focusing on those who are most vulnerable to climate change, by involving them in decision-making and targeting specific measures at these groups. 

§ This week

Australia votes for climate action

CLIMATE PROMISE: Australia’s Labor party has secured a second term in power following a landslide election victory, reported CNN. Prime minister Anthony Albanese “reiterated his commitment to climate action” and his government’s target to reach net-zero by 2050, added the outlet. Bloomberg said Albanese’s “next campaign” is to stave off Turkey to secure hosting the COP31 climate summit, along with Pacific nations, in 2026.
PUBLIC SUPPORT: The Conversation said that Australia now has “five huge climate opportunities”, including setting an ambitious new international climate pledge for 2035. Columnist David Fickling wrote in Bloomberg that the “historic” victory of the Labor party proved the right-wing opposition party’s plan to replace “renewables-focused climate targets with a switch to nuclear energy” was not widely supported. Guardian Australia’s climate and environment editor Adam Morton said that the country “backed a rapid shift to renewable energy”.

EU eyes renewable future

RUSSIAN GAS: The European Commission published a “roadmap” for ending reliance on Russian energy, which includes a ban on all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, BBC News reported, adding that the bloc hopes to move away by “accelerating the deployment of renewable energy”. Meanwhile, Chinese president Xi Jinping was expected to talk about the China-Russia Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which could send 50bn cubic metres of gas to China, during his visit to Moscow this week, the Guardian reported. 
SPAIN’S TRANSITION: Following last week’s blackout in Spain and Portugal, the Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez said that he will not deviate a “single millimetre” from his commitment to renewable energy, calling it “our country’s energy future” and “our only and best option”, reported the Financial Times. Sanchez rejected nuclear-power advocates, saying the blackout was used as an excuse for a “gigantic manipulation exercise”, reported the Daily Telegraph.

Trump regime continues

DISASTERS DELETED: The New York Times reported that the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has announced that it will stop tracking the cost of the country’s most expensive disasters – defined as those that cause at least $1bn in damage. The newspaper described this as the “latest effort from the Trump administration to restrict or eliminate climate research”.
MORE TRUMP: The Trump administration also proposed to cut more than $21bn in climate-related funding, including $15bn for carbon capture and renewable energy and $6bn for electric-vehicle chargers, reported Reuters. Elsewhere, two major science unions pledged to produce “over 29 peer-reviewed journals that will cover all aspects of climate change” after the administration dismissed a “key Congress-mandated report on climate”, reported the Guardian.

§ Around the world

• UN REFORM: The UN is “considering sweeping reforms”, which could “integrate” the “climate change arm” into the “environment programme”, following “even deeper funding cuts” from the Trump administration, said the Financial Times. The newspaper added that the reform memo also “mulled whether the COP climate change summit…‘should be discontinued’ in its current form”.
• WINDFARM BLOW: The construction of Hornsea 4, a windfarm that aimed to add 2.4GW to the UK’s clean energy capacity, was cancelled by its Danish owner Ørsted, reported BBC News. The Guardian said the decision was a “major blow to the government’s plan to quadruple the UK’s offshore wind capacity by the end of the decade”. 
• CHINA EXTREME WEATHER: Upcoming “hot and dry” weather will pose risks to the wheat harvest in China’s Henan province, which accounted for nearly a third of the nation’s total wheat output in 2024, Bloomberg reported. 
• METHANE EMISSIONS: Record fossil-fuel production pushed methane emissions close to an all-time high in 2024, according to a report by the International Energy Agency, covered by Agence France-Presse.

§ 65%

The proportion of global warming from 1990-2020 that the “wealthiest 10%” of people are “responsible” for, according to research covered by Carbon Brief.

§ Latest climate research

• Research in PLOS Climate found that just 4% of hyperlinks point to “scientific sources” in 1.3m posts and 20.3m comments related to climate change on Reddit from 2009-22. 
• Climate change intensified deadly rainfall and made storms more likely to occur in Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee and other states across the US south and midwest in early April, a new World Weather Attribution analysis found.
• Science Advances published a study finding that an unprecedented surge in concurrent heatwave-drought events from Eastern Europe to East Asia has been “amplified” by climate change.

For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

§ Captured

Children born in 2020 – of which there are about 124 million – will face “unprecedented exposure” to extreme weather events, even if global warming is limited to 1.5C by the end of the century, according to a new study published in Nature and covered by Carbon Brief. The chart above illustrates how many millions of children born in 2020 are expected to face a range of extremes, from heatwaves to tropical cyclones, throughout their lifetime at 1.5C (dark blue), compared to even higher levels of warming. Limiting global warming to 1.5C could save 77.2 million children from exposure to extremes, the research concluded.

§ Watch, read, listen

WEATHER AND PANGOLINS: A TEDxLondon podcast focused on how crop failure, drought and extreme weather are damaging the livelihood of pangolins. 

DEEP DIVE: A new feature-length documentary “Ocean With David Attenborough” is in cinemas now. 
US AND CLIMATE: An editorial in the Break-Down, a new publication focusing on the “political economy of climate and ecological crisis”, dissects “this moment in climate politics”.

§ Coming up

• 10-11 May: 2025 international workshop on methane observation and quantification, Xuzhou, China
• 12 May: Philippines elections
• 12-14 May: African Union conference on debt, Lomé, Togo
• 14 May: NDC partnership public webinar, online

§ Pick of the jobs

• BBC World Service, science/climate journalist and senior science/climate journalist | Salary: £28,000-£35,000 and £42,000-£49,000. Location: London
• Global Renewables Alliance, various roles | Salary: Unknown. Location: Various
• EarthRights International, Mekong communications manager | Salary: Unknown. Location: Chiang Mai, Thailand

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

§ Intergenerational justice

As the planet warms, extreme weather events such as heatwaves, floods and droughts are becoming more intense, more frequent and lasting longer.

A popular 2021 study found that children born in the 21st century will be exposed to more extreme weather events in their lifetimes than their parents and grandparents.

The paper found that in a scenario of 3C of warming above pre-industrial levels, a child who turns six in 2020 will experience twice as many wildfires and tropical cyclones, three times more river floods, four times more crop failures, five times more droughts and 36 times more heatwaves over their lifetime than a six-year-old living in a pre-industrial climate.

The authors also found a “particularly strong increase” in children’s future exposure to extremes in the Middle East and North Africa.

The lead author of the study – Prof Wim Thiery from Vrije Universiteit Brussel – told Carbon Brief at the time that today’s youth will live “an unprecedented life”, in which they will “face conditions which older generations have never experienced”.

Four years later, Dr Luke Grant – a researcher in Thiery’s team – has led a new study building on the ideas of the 2021 paper.

Grant tells Carbon Brief that rather than counting the number of extreme events that an individual might experience, his new study counts the number of people that reach an “unprecedented state” of exposure to extremes.

Prof Kaveh Madani is the director of the UN University Institute for Water, Environment and Health and was not involved in the study. He tells Carbon Brief that the paper “helps the climate community build new narratives that better clarify the impacts [of climate change] on younger generations and vulnerable populations”.

The authors define “exposure” as the number of extreme events that a person experiences in their lifetime, relative to the number they would have experienced in a pre-industrial climate.

“Unprecedented lifetime exposure” is defined as exposure so high that it has only a one-in-10,000 chance of happening in a world without any greenhouse gas emissions.

§ ‘Unprecedented lifetime exposure’

The authors present a case study of extreme heat in Brussels, Belgium, to explain their method.

They define a heatwave as a three-day extreme heat event, which reaches average temperatures that would be expected once per century in a pre-industrial climate.

Using models from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP), the authors calculate heatwave frequency in a world without climate change. They also assess scenarios in which warming is limited to 1.5C, 2.5C and 3.5C by the end of the century.

They combine this data with demographic information, including how many people are born in the country each year and their average life expectancy, using data from sources including the ISIMIP database and UN population estimates and projections.

In a world without climate change, the study finds that a person born in 1960 in Brussels would have a one-in-10,000 chance of experiencing six of the pre-defined heatwaves in their lifetime. Any member of this “birth cohort” who experiences more than six heatwaves in their lifetime has therefore faced “unprecedented lifetime exposure” to extreme heat, according to the study.

The authors find that a person born in Brussels in 1960 is likely to experience three heatwaves on average during their lives under all of the three future warming pathways– meaning that they are unlikely to face “unprecedented lifetime exposure” to heat.

By contrast, the researchers find that many younger age cohorts will experience unprecedented heatwave exposure. For many younger age cohorts, lifetime exposure to heatwaves is greater for higher warming pathways. 

For example, people born in Brussels in 2020 will experience 11 heatwaves in their lifetime if global warming is limited to 1.5C by the end of the century. If warming rises to 2.5C or 3.5C, they could experience 18 or 26 heatwaves, respectively. 

The graphic below shows heat exposure since birth in Brussels for three “birth cohorts” of 1960 (bottom row), 1990 (middle row) and 2020 (top row). It presents three future scenarios, in which warming is limited to 1.5C (blue), 2.5C (yellow) and 3.5C (red) by 2100. The dotted line shows the threshold for an “unprecedented” lifetime exposure to extreme heat. 

§ Heat exposure

The authors repeat their analysis across the Earth’s entire land surface, by dividing it into grid cells and using location-specific temperature and demographic data. 

Of the 81 million people born in 1960, they find that 13 million are likely to face unprecedented exposure to heatwaves in their lifetimes. They add that for this age cohort, lifetime exposure to unprecedented extremes does not vary depending on the warming scenario.

However, 21st century warming has a significant effect on exposure for younger generations. Under a 1.5C warming pathway, 52% of people born in 2020 will face unprecedented exposure to heatwaves. This rises to 92% under a 3.5C warming scenario.

The study adds:

“This implies that 111 million children born in 2020 will live an unprecedented life in terms of heatwave exposure in a world that warms to 3.5C versus 62 million in a 1.5C pathway.”

The charity Save the Children has published a report which unpacks the findings of the study. The graphic below, from the report, shows the percentage of people from different countries born in 2020 who will face unprecedented lifetime exposure to heatwaves under the 1.5C (top), 2.5C (middle) and 3.5C (bottom) warming scenarios.

Each circle shows a country, indicated by its three-letter countries code. The size of the circle indicates the number of people in the country. Darker circles indicate higher-income countries. 

Circles on the right hand side of the graphic indicate that more than half of the country’s 2020 cohort will be exposed to unprecedented heatwaves in their lifetime. 

“The evidence is now inescapable that heatwaves impact every community around the world,” Dr Luke Harrington, a senior lecturer in environmental science at the University of Waikato, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief. He adds: 

“This paper offers the clearest view that climate change is verifiably unfair: those who have done the least to contribute to rising global temperatures will experience the most extreme impacts.”

§ From floods to fires

The authors apply the same method to five other climate extremes – crop failure, wildfires, droughts, floods and tropical cyclones.

The graphic below shows the key findings. The coloured portion of the bar shows the number of people born in 2020 who will face unprecedented exposure to each extreme under a 1.5C warming pathway. The dark green and light green bars show the additional exposure under 2.7C and 3.5C warming.

The authors find that unprecedented lifetime exposure to heatwaves will affect the most people, with 62 million people born in 2020 likely to face unprecedented exposure to heat in their lifetimes if warming is limited to 1.5C.

This is followed by crop failures and river floods, which will impact 23 million and 10 million people from the 2020 birth cohort under the 1.5C warming pathway, respectively.

Lead author Grant tells Carbon Brief that he is “most confident” about his heatwave findings because temperature is a “basic” metric for climate models to “get right”.

Meanwhile, extremes such as crop failure depend on a range of factors including soil moisture, land-atmosphere interactions and rainfall, which can make it harder for the models to accurately capture changes, Grant explains.

§ Vulnerability

The authors also assess how “socioeconomic vulnerability” affects their findings using a global deprivation index – a tool which measures the level of disadvantage and hardship experienced by individuals or communities in a particular geographic area.

The authors use the index to identify the 20% most and least vulnerable people in each age cohort. They find that the most vulnerable groups are overwhelmingly from African countries.

The authors also conclude that “socioeconomically vulnerable people have a consistently higher chance of facing unprecedented lifetime heatwave exposure compared to the least vulnerable members of their generation”.

The graph below, taken from a news and views article about the study, shows the percentage of high vulnerability (red) and low vulnerability (pink) people in each age cohort who would be exposed to unprecedented heat, under a 2.7C warming scenario. 

Dr Marina Romanello, a research fellow at the University College London and research director of the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the paper “is an important addition to the scientific literature, showing how our delays in tackling climate change are putting the future of our children at risk”. 

She adds:

“The authors have used well-established models to project future health threats, framing them around what matters the most: the wellbeing, health and survival of present and future generations.”

§ Key developments

US ocean actions cause alarm

DEEP-SEA BREACHES: US president Donald Trump signed an executive order “aimed at making it easier for companies to mine the deep seafloor”, including in international waters, according to National Public Radio. BBC News reported that the move “has been met by condemnation from China, which said it ‘violates’ international law”. In the South China Morning Post, two researchers at Nanjing University wrote that the order “will force China to act”, adding that Trump has “set the stage for heightened geopolitical tensions”. They concluded: “Should the US insist on unilateral mining, China, in collaboration with international partners, may implement maritime monitoring initiatives…[that] could document the environmental impact and breaches of standards.”

RISKY BUSINESS: Meanwhile, a Trump proclamation to loosen fishing regulations surrounding federally protected areas of the ocean – issued in mid-April – “poses major risks”, the Guardian reported. The Pacific Islands Heritage Marine national monument is home to the “most undisturbed coral reef within the US”, as well as “many threatened, endangered and depleted species”, the outlet added. Other experts said that the order – which purportedly aims to promote US fishing interests – “will negatively impact American fishers in the long run, leading to higher seafood prices for American consumers”.

OCEAN FUNDING FALLS: The 10th edition of the Our Ocean conference was held in Busan, South Korea, over 28-30 April, EFE Verde reported, where it was “attended by ministerial representatives from 100 different countries”. The newswire added that the conference would “serve as an impetus for participants to announce effective actions to accelerate the achievement of the goal of protecting 30% of the world’s oceans by 2030”. According to Mongabay, delegates to the conference announced funding commitments “totalling around $9.1bn”, but added that “this year’s numbers were the lowest since 2016”. The outlet noted that this edition was the first time the US “did not send an official delegation or make any pledges”.

Between tariffs and traceability

TARIFF-DRIVEN DEFORESTATION: US tariffs on Indonesian and Malaysian palm oil could drive up demand for soybean oil – a cheaper but more land-intensive option – and exacerbate deforestation, according to climate experts consulted by BusinessGreen. Elsewhere, Dialogue Earth reported on expectations that Brazil could expand its export of agricultural commodities to China, increasing the risk of deforestation in the South American country. Experts told the outlet that products such as soya, corn, beef and chicken could experience a surge in international demand. It added that Brazil captured a significant share of the Chinese soya market from the US during Trump’s first term.

BACKWARDS STEPS: Brazil’s supreme court ruled that Mato Grosso, the country’s biggest farming state, is allowed to withdraw tax incentives for signatories of the “soy moratorium” initiative, Reuters reported. The soy moratorium, a 2006 voluntary ban aimed at disincentivising soybean purchases from deforested areas of the Amazon, has been praised by conservationists for “slowing damage to the world’s largest rainforest”, the newswire said. However, farm lobbyists interested in increasing production are opposed to the agreement. The ruling needs to be ratified by a panel of supreme court justices before entering into force in January 2026.

COFFEE TRACEABILITY: The EU deforestation regulation has coffee farmers in Ethiopia “scrambling”, the New York Times reported. Under the new EU environmental regulation, which will enter into force at the end of the year, producers of major commodity crops will have to provide geolocation data to demonstrate that their products were not grown on recently deforested land. The outlet quoted the head of a coffee farmers’ cooperative, who said they need support to carry out the traceability of their products, adding that to do so is “very challenging and costly, and we don’t have any help”. 

§ Spotlight

The climate uncertainties for west Africa’s fishers

This week, Carbon Brief unpacks three key takeaways from a recent report, published by the Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability, on the sustainability of west African fisheries.

In west Africa, coastal fishing communities underpin a large proportion of the region’s economies and traditional ways of life. 

Their number has only increased in recent years as a result of population growth and migration, driven by economic opportunity – even as fishers have faced declining catches.

A new report detailed the challenges facing the Gulf of Guinea’s fisherfolk amid a warming climate, as well as offering insight into what the future of the fishery could look like.

Here, Carbon Brief unpacked three key messages from the report.

1. Key fish catches have declined dramatically since the 1990s. 

The report identified three major factors that have contributed to the decline of fish stocks in the Gulf of Guinea: climate-change-driven ocean warming, illegal fishing by industrial Chinese trawling ships and overfishing by fisherfolk using traditional methods. 

According to the report, sea surface temperatures along the Ghanaian coast have increased at a rate of 0.011C annually since the 1960s – and could increase by another 1.6C by the end of the century under a high-emissions scenario. This warming is driving “significant geographic shifts” in the range of the species targeted by west Africa’s fisherfolk, the report said. 

The report also identified other climate-driven threats to fishers, such as sea level rise, deoxygenation of ocean waters and beach erosion.

As a result of dwindling numbers, catches have fallen significantly – in some cases, by more than 50% – since the early 1990s “despite an increased number of workdays spent fishing, evidence of an underlying stock collapse”, the report warned.

Even under good fisheries management in the future, the report warned that the maximum catch potential will continue to decline due to warming. 

2. Current management strategies are not sufficient to allow fish stocks to recover.

The climate pressures on the Gulf of Guinea fish stocks are compounded by overfishing from two main sources – industrial trawling ships, predominantly from China, and an increasing number of artisanal fisherfolk using improved equipment, such as outboard motors. 

Ghana’s artisanal fishing fleet has grown from around 8,000 canoes in 1990 to more than 12,000 in 2022. Previous research has estimated that this fleet lands up to 70% of the small fish taken in the country. The report did not mince words:

“They clearly contribute to overfishing.”

Both Ghana and neighbouring Ivory Coast have implemented “closed seasons” during peak spawning months in an attempt to allow the fish populations to recover, but the policies “have produced disappointing results so far”, the report noted. It said:

“To be technically effective in rebuilding fish stocks, the closed seasons should have begun prior to 2016, before spawning stock biomass had been so badly harmed.”

3. Diversifying income will be key for adapting these communities to climate change.

The researchers surveyed fishing communities in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria that relied on fishing for “nearly all” of their livelihoods. Most of the individuals identified a decrease in catch over the preceding years.

A large majority of respondents answered “no” when asked if their children would be able to make a living off fishing or fishing-related activities.

The researchers then evaluated programmes in Ghana, undertaken alongside the US Agency for International Development, that were focused on helping fishing households diversify their income. The weekly earnings “were far from a full replacement for fishing income, but to a varying extent they did provide a useful supplement”, the authors wrote. 

However, funding for these programmes was cancelled by the Trump administration in its attempt to dismantle USAID in early 2025. The report added:

“Finding substitute funding…will be difficult.”

§ News and views

CONSERVATION REFORM: The Washington Post editorial board called for “reforming” the US Endangered Species Act “to better incentivise citizens to protect the country’s precious biodiversity”, amid Trump’s attempted weakening of the landmark law. It argued for “giving landowners financial incentives to assist in conservation efforts” – similar to existing subsidy programmes from the US agriculture department. The editorial said: “The scale of the threats to biodiversity…makes it essential to expand federal conservation strategy beyond punitive measures.”

IMPORT IMBALANCE: Amid growing US-China tensions, top Chinese policymakers “said the country could do without American farm and energy imports”, according to the Financial Times. China’s state planner, Zhao Chenxin, “said domestic farm and energy production, along with imports from non-US sources, would be more than enough to satisfy demand”, the outlet reported. At the same time, the FT said, the “loss of the Chinese market would be a substantial hit for US farmers”. It added: “China has shown little appetite for negotiations and repeatedly blasted Washington’s claims of ongoing discussions as false.”

WAYWARD WHALES: Australia’s whale-watching season “started early” this year, according to the Sydney Morning Herald, which said the early migration was a “possible sign of stress from climate change”. A population of humpback whales migrates from Antarctica to Australia at the end of the southern hemisphere summer in “one of the longest migrations of any mammal”, the outlet said. The newspaper cited Dr Olaf Meynecke, a research fellow at Australia’s Griffith University, who explained that the “earlier migration was probably because record-low sea ice reduced krill numbers, making it harder for whales to find food”.

COFFEE GOES UP: The Associated Press reported that coffee prices have remained high due to drought and heat last year that impacted production in Brazil and Vietnam, the world’s largest coffee growers. US tariffs on coffee-producing countries “are expected to drive up costs for Americans”, the newswire added. Elsewhere, extreme weather conditions, such as drought and tropical cyclones, have affected major coconut-growing countries, with the Philippines’ output expected to decline by 20%, Bloomberg reported.

OFFSET OPPOSITION: Inhabitants of the Kajiado county, in Kenya, clashed over a carbon-offsetting initiative that would have set up a 40-year land lease deal, the Daily Nation reported. The project involved leasing 168,000 acres of the community’s ancestral land in return for “promis[ed] financial benefits”. Opponents of the deal said they were “misled and misinformed about the whole process”, but the community’s chair “dismissed the allegations of fraud or coercion”. The final signing of the deal was “postponed indefinitely”, as the two sides could not come to an agreement. 

INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTING: Science Feedback questioned a recent study, published in Environmental Research Letters and covered in the media, that claimed agriculture is the largest greenhouse gas-emitting sector. According to climate scientists consulted by the outlet, while methane emissions from agriculture and fossil fuels are comparable, fossil fuels have a greater impact on CO2 emissions. Prof Pierre Friedlingstein, a climate scientist at the University of Exeter, told the outlet that the paper only considered gross emissions, not factoring in the carbon sequestration that occurs in agriculture.

§ Watch, read, listen

ATTENBOROUGH’S OCEAN: BBC News covered Sir David Attenborough’s new documentary, which chronicles the Earth’s oceans.

SIGHTING BIRDS: The New York Times chronicled a bird-watching trip to the Panama Canal, home to a thousand native and migratory birds.

WHALE SONGS: A Mongabay podcast interviewed biological oceanographer Dr John Ryan, who explained why listening to whales’ songs is important for their conservation. 

FORESTS MONITORING: A short video by France24 featured the European Space Agency’s new satellite, which is aimed at monitoring the world’s forests.

§ New science

• Research published in Nature Ecology & Evolution found that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to preserving biodiversity amid growing agriculture. The scientists found that neither agricultural expansion and intensification “consistently benefits biodiversity” and urged a “context-dependent balance” between the two.
• Intense tropical cyclones may pose an extinction risk to organisms living on five island chains that are biodiversity hotspots, a Biological Conservation study found. The researchers tracked the trajectory and frequency of severe tropical cyclones over the last 50 years and used the IUCN red list to identify species at risk.
• Another Nature Ecology and Evolution study found that implementing strategic restoration measures – such as those outlined in the EU nature restoration law – could improve the conservation status of more than 20% of endangered species and increase carbon sequestration.

§ In the diary

• 5-8 May: World Bank Land Conference | Washington DC
• 5-9 May: 20th session of the UN Forum on Forests | New York
• 10 May: World Migratory Bird Day
• 22 May: International Day for Biological Diversity

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

§ Emissions inequality

Humans emit more than 40bn tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere every year. Developed countries are responsible for the majority of global emissions, as a result of the typically more carbon-intensive lifestyles of their residents. 

Meanwhile, the most severe impacts of climate change are disproportionately felt by the poorest and most vulnerable people.

The new study uses an income and wealth inequality dataset from the World Inequality Database to track inequality over 1990-2019, showing how much the world’s wealthiest 10%, 1% and 0.1% of society have contributed to warming over 1990-2020. (For details on the method, see the modelling inequalities section below.)

The world’s wealthiest 10% all earn more than €42,980 (£36,605) per year, according to the database. Meanwhile, the world’s wealthiest 0.1% earn more than €537,770 (£458,011) per year.

Of the 0.61C increase in global average temperatures over 1990-2020, the authors estimate that 65% was due to the emissions of the wealthiest 10% of people on the planet. For the wealthiest 0.1%, the estimate is 8%.

The graph below shows how much global temperatures would have risen over 1990-2020 if everyone in the world emitted as much as the world’s poorest 50% (purple), middle 40% (green), richest 10% (orange), richest 1% (blue) and richest 0.1% (pink) people. The grey bar shows how much global temperatures actually rose. 

The authors find that if the whole world had emitted as much as the wealthiest 10% of people over 1990-2020, global average temperatures would have risen by 2.9C, instead of 0.61C. If the global population had emissions as large as the wealthiest 0.1%, temperatures would have risen by 12.2C.

Meanwhile, the study calculates that if the whole world had emissions as low as the poorest 50%, global temperatures would have remained close to 1990 levels.

§ Hot and dry extremes

As greenhouse gas emissions cause the climate to warm, extreme weather events such as heatwaves and droughts are becoming more intense, frequent and long-lasting. 

The authors use attribution – a field of climate science that aims to identify the “fingerprint” of global warming on these events – to determine the contribution of the emissions of the world’s wealthiest people to the increasing frequency of heatwaves and droughts.

The authors assess “extremely hot” and “extremely dry” months, defined as the most extreme 1% of months in a pre-industrial climate during the hottest month of the year regionally. (In a pre-industrial climate, only one of each extreme would be expected every 100 years on average.)

The graphs below show the number of additional heatwaves (left) and droughts (right) that have occurred since 1990 due to climate change in different regions of the world. 

The full bar shows the total number of additional heatwaves due to human-cased climate change in each region. The green bar shows additional occurrences due to the wealthiest 1%. The green and orange bars combined show the wealthiest 10%.

The numbers in green and orange show how much the wealthiest 1% and 10% of the planet contributed to the extreme, compared to the global average. (For example, an orange number of 7.0 means that the wealthiest 10% of people contributed seven times more to the extreme event than the global average.)

The study finds that an average of 11.5 additional heat events observed in August – the month where the rise in heat extremes is, on average, most pronounced – are attributable to the wealthiest 10%.

It also calculates that emissions from this group resulted in, on average, an additional 2.3 droughts in the Amazon in October – the month with the strongest attributable drying trend in the region. 

§ Highest emitters

The authors also assess the contributions of the wealthiest people to climate extremes on a country level, identifying the US, the EU, China and India as the world’s four highest emitting regions. 

The graphic below shows the increase in frequency of one-in-100 year peak summer heat extremes in selected regions attributable to the wealthiest 10% of people (left) and 1% of people (right) in China (red), the US (pink), the EU (peach) and India (blue). 

Emissions from the wealthiest 10% in the US resulted in an average of 1.3 extra heat events globally, the authors find. However, this increase is distributed unevenly across the globe. 

For example, the authors find this income group was responsible for the emissions that contributed to 2.7 additional heat events in “heat-affected areas” such as the Amazon and south-east Africa.

Emissions from the wealthiest 10% of people in the EU resulted in an additional 1.5 heatwaves in both the Amazon and south-east Africa.

Meanwhile, the Amazon faces 2.1 more heat extremes in 2020 than in 1990 due to the emissions of the richest 1% in the US, China, EU and India. 

While inequalities between one country or region and another are well documented, it should also be noted that “inequalities within developing countries are increasing”, Dr Carl Schleussner, study author and leader of the integrated climate impacts research group at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), tells Carbon Brief.

For example, he notes that the paper shows “very high levels” of emissions from “the Chinese middle and upper classes”.

However, he says that many existing global frameworks to address climate change “treat countries as a whole” and fail to “differentiate” between income groups within countries. 

Schleussner argues that the study highlights the need for “progressive policies” for climate action, which involve “tackling particularly high emitters” in all countries. 

Dr Sarah Schöngart, a researcher at ETH Zurich and lead author of the study, tells Carbon Brief that studies such as this could provide important evidence in loss and damage litigation.

Prof Jakob Zscheischler, an Earth system scientist at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research who was not involved in the study, also highlights the ways the findings could be used in climate-change lawsuits. He tells Carbon Brief:

“Quantifying the contribution of individual income groups to global warming and changes in climate extremes is an important step towards targeted policies and further supports climate litigation. Supporting climate injustice with concrete numbers will hopefully help the most vulnerable and least responsible strengthen their case.”

§ Modelling inequalities

The study uses a range of methods to attribute changes in heat and drought to the emissions of particular wealth groups. To model global greenhouse gas emissions by wealth group, the paper uses a “wealth-based carbon inequality assessment” from a 2022 study.

(See Carbon Brief’s coverage of the 2022 study.)

The study uses income and wealth inequality dataset from the World Inequality Database to track inequality over 1990-2019. It combines economic data with information on per-capita carbon footprints – calculated using “input-output” methodologies combined with data from the “distributional national accounts” project.”

The model considers three factors. The first is private consumption – made up of emissions from the direct use of fossil fuels and emissions embedded into goods and services. The second includes emissions from government spending in that person’s country – such as government administration, public roads or defence. The final component of a person’s carbon footprint is from their investments.

The authors then created a series of “counterfactual” emissions pathways, which imagine the world without the emissions of the wealthiest 10%, 1% and 0.1% of society, respectively. The emissions pathways include CO2, methane and nitrous oxide emissions, expressed as CO2-equivalent. 

Lead author Schöngart tells Carbon Brief that including methane in the models is important, because it has “really high potency and near-term warming”. However, she notes that the team needed to make some assumptions about methane emissions – for example, assuming that each income group emits the same relative amount of methane compared to other greenhouse gas emissions. 

Using a “simple” climate model called MAGICC, the authors model global average temperatures under these counterfactual emissions pathways. This allows them to calculate how much the planet would have warmed over 1990-2020 without the emissions of the 10%, 1% and 0.1% of society, respectively.

The authors use the global average temperature trends to produce temperature and rainfall data for every land-based grid square on Earth via a climate model emulator called MESMER.

Schöngart tells Carbon Brief that an emulator is “an approximation of an Earth system model” which “allows us to generate incredible amounts of data”, while using less computing power and taking less time to run. 

The study authors then use attribution methods to identify how the emissions from the world’s wealthiest members of society have affected the frequency of heatwaves and droughts, by comparing the world as it is to a “counterfactual” world without human-caused climate change.

The graphic below shows these steps. 

Earth system scientist Zscheischler praises the methods in the study. He tells Carbon Brief that “the main innovation of work lies in its novel combination of relatively simple emulators that capture the most important relationships between emissions and global warming and changes in extremes”.

He adds that emulators have been evaluated in other studies and are “trustworthy for this type of delicate analysis”. 

Prof Wim Thiery – an associate professor at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, who was not involved in the study – also commends the use of emulators. He tells Carbon Brief that “producing the information presented in this study with a suite of full-blown Earth system models is impossible from a computational cost and human effort perspective”.