These are two key conclusions from the latest report on risks to the government finances from the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), which includes a chapter on climate change.
The new OBR report shows very clearly that the cost of cutting emissions to net-zero is significantly smaller than the economic damages of failing to act.
Here are four key charts from the OBR report.
The UK could take an 8% hit to its economy by the early 2070s, if the world warms by 3C this century, according to the new OBR report.
(This aspect of the OBR report has been picked up in a Reuters headline: “Global 3C warming would hurt UK economy much more than previously predicted, OBR says.”)
Its latest estimate (blue line) of the impact of “climate-related damages” by the 2070s is three percentage points (60%) higher than thought just last year (yellow), as shown in the figure below.
The OBR says that the increase in its estimate of climate damages is due to using a “more comprehensive and up-to-date analysis”.
(The world is currently on track to warm by only slightly less than 3C this century.)
The impact of climate damages on government borrowing would be nearly twice as high by the 2070s, if global warming goes unchecked and reaches 3C, according to the OBR report.
This is shown in the figure below, which compares additional government borrowing each year, as a share of GDP, if warming is limited to less than 2C this century (left) or if it climbs to 3C (right).
The OBR explains that the largest impact of climate damages on government borrowing is “lower productivity and employment and, therefore, lower tax receipts”.
When it comes to cutting UK emissions, the OBR says the government will only need to invest just over half as much on reaching net-zero, compared with what it expected four years earlier.
This is shown in the figure below, with the latest 2025 estimate (right) showing a cumulative government investment of 6% of GDP across the 25 years to 2050, down from 11% (left).
(Note that the large majority of “lost government receipts”, shown in yellow in the figure below, are due to fuel duty evaporating as drivers shift to electric vehicles. As the OBR notes, the government could choose to recoup these losses via other types of motoring taxes.)
The OBR takes its estimates of the costs and benefits of cutting emissions to net-zero from the government’s Climate Change Committee (CCC). The CCC recently issued significantly lower estimates for net-zero investment costs, due to more rapidly falling clean-technology costs.
Acknowledging this shift, the OBR says the latest CCC estimates on the cost of reaching net-zero are “significantly lower” than earlier figures.
It notes that the net cost to the economy of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 is now put at £116bn over 25 years, some £204bn lower than previously expected.
In very rough terms, this figure – which excludes health co-benefits due to cutting emissions and avoided climate damages – is equivalent to less than £70 per person per year.
Taken together, the OBR findings show more clearly than ever before that the cost of taking action to tackle climate change would be far lower than the cost of unchecked warming.
For the first time, its latest report combines the estimated cost of cutting emissions with the expected damages due to rising temperatures in a single figure, shown below.
The comparison illustrates that climate damages (blue bars in the chart) are set to impose severe costs on the UK public finances, even if warming is limited to less than 2C this century (left).
The OBR also shows how the cost of government investment in cutting emissions (yellow) is both temporary and relatively small in comparison to climate damages.
Moreover, it highlights how unchecked warming of 3C this century (right) would impose far higher climate damages on the UK government’s finances than if global temperatures are kept in check.
Specifically, global action to limit warming to 2C instead of 3C could prevent more than 1 percentage point of climate damages being added to annual government borrowing by the 2070s.
In contrast, the combined estimated cost to government of action to cut emissions never exceeds 0.6 percentage points – even if lost receipts due to fuel duty are not replaced (green).
Beyond these new numbers, the OBR acknowledges that it still does not include the cost of adapting to climate change, or the impact this could have on reducing damages.
Nor does it consider the potential for accelerated transitions towards clean energy, technological advances that make this shift cheaper or the risk of tipping points, which could cause “large and irreversible changes” to the global climate.
The event was billed as a “call to action” to the “research community, policymakers and business to raise awareness and understanding of the importance of tipping points and to accelerate the required action”.
As human activity drives global temperatures to record highs, multiple parts of the Earth system are at risk of being pushed beyond thresholds that would see them shift irreversibly into a new state.
The conference also focused heavily on “positive tipping points”, where large-scale, self-propelling social change can reduce the impact of humans on the climate.
Hosted jointly by the Global Systems Institute at the University of Exeter, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology, the conference was the second event dedicated to global tipping points, following the first in 2022.
A statement issued by conference convenors – and endorsed by hundreds of delegates – warned that the window for preventing tipping points is “rapidly closing”.
It called for “immediate, unprecedented action from policymakers worldwide and especially from leaders” at the forthcoming COP30 climate talks in Brazil.
The meeting was part of a week-long Exeter Climate Forum, which also included a separate Climate Conference and a series of community and business-focused events.
In this article, Carbon Brief draws together some of the key talking points, new research and ideas that emerged from the four-day event.
As he opened the conference, Prof Tim Lenton – director of the University of Exeter’s Global Systems Institute and one of three convenors of the event – introduced tipping points and set out the direction of the upcoming four days of talks.
He explained that tipping points are caused by “amplifying feedbacks” in a system becoming “self propelling”. He said these systems are “very hard to reverse and it could be quite abrupt”.
Lenton warned that since the last tipping points conference in 2022, global temperatures have risen, bringing many Earth system tipping points closer.
However, he told the conference that not all tipping points are harmful, distinguishing between a “bad tipping point in the climate or a positive one in societies and technologies”.
Lenton told the conference that “there is a compelling case that we could accelerate out of trouble”, adding that we could “lift [many people] out of harm” by focusing on positive tipping points.
Prof Johan Rockström, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and joint convenor of the conference, talked about the importance of considering planetary boundaries in tipping-points research. This framework sets out nine interlinked thresholds that would ensure a “safe operating space for humanity”.
Rockström told the conference that using this “whole Earth approach” can highlight that thresholds for tipping points may be lower than when only considering climate change.
For example, he said the Amazon rainforest is at risk of crossing a tipping point that could trigger “dieback” at around 3-5C of global warming above pre-industrial levels. However, he said that “transgressing” other thresholds, such as deforestation and moisture levels, could cause the system to tip sooner.
Rockström also argued that Earth system risks have now reached the “global catastrophic” level – defined by the Global Challenges Foundation as an event or process that “would kill or seriously harm more than 10% of the human population”.
He said the collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, the dieback of the Amazon rainforest and the shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) present the greatest risk, as they have a high severity of impact and probability of occurrence.
He closed by arguing that scientists need to better communicate the risks of tipping points to encourage more action.
Prof Ricarda Winkelmann, the third convenor of the conference and professor of climate system analysis at PIK, discussed tipping of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, which together hold enough ice to raise global sea levels by 65 metres.
Winkelmann encouraged the delegates to consider timescales. She described tipping of the ice sheets as “slow-onset systems”, but highlighted that they can also “undergo quick and abrupt changes”.
To demonstrate this, she played a video of “calving” from the Ilulissat glacier in western Greenland. This was the largest calving ever caught on camera, which saw chunks of ice up to 1,000-metres thick break off the main ice sheet, she said.
Winkelmann described a “time clash” between the long-term changes in biophysical systems and short-term changes in socioeconomic systems. She concluded:
“The choices and actions implemented in this decade really have impacts now and also for the next 1,000 years.”
Also in the opening plenary session, Dr Carlos Nobre, a former Earth system scientist at the University of São Paulo, discussed tipping in the Amazon rainforest.
He said that decades of “high-level deforestation and degradation” across the Amazon have resulted in “much less water recycling”, as well as droughts and forest fires, that are creating a “tremendous health problem” for people.
Nobre noted that higher levels of deforestation push down the temperature threshold at which the rainforest could tip from lush rainforest to dry savannah.
He also discussed “nature-based solutions” and the importance of combining scientific knowledge with Indigenous knowledge and local communities.
Dr David Obura, the founding director of CORDIO East Africa and chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), highlighted the importance of the IPBES framing, which emphasises the need to connect nature and people.
He flagged the state of the world’s coral reefs, telling delegates that, as of the end of last year, 44% of the 800 coral reef species studied by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are “threatened”.
Obura added that “ocean temperatures have shot up in the last few years”. However, he warned that looking at temperature alone is insufficient, arguing that there are other physical and socioeconomic factors that need to be understood.
In the panel discussion that followed, Nobre stressed the importance of the COP30 talks in Brazil this year “looking at solutions” to the changing climate. Obura said that humanity has “extracted wealth from nature into economic systems”, arguing that this money must “come back into nature”.
When asked why the risk of tipping points is not being discussed at the UN security council, Rockström flagged an “inability to handle timescales” and said that language around uncertainty allows politicians to “kick the can down the road”.
When asked about the media, Rockström said it is “unfortunate” that humanity is allowing a media landscape that “underplays risk” and allows only “soundbites” from scientists. He added that the “media has a huge responsibility” in the current framing of climate change.
However, Winkelmann said the media “can play an incredibly important role in moving things forward”.
While the central themes of the 2022 conference were the two main areas of climate tipping points and positive tipping points, the 2025 event took a broader focus that encompassed social systems and governance.
Prof Winkelmann told Carbon Brief that this reflected how the tipping points “community” is much larger now than it was three years ago:
“The community has grown a lot since [2022] and it especially also includes not just the scientific community, both on the biophysical side and the social side, but also a lot of people from policy, governance and business. So I think it is really brilliant to have this community here together, thinking about tipping dynamics and the impacts in this holistic approach.”
Lenton told Carbon Brief the conference was “bigger and more diverse” than the 2022 edition. This, he said, was likely due to “demand for knowledge of the subject”, alongside a wider range of “stakeholders, voices and actors” being engaged in discussions about tipping points.
While tipping points are well-defined in natural sciences, they are less so in the social sciences, Rockström told Carbon Brief:
“I would even argue that many social scientists – even some social scientists at this conference – are even uncomfortable in using the term social tipping point, or positive tipping point, and are much more academically grounded in defining ‘social transformations’, ‘social transitions’ or ‘social change’. I have a strong respect for that. It is really important to humbly recognise that the social sciences come at this with very different methods and theories.”
In a plenary session on social-ecological tipping points, Dr Patricia Pinho – deputy science director at the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) – argued that “we can’t really model forest resilience if we ignore the people that are on the frontline”.
According to her presentation, “Indigenous and traditional communities are already experiencing and resisting socio-ecological tipping points”.
Global warming and land-use change have led to forest degradation in 36% of the region, Pinho said. Combined with increasing forest fires, heat and drought, communities are seeing impacts on “food security, health [and] loss of biodiversity”, she added:
“So what we are seeing is loss of identity, place, attachment. People are losing their relationship [with the Amazon] and livelihoods and culture.”
Another plenary considered the positive tipping points in “socio-technical systems”.
Among the talks, Simon Sharpe, former deputy director of the UK government’s COP26 unit and now managing director of the non-profit research group S-Curve Economics, outlined the progress towards positive tipping points in the sectors of power generation, road transport and steel production.
While the power-sector transition is “going quite well” and light road transport is already seeing electric vehicles (EVs) make up “20% of new car sales globally”, the steel transition is in its “very early stages”, Sharpe explained.
For the steel industry, the “tipping point that we have to cross is in terms of risk perception”, Sharpe said:
“You have to get to the point where industry feels that actually it’s no longer the ‘first-mover risk’ that is the biggest risk – it’s the ‘late-mover risk’ that’s the biggest risk.”
Sharpe argued that this was best achieved by a clean-steel subsidy, noting that “we’ve seen for the brief period where the US had its [Inflation Reduction Act] and was strongly subsidising clean industrial production”. He continued:
“That resulted in a big shift of industry lobbying in Japan and the EU, where all the steel companies suddenly said, ‘Oh, can we have clean-steel subsidies as well, please?’”
Focusing specifically on EVs, Dr Jean-Francois Mercure from the University of Exeter described his forthcoming study on the tipping point “that is unfolding now”.
This has been driven by a feedback loop between the falling cost of EVs and the rise in how many are being purchased, Mercure explained:
“The cost coming down helps people buy more electric vehicles; more electric vehicles [being bought] causes the cost to come down.”
While there is “exponential growth” in EV sales, Mercure showed how the sales market share in conventional cars has been “plunging” in “Germany, UK, France and especially China” since 2019:
“So we’re kind of saying, yes, the system has started to tip into this new electric vehicle regime.”
However, Mercure added, “it’s fragile” as it could be bogged down by policy reversals. He also noted that there are barriers, such as China’s dominance in producing batteries, which is “becoming problematic” and led to tariffs in the EU and US.
From the audience, Prof Joyeeta Gupta of the University of Amsterdam questioned whether EVs are seeing a “long-term” tipping point when the global south is considered:
“Electric cars are going up the global north, but the old petrol cars are going south. Basically, what you’re seeing is that when certain things improve in the global north, the older stuff just gets dumped on the global south.”
The conference also emphasised the importance of governance, with multiple breakout sessions and a plenary dedicated to the topic.
In one breakout session, author Herb Simmens explained that governance is a “system of rules, processes and practices by which public institutions are managed and controlled”, which aim to “establish how decisions are to be made, and then to ensure that those responsible for making them do so”.
He argued that setting out to limit tipping points should be considered policymaking, not governance. However, he said that strong global governance is needed in order to oversee the implementation of policies to stop global warming. He also added that local governance is needed in many instances – for example, to stop deforestation in the Amazon in order to prevent the rainforest from tipping.
Dr Manjana Milkoreit – a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oslo – chaired a plenary session on governance. She told delegates that the 2023 tipping points report identifies “two major domains of governance involved” in managing global tipping points. These are “prevention” and “reorganisation”, she said.
Sandrine Dixson-Decleve, co-president of the not-for-profit Club of Rome, stressed the importance of discussing how to “integrate planetary emergency at the top level into constitutional law”. She concluded:
“If we can’t get the governance to work right now, we have to think about other types of governance frameworks at the local level, community level, that start to create the feedback loop all the way back up to the international level.”
Durwood Zaelke, founder and president of the Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development, highlighted the success of the Montreal Protocol – an agreement signed in 1987 by nearly 200 countries to limit emissions of “ozone-depleting substances” in an effort to stem the damage to the ozone layer.
He argued that governance on cutting emissions must be binding, as the Montreal Protocol was, rather than voluntary.
He also argued that cutting CO2 emissions is “essential, but a slow process” and advocated for more emphasis on cutting emissions of “short-lived super-pollutants”.
Prof Per Olsson, deputy science director at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, said there has been a “deeply problematic” backlash in the past five years, in the form of “political polarisation”, “war”, “democratic backsliding” and the “dehumanisation of people that think differently from you”. He warned that these “threaten to derail many processes”.
Oliver Morton is a senior editor at the Economist and serves on the board of trustees of the Degrees Initiative – a non-government organisation that focuses on promoting expertise on solar radiation management in the global south. (However, he said at the start of his talk that he was not speaking in these capacities.)
Morton argued for a greater emphasis on solar geoengineering in the tipping points community.
Morton told delegates that the lengthy 2023 global tipping points report featured only a few paragraphs on solar geoengineering, stating that the technology “might” help limit temperature rise, he said:
“I would really be interested in that ‘might’. But that’s not, in fact, what this community does. It’s not what people particularly seem to want to talk about.”
Morton noted that many delegates of the recent Arctic Repair Conference, which was held in Cambridge in June, were present at the tipping points conference, highlighting the “overlap” between the two fields.
He recognised the challenges with the governance of solar geoengineering, but added that there are challenges “for all governance”. He also emphasised that “everyone in the solar geoengineering community” says that the technology would “complement, not replace, mitigation”.
Morton emphasised the need for expertise on solar geoengineering in the global south. He concluded that “sidelining” research on geoengineering, which potentially could reduce harm, opens up the tipping-points community to criticism for not considering all options. He referred to this as “choice-editing”.
Finally, Prof Joyeeta Gupta, spoke about the divide between the global north and global south.
She said that she is working to introduce a global constitution “to try to understand how to regulate the public and private sector” and she invited the audience to participate by sending in submissions.
When asked whether the phrase “tipping points” has been watered down, Sandrine said that words like “regenerative” and “sustainable development” are overused and agreed that we “can’t keep playing with the language until it becomes nonsensical”. She called on conference delegates to come together to define key terms.
At a breakout session, Prof Karen Morrow, a professor of environmental law at Swansea University, explained that the legal system currently does not deal well with any issue at the planetary scale, as global problems cannot be reduced to a “nice, tidy jurisdictional issue”.
She said that the irreversibility of Earth system tipping points is “horriffic”. However, she noted that the language of uncertainty in science can make it hard to “find a foothold” legally, arguing that the irreversibility may help with this by providing more certainty.
She added that there are currently laws around “obligation to prevent harm”, but said that there are “not enough”, arguing that we need laws that dictate a “substantive restraint on human activities”.
A significant portion of the conference was dedicated to “positive tipping points” – described to Carbon Brief by Rockström as “social transformations” that generate “feedbacks that are self-enforcing”, making them difficult to reverse.
Examples of these social transformations that featured in plenaries and research sessions included the rapid rollout of EVs in Norway, tree-planting schemes in Uganda, investments in “regenerative” cotton farming and the falling costs and rising adoption of solar energy around the world.
In a breakout session, Dr Jean-Francois Mercure said the “positive tipping point narrative is good because it changes the policy narrative”. He explained:
“We used to have this narrative, which goes – ‘we tax [and] we price the externality because prices need to reflect costs’. This is demanding because it is politically difficult to tax and subsidies need to be justified. [That narrative says] we are pushing a thing that gets harder the more we do it – so there is a limit to climate action.
“This is not how it really works. When you look at the solar revolution, we had to push up to a certain point, after which it went off on its own. Electric vehicles, too. This [narrative] changes what policymakers need to do and think. They need to work to push over the initial hurdle.”
In a plenary session, Kate Raworth, an ecological economist at the University of Oxford, highlighted how a growing number of states, cities and regions around the world had adopted her “doughnut” theory of economics.
“Doughnut economics” is a framework which imagines a global economy which prioritises meeting the needs of people without overshooting planetary boundaries.
Raworth highlighted how more than 50 municipal governments had publicly adopted the framework since 2019 – and added there are “another 50 doing it behind the scenes”. She said that “peer-to-peer inspiration” has been a powerful force in driving momentum behind the framework’s popularity.
Jameela Mahmood, executive director of the Sunway Centre for Planetary Health at Sunway University in Kuala Lumpur, described how her organisation’s advocacy had led to the Malaysian government’s adoption of a planetary health framework in its forthcoming economic development plan. She also said planetary health would become a mandatory part of the nation’s undergraduate curriculum from 2026.
Túlio Andrare, chief strategy and alignment officer for the COP30 presidency, described the Brazilian government’s plans to convene a “global mutirão”, which encourages individuals, communities and organisations to make self-determined commitments to take actions to tackle climate change. (Mutirão is a word from the Indigenous Tupi-Guarani language family that refers to collective action). He said:
“The global mutirão is about inviting people to think about who they are and what they can offer. It is also about designing potential positive tipping points. Because if we have different initiatives that are self-organised, we can integrate those local initiatives in a global framework.”
In a separate plenary session on tipping points within food systems, Rune Baastrup, director of development at Democracy X, a private foundation focused on deliberate democracy, presented on a project to shift eating habits in Denmark.
The project, which he said is grounded in “sociological literature”, is to encourage a push towards plant-based eating from a local level, by funding and coordinating communal meals that citizens arrange for and with each other. Baastrup explained:
“It’s not about politicians going out pointing fingers at citizens. It is about citizens engaging and then mobilising each other – not necessarily because they want to save the world, but because they want to do interesting and cool things with their neighbours.”
According to Democracy X’s theory of change, reaching “one in 10 Danes” through this work would be enough to galvanise a “profoundly more deep green transition” in the Scandinavian country, Baastrup said.
In the same session, journalist and author George Monbiot said it was “questionable” whether the global food system could achieve a “positive tipping point”.
However, he said there were a number of actions that could be taken to create a food system which maintains high yields, reduces environmental impacts while remaining diversified and leaving space for nature restoration and recovery. He argued that these included: switching away from an animal-based diet to a plant-based diet; the embrace of perennial grain and arable crops; and production of food outside the farming system, including through precision fermentation.
Monbiot said the conversation around food systems was “going backwards”, pointing to the growing popularity of “simple living, grow-your-own soul food” tropes on social media:
“There is this complete confusion between what looks nice – between the bucolic, romantic, aesthetic and cottagecore that you can post up on Instagram – and what we actually need in order to intervene effectively in this huge Leviathan of a system which is going to crush us into dust.”
In his closing remarks, Lenton mused that the research community was on a quest to discover the “recipe” behind positive tipping points. He explained:
“We’re passionate as researchers to seek out the early opportunity signals that systems we want to get rid of might be able to get tipped out of.”
Having a toolkit for identifying the “generic” signals of when an incumbent system is showing signs of destabilising could guide efforts from activists, policymakers and investors to drive positive change for the planet, he said.
Lenton said upcoming research, set to be published in Sustainability Science, represented a “first attempt” at a methodology “for anyone who wants to ask whether a system has the potential for a positive tipping”. The methodology in question would also seek to answer the following questions, he said:
“If [a system] has [the potential to tip], how close is it? What factors would influence it? In particular, what could bring it forward? And then what actions could influence those factors to tip other systems?”
Lenton urged scientists at the conference to help him “refine and apply” the methodology. He also urged colleagues to keep “documenting” evidence of positive tipping over the years ahead. He explained:
“There is a theory of change here. We have got to enable each other to learn faster [and] to spread these initiatives better.”
Along with the main plenaries, the conference included around 50 breakout meetings, split between “research sessions” and “action workshops”.
Among the new research being presented at these sessions were early results from the “TIPMIP” international modelling project.
Rockström told Carbon Brief the “biggest change” in tipping-points science since the first conference in 2022 is the launch of TIPMIP. He said:
“The most solid scientific basis in the IPCC are all the ‘MIPs’, the modelling comparison programmes. The biggest one is CMIP [the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project], which gives us the data and the scenarios to be able to deliver the Paris Agreement.
“Now, we finally have a MIP for tipping points – and the tipping point comparison community is here at the conference, as well as [scientists from] the big Earth system models. Big tipping modelling analysis [is underway] on AMOC risks, on the Amazon rainforest, on permafrost and the ice sheets. That is a major advancement.”
Dr Jeremy Walton, who leads the software engineering team for the UK Earth System Model at the Met Office Hadley Centre, kicked off one research session by unpacking the Earth system modelling “experiment protocol” within TIPMIP. This is a “framework for the modelling and investigation of climate overshoot and tipping points”, he explained, which sets out a consistent set of “idealised” – or simplified – experiments for scientists to conduct in order to build up a large dataset of results from lots of climate models.
The figure below illustrates these experiments, which include control runs with no global warming (black line), runs where warming is stabilised, such as at 2C or 4C (green lines) and further runs where warming is subsequently reduced via carbon removal (blue lines).
In all cases, warming first “ramps up” at a rate of 0.2C per decade “because that matches the observed rate in recent years”, Walton said.
Prof Colin Jones from the University of Leeds presented some initial results from the idealised experiments for the Antarctic ice sheet, carried out by Dr Sophy Oliver of the National Oceanography Centre in Southampton.
The analysis focuses on the massive Ross and Filchner-Ronne ice shelves, which float on the ocean and hold back land ice behind them. At the moment, Jones explained, they are both “cold-water cavities”, in that the ocean water beneath the shelves is “below the freezing point of sea ice”. However, if they “tip” to “switch to being warm-water cavities, then there’s a risk for rapid loss of ice”, he said.
The switch happens because melting of Antarctic ice adds freshwater beneath the ice shelves. This reduces the “density barrier” between the cavity and warmer open ocean, said Jones, reaching a “sudden point where the salinity is sufficiently low that the density has changed and it allows open ocean water” to get into under the ice shelves.
Their model runs suggest that there is a “danger zone” for the Ross ice shelf of around 3.5-4C, Jones said:
“If you go more than 4C, it will always tip [in model runs]…If you stay below about 3C, it will never tip.”
For the Filchner-Ronne ice shelf, “it is basically the same mechanism, but it happens at a higher warming level”, noted Jones, with a “danger zone” around 5-5.5C.
Also focusing on Antarctica, Sacha Sinet from Utrecht University presented analysis on the interactions between AMOC and the polar ice sheets, with results suggesting that the loss of the Antarctic ice sheet could actually stabilise the AMOC and prevent it from collapsing.
Sinet’s research is currently being reviewed before potential publication.
Another study on Antarctica was published on the opening day of the tipping points conference. The research, led by Dr Alessadro Silvano from the National Oceanography Centre, uses satellite data to reveal a marked increase in surface salinity across the Southern Ocean since 2015, coinciding with a “dramatic decline” in Antarctic sea ice.
The findings suggest that the Southern Ocean “might have entered a new system”, Silvano said. He explained how he has been observing an increase in salinity in the top 100 metres of the ocean. This is “counterintuitive”, he said, as “you think the more melting of ice, then you should freshen the ocean instead”.
The increase is because the ocean is becoming “less stratified”, meaning that warm water – which is also more salty – is “able to reach the surface of the ocean more”, making is harder for sea ice to regrow. he explained:
“And this is circumpolar. So it’s happening everywhere you see the increase in salinity.”
This has the potential to drive a self-reinforcing feedback loop, Silvano wrote in an article for the Conversation:
“We may have passed a tipping point and entered a new state defined by persistent sea ice decline, sustained by a newly discovered feedback loop.”
When asked by an audience member whether solar geoengineering could help, Silvano noted: “The problem for Antarctica is that melting is driven by the ocean. You cannot stop warming in the ocean, so that, to me, is an impossible task.”
Away from Antarctica, Dr Bette Otto-Bliesner of the US National Center for Atmospheric Research introduced another “MIP” – the What If Modeling Intercomparison Project (WhatIfMIP), which aims to investigate the consequences of what happens if a tipping point is crossed.
In particular, the programme will look at the cascading effects of one tipping element on another, including Amazon dieback, shifts in boreal forests, AMOC collapse, permafrost loss and the collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, Otto-Bliesner explained.
One area of focus will be on the potential implications of “Sahel greening”, Otto-Bliesner said:
“We don’t think the Sahara is going to green in the next few centuries. But there is a project in the Sahel region called the Great Green Wall Initiative, where they’re actually planting trees. They’ve already started this…So what are the consequences of that, in terms of precipitation, drought, but also…heatwaves?”
In another talk, Caroline Wallington – from the Centre for Sustainability Transitions at Stellenbosch University in South Africa – presented a global analysis of ecosystems and people at risk of 21 different ecological “regime shifts”.
The findings show that 26% of the global land area is at risk of at least one ecological shift, covering 3.4 billion people, or 43% of the global population.
Around 31% of corals are at risk of a regime shift, Wallington said, while 30% of tundra is at risk from a transition to boreal forest and 28% of tropical forests are at risk of tipping into savannah.
The regions of the world at highest risk include the south Pacific, south-east Asia and central America, Wallington noted. Some of the most populous countries in the world are at risk from these regime shifts, she added, including China, India, the US and Indonesia.
Dr Nico Wunderling, from the Center for Critical Computational Studies at Goethe University Frankfurt and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, presented on how tipping point risks are affected by “overshooting” temperature goals, such as the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit.
His work indicates that “tipping risks are even non-negligible now at global warming levels of 1.3-1.5C”, while overshooting 2C would mean “entering a very high risk zone for climate tipping elements”.
Wunderling presented some early results – currently undergoing peer review – on how the risk of Amazon dieback depends on both the levels of warming and deforestation.
When only warming is considered, current pathways to 2.7-2.8C above pre-industrial levels “seem to still relatively keep the Amazon rainforest at a safe level”, he said. However, he added, when deforestation is included, tipping risks become much closer – “to levels that are well within the Paris Agreement, so about 1.5-2C”.
Wunderling recently wrote a Carbon Brief guest post on “cascading” tipping points, indicating that the “majority of interactions between tipping elements will lead to further destabilisation of the climate system”.
In the closing plenary, Rockström confirmed that PIK would host a tipping points conference in Berlin in 2027.
He also revealed that plans were afoot to host a tipping points conference in 2026 in Malaysia, following discussions with Jameela Mahmood of the Sunway Centre for Planetary Health in Kuala Lumpur.
Rockström said this reflected the need to host the conference in the global south and the importance of “building momentum” around tipping point risks and opportunities.
He added that the Malaysia-hosted conference could be held “in connection” with the COP31 climate summit, should Australia’s bid to host the UN talks in 2026 prove successful.
Meanwhile, a second global tipping points report is earmarked for the latter half of 2025.
(Carbon Brief covered the first global tipping point report in 2023).
Lenton told Carbon Brief the upcoming report will be “tighter” than its predecessor and “major” on governance issues.
Explaining the rationale for giving governance top billing in the report, Lenton said:
“We want to lead on the things we need. We clearly need some improvements in governance and institutions to get on top of both the tipping point risks and, arguably, the opportunities. Everyone can see that – it has been repeated several times already at this meeting. So, it is important to be clear what differences [governance] makes and what different kinds of governance we are calling for.”
The report will also offer an “update on tipping point risks and opportunities”, Lenton said, and include three case studies looking at Earth system tipping points – the shutdown of AMOC, Amazon dieback and coral die-off. It will also feature one “localised” example of a glacier tipping point and its consequences.
The case studies are designed to provide “more specific and concrete guidance” on how to avoid tipping risks, according to Lenton.
In addition, Ricarda Winkelmann told Carbon Brief that she and her colleagues will be answering a “call on the scientific community to put together a robust risk assessment on tipping dynamics”. This will involve “creating a first global atlas of tipping financial risks”, she explained – in time to feed into the seventh assessment report (AR7) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Discussing AR7 with Carbon Brief, Rockström said he was “very disappointed” that, at a meeting last year, countries decided not to include a special report on tipping points in the IPCC’s AR7 cycle.
This happened because the topic “makes policymakers and some member countries around the world very uncomfortable”, Rockström said.
Despite the “illogical” decision, the AR7 assessment reports will “see much more tipping-point science”, added Rockström, “for the simple reason that we have TIPMIP [and] we have a much broader community now – it’s entering the mainstream of Earth system modelling”.
This is “so important” in order to narrow uncertainty ranges in projections of tipping points, Rockström argued:
“I am of the view that one reason why we’re not acting faster on the climate crisis – one of many reasons – one fundamental reason is that we in the scientific community are not able to communicate precision on risk.
“Science on tipping point risk is so important because so many actors are using the uncertainty ranges as an excuse for not acting. So, as long as the AMOC continues to have medium confidence, then you can go on forever kicking the can down the road.”
The Exeter meeting comes against a backdrop of cuts to climate science funding in the US, including to the budget of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Lenton said the tipping-point community was “traumatised” by the developments – “especially [on behalf] of colleagues in the US” who had lost their jobs. He added:
“It is already influencing things. If we lose NOAA and we lose our state-of-the-art assessment of the state of the oceans – these are dangerous erosions of our ability to sense whether the Earth system is destabilising or not. This is a fundamental loss.”
During the conference, the convenors drafted a conference statement, which they encouraged delegates to endorse.
With global warming approaching the Paris Agreement 1.5C limit, the statement warns that this places “humanity in the danger zone where multiple climate tipping points pose catastrophic risks to billions of people”.
It says that the “window for preventing these cascading climate dynamics is rapidly closing”, adding:
“We join the COP30 presidency in calling on governments to enact policies that help trigger positive tipping points in their economies and societies, which generate self-propelling change in technologies and behaviours towards zero emissions.”
The statement concludes by arguing that “decisive policy and civil society action” is needed for the world to “tip its trajectory from facing unmanageable climate tipping point risks to seizing positive tipping point opportunities”.
TAX CREDITS CRUSHED: A major budget bill passed by US congress this week is “poised to remake American energy by slashing tax breaks for wind and solar power and electric cars”, reported the New York Times. The legislation, which was “muscled” through by Republicans, “provides a boost to fossil fuels and dismantles many of the biggest actions the federal government has ever taken to fight climate change”, the newspaper said.
‘CRACKDOWN’: The version of the bill approved by the Senate on Tuesday included “compromise language” that gave wind and solar projects one year to begin construction to claim current tax credits, noted Politico. “Hard-line” Republicans in the House of Representatives told the outlet that they backed the bill only after receiving assurances from Donald Trump that he would use executive action to further “constrict” wind and solar.
LAB LIABILITY: The bill, which is expected to be signed by Trump today, also “seeks to defund” multiple climate labs, according to CNN. This includes the Mauno Lao laboratory in Hawaii, where measurements since 1958 have produced the iconic “Keeling Curve” of rising atmospheric CO2, the outlet noted. See below for more on the emissions impact of Trump’s bill.
RED ALERTS: At least eight people died across Europe as a heatwave gripped much of the continent, reported Reuters, “triggering health alerts and forest fires and forcing the closure of a nuclear reactor at a Swiss power plant”. The New York Times quoted UN secretary general António Guterres, who said: “Extreme heat is no longer a rare event – it has become the new normal.”
RECORD-BREAKING: Both Spain and England had their hottest June on record, noted BBC News, with the Spanish weather service saying the average of 23.6C “pulverised records”. The outlet added that France registered its second-hottest June, while the Guardian reported that Portugal hit a provisional record high for June of 46.6C.
FLASH FLOODS: Elsewhere, a record downpour in the central Chinese province of Hubei brought a month’s worth of rain in just 12 hours to the city of Xianfeng, reported Reuters. Authorities moved 18,000 people to safety, the newswire said. Flooding in India’s northern state of Himachal Pradesh left five people dead, reported the Hindustan Times.
The amount by which “climate aid” given by the UK government to developing countries was inflated through controversial changes to the way climate finance is now being designated, Carbon Brief analysis showed.
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Trump’s dismantling of climate policy means the US will add an extra 7bn tonnes of emissions to the atmosphere from now until 2030, compared to meeting its former climate pledge under the Paris Agreement, according to new Carbon Brief analysis of modelling from Princeton University. The approval of Trump’s megabill repealing clean-energy tax credits, alongside a series of executive orders, means that US emissions are now set to drop to just 3% below current levels by 2030 – effectively flatlining – rather than falling 40% as required to hit the now-defunct target, according to the analysis.
This week, delegates at the Global Tipping Points 2025 conference in Exeter tell Carbon Brief which potential tipping “element” in the Earth system they are most worried about.
“The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, or AMOC, for sure. The consequences of crashing that would be devastating globally – and also for where I live in the UK. By our own calculation, we could have less than half the viable area for growing a couple of major staple crops, wheat and maize, worldwide. We would have a widespread water crisis. We could have collapses of the monsoons in West Africa and India that would displace hundreds of millions of people. It is hard to see that in anything other than a catastrophe.”
“So I am thinking about this from a risk perspective – so both the likelihood as well as the impacts – and I think the answer depends on that. Because when it comes to the likelihood and the particular threshold – and we know about those – I’m mostly concerned about the Greenland and the West Antarctic ice sheets. This is because we know that, even at lower warming levels, they’re already at risk of transgressing tipping points in certain regions.
“But when it comes to the impacts and also the timescales over which those play out, there are other tipping elements that worry me most. In particular, regional tipping elements. So, if we think of the mountain glaciers, for instance, these impacts are already experienced right now and several mountain glaciers are undergoing these accelerated changes.”
“I am worried about all of them. But, for the immediate future, I am particularly worried about tipping points that involve the biosphere and humans due to breaching thresholds for heat or drought that then ripple into food availability, livelihood and ecosystems. The Earth system tipping points will do that, too, but maybe a little bit later. Examples are coral diebacks triggered by marine heatwaves, forest change and fires, and droughts threatening livelihoods and putting people on the move.
“I did a research project on the US dustbowl and the trigger was drought causing vegetation and crop dieback, then [leading to] extreme heat and dust storms in response – and migration, as memorialised in [the 1939 John Steinbeck novel] The Grapes of Wrath. And, now with warming, all droughts get supercharged.”
“The Amazon is a very serious tipping point, because [dieback] could release around 250bn tonnes of CO2 by 2100 – which will make it impossible to [limit global warming] at 1.5C. We could also lose the largest [host to] biodiversity on the planet, which would induce a tremendous, large number of epidemics and several pandemics. Also, of course, the Amazon forest controls aspects of the global climate. In South America, the climate is entirely controlled by the Amazon forest.”
Carbon Brief will publish further coverage of the Global Tipping Points conference next week.
‘CLIMATE ACTION IS UNSTOPPABLE’: In a talk at the recent TED Countdown Summit 2025 in Nairobi, former US vice-president Al Gore explained why the narrative of “climate realism” is a “myth”.
PROTESTOR IN PRISON: A BBC Radio 4 Currently documentary followed the story of a “law-abiding Middle England mum”, who received a four-year prison sentence for a Just Stop Oil protest on the M25 motorway.
‘FROM THE GREEN TO THE UNSEEN’: In its L is for Labour YouTube show, the Migration Project asked what a “just transition” to electric vehicles would look like for the traditional automotive industry and its workers in India.
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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Since winning office last November, he has issued a series of executive orders and is poised to sign his “big beautiful bill” that effectively terminates Biden-era climate policies.
Carbon Brief’s analysis of modelling from the Princeton University REPEAT Project shows that this means US emissions are now set to drop to just 3% below current levels by 2030 – effectively flatlining – rather than falling 40% as required to hit the now-defunct target.
This would leave the US around 2bn tonnes short of its greenhouse-gas emissions target for that year, adding emissions equivalent to around 4% of the current global total each year
To put this in context, it is roughly the annual output of Indonesia, the world’s sixth-largest emitter.
Trump is already withdrawing his nation from its international climate obligations under the Paris Agreement.
The passage of the new Republican-backed “megabill” means that US climate targets pursued by Trump’s predecessor now appear firmly out of reach.
Trump is due to sign the so-called “big beautiful bill” into law after it was approved by the Republican-controlled US Congress on 3 July.
This “megabill” removes virtually all of the tax credits for renewable energy, electric vehicles and clean manufacturing that were at the core of Biden’s landmark Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).
(Ahead of the US presidential election last year, Carbon Brief estimated that, by reversing the IRA and other key policies, a Trump administration would add 4bn tonnes of emissions by 2030, compared to a continued Biden administration.)
Since his return to the White House, Trump has moved to strip away his predecessor’s climate policies, including via a series of executive actions. This includes targeting vehicle fuel-efficiency standards and power sector emissions standards.
The passage of the new bill means US solar and wind power expansion will likely slow down, as will sales of electric vehicles and energy efficiency improvements. The combined effect of these policy rollbacks can be seen in the chart below, based on modelling by the REPEAT Project.
Carbon Brief has compared the impact of Trump’s policies, including the megabill, to a pathway on which the US meets its former target, under the Paris Agreement, to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 50-52% from 2005 levels by 2030.
The cumulative gap between this pathway and the Trump administration’s trajectory amounts to 7bn tonnes of emissions over the next five years.
Based on the most recent central estimate of the “social cost of carbon” in 2030 from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), published under the Biden administration, those 7bn tonnes of extra emissions would cause global climate damages worth more than $1.6tn.
Under this new set of US policies, emissions are only expected to be 20% lower than 2005 levels by 2030, rather than 50-52%, meaning the nation would be 2bn tonnes short of its goal.
This amounts to just a 3% drop from 2024 levels by 2030, meaning emissions are effectively flatlining.
Among the hundreds of provisions in the new Republican-backed bill are several key rollbacks that are expected to affect US emissions.
Under the IRA, wind and solar projects could receive tax credits up to 2034. Following the Republican bill, most projects would need to start construction within the next year to qualify.
Without federal support, the pipeline of new renewable-energy projects is expected to contract.
The REPEAT analysts estimate that cumulative new solar capacity additions will drop by 29 gigawatts (GW) by 2030 and around 140GW by 2035. For wind power, the decrease is set to be 43GW by 2030 and 160GW by 2035.
Some renewable projects will likely be built without support, but developers will need to contend with other Trump administration policies, such as stopping federal windfarm approvals.
The lost renewable capacity is unlikely to be entirely replaced by fossil fuels, due to a multi-year backlog in the construction of gas-fired power plants.
Tax credits for nuclear and geothermal power have been retained until 2036 in the bill. While these projects generate clean electricity, they can also take a long time to build.
Other key policies in the new bill include the removal of tax credits worth up to $7,500 to purchase electric vehicles, which could result in tens of millions fewer such cars and vans being sold. Ending tax credits for low-carbon manufacturing is also expected to undo progress in building clean technologies, such as solar panels and electric cars, domestically.
Beyond its effect on US emissions, various early analyses have suggested the Republican-backed bill is likely to increase energy prices and lead to job losses.
REPEAT estimates household energy costs are likely to be $165 higher in 2030 and more than $280 higher by 2035, following the passing of the bill.
Some of this increase can be attributed to fewer electric vehicles on the road, leading to higher petrol and diesel consumption and prices. Slowing construction of solar and wind projects as power demand increases will also likely affect the cost of electricity.
Without tax credits to boost the construction of new generation capacity, residential electricity prices are set to increase by 7% – or $110 – by 2026, for the average US customer, according to analysis conducted for trade body the Clean Energy Buyers Association.
In the state of Wyoming, the same analysis found that electricity prices may rise by as much as 30% over the next year. Other firmly Republican states, such as North Carolina and Tennessee, are also expected to see near-term price rises in the double digits.
Modelling of the impact of the Trump administration’s “big beautiful bill” is from the REPEAT Project, a joint initiative of the Princeton University ZERO Lab and Evolved Energy Research.
The project has assessed the emissions impact of the executive actions that the Trump administration has already taken to unwind Biden-era policies, as well as the bill itself.
Carbon Brief compared this trajectory out to 2030 with a straight-line pathway towards the official US climate target for 2030. This is set out in the US’ nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. It is worth noting that the Trump administration is withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement.
In a proposed amendment to EU climate legislation, the commission has laid out what it calls a “new way to get to 2040”, including “flexibilities” to ease the burden on member states.
Besides the limited use of carbon credits, the proposal also gives a potentially larger role to carbon dioxide (CO2) removal technologies and leaves the door open for weaker sectoral goals.
It has drawn criticism from climate NGOs and left-leaning European politicians, who argue that it “waters down” the EU’s climate ambitions and presents “considerable risks”.
Yet, the proposal is seen by many as an acceptable compromise option, following strong pushback from many member states to the 90% target, originally proposed last year.
With all nations expected to come forward with new international climate targets for 2035 by September and ahead of the COP30 climate summit, the 2040 goal will also be crucial in determining where the EU’s pledge lands.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief outlines what the amendment proposed by the commission includes, why it has proved controversial and what is expected to happen next.
The European Commission has proposed an amendment to the EU Climate Law, which would set a target for a 90% reduction in net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2040, compared to 1990 levels.
It will “give certainty to investors, innovation, strengthen industrial leadership of our businesses and increase Europe’s energy security”, the commission says.
In a statement, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, added:
“As European citizens increasingly feel the impact of climate change, they expect Europe to act. Industry and investors look to us to set a predictable direction of travel. Today we show that we stand firmly by our commitment to decarbonise [the] European economy by 2050. The goal is clear, the journey is pragmatic and realistic.”
The proposal includes new “flexibilities”, such as a limited role for “high-quality international credits” from 2036, the use of domestic permanent emissions removals within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and additional flexibilities across certain hard-to-decarbonise sectors.
These additional flexibilities are designed to allow countries to meet targets in a cost-effective and “socially fair” way, the commission adds. It says they will provide the possibility that a member state could compensate for a struggling land-use sector with overachievement in other areas, such as emissions from waste or transport.
The target will “send a signal to the global community” that the EU will “stay the course on climate change, deliver the Paris Agreement and continue engaging with partner countries to reduce global emissions”, says the commission.
It has been announced ahead of the UN COP30 climate summit in Belém, Brazil in November.
The European Commission says it will now work with the council presidency – representing EU member state governments – to finalise the EU’s climate pledges for 2035, so that the EU can submit its “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.
The EU was among the 95% of countries that missed the UN deadline to submit their NDCs by February of this year.
A recent update from the European parliament noted that the EU “needs to update its NDC…by September”, in order to meet an extended deadline from the UN.
In 2023, independent advisory body the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change recommended that the EU should aim for net emissions reductions of 90-95% by 2040, compared to 1990 levels.
As such, the advisory board said that the bloc would need to limit its cumulative emissions from 2030-50 to 11-14bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e), in order to be in line with bringing global warming down to 1.5C by the end of the century.
The 90% emissions reduction figure set out by the EU is on the lower end of guidance.
The European Commission’s new proposal builds on previous targets and roadmaps, representing a significant step towards enshrining the 2040 target in law.
In July 2021, the European Climate Law officially entered into force, setting a target of a net GHG reduction of at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, as shown in the chart below.
Rules were introduced governing sectors, such as clean energy, energy efficiency and transport, among others, to help meet this target.
If all were successful in their implementation, they would reduce emissions by roughly 57% by 2030, according to a European parliament assessment in 2022.
Subsequently, the commission has been working on developing a target for 2040, as an interim benchmark between the 2030 target and the EU goal – announced in 2018 – to be “climate neutral” by 2050. At this point, the bloc would reach net-zero emissions overall and would stop adding to global warming.
In 2024, the commission published an impact assessment, detailing the underlying qualitative analysis it had undertaken around emissions reduction targets for 2040.
This, together with the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change’s report (detailed above) and advice from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, formed the basis for the 90% target, the commission says.
The headline 90% target for 2040 was announced as part of a roadmap outlined by the commission in February 2024.
The roadmap kicked off a lengthy process in which EU politicians and institutions worked to cement the details of this target, ahead of this week’s proposal on turning it into law.
This process included “substantial engagement” with member states, the European parliament, stakeholders, civil society and citizens, the commission says.
In particular, certain European countries have been placing pressure on the commission to change or adapt the 2040 target, slowing the progress of this week’s proposal, which had been due out in February.
For example, Italy called for the goal to be weakened and France asked for “flexibility” to be introduced (See: Who has supported and opposed the proposed climate target?).
The commission hopes that publishing the proposed target now will allow it to be factored into the EU’s upcoming NDC, in which it will establish an emissions reduction target for 2035.
The European Commission’s proposal sets out a “pragmatic” pathway towards the 2040 target, including specific measures to give EU member states “flexibility”.
Of these, the one that has received the most attention is to allow limited use of international carbon credits, under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, starting in 2036.
In effect, this flexibility means that emissions within the EU would only need to fall to 87% below 1990 levels by 2040, with the remaining 3% taking place overseas.
This would mean member states could buy credits generated by emissions-cutting projects in other countries and count those cuts towards their own targets.
Other nations, including Japan and Switzerland, have already welcomed the use of international credits to meet their climate goals.
In an unusual intervention that coincided with the proposal itself, the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change stated that the EU should not count such credits towards the 2040 target. It said:
“Using international carbon credits to meet this target, even partially, could undermine domestic value creation by diverting resources from the necessary transformation of the EU’s economy.”
The board also mentioned other concerns that are frequently levelled at “carbon offsetting”, such as credits not resulting in real-world emissions cuts.
The commission’s proposal refers to “high-quality international credits under Article 6”, but does not specify which types of credit. This leaves the door open for lower quality options.
For example, carbon trading under Article 6.2 is subject to far less oversight than trading of Article 6.4 credits.
The proposal also states that: “The origin, quality criteria and other conditions concerning the acquisition and use of any such credits shall be regulated in union law.”
This suggests that the EU would conduct its own assessment of any credits used by member states, beyond the rules that have been negotiated at an international level.
Jonathan Crook, the lead expert on global carbon markets at Carbon Market Watch, tells Carbon Brief that additional safeguards would be “essential”, given outstanding issues with Article 6 carbon credits.
A Q&A accompanying the commission proposal states that credits would be bought from “credible and transformative” projects in nations with Paris-aligned climate goals.
It mentions direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) as examples of the kinds of projects that the EU could source credits from.
This could severely limit the pool of available credits, because – as it stands – almost all carbon credits are from tree planting, forest conservation and clean-energy projects.
DACCS and BECCS projects could result in relatively permanent carbon removal. Crook says this would be one of the “many necessary safeguards” needed for credit purchases, although he points to potential issues with such projects. He adds:
“This potential durability criterion is only mentioned in the Q&A, rather than in the actual commission proposal and so currently has very limited standing unless it is introduced [into the legal text] during the co-legislation process.”
There are two additional “new flexibilities” mentioned in the commission’s proposal, to help member states meet the 2040 emissions target more easily.
One is the inclusion of permanent carbon dioxide (CO2) removal in the EU ETS, something that was already being discussed as part of an ETS revision.
This would mean that DACCS and BECCS projects in EU member states could sell credits to help high-emitting companies, such as steel plant operators, stay within their ETS limits.
Paying for such credits could become more appealing as the number of available emissions “allowances” under the overall “cap” for ETS system shrinks and the allowances become more expensive.
The commission says this would help to “compensate for residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors”, referring to those that are expensive or difficult to reduce to zero.
The need to remove CO2 from the atmosphere is widely recognised and inclusion in the ETS could help to drive investment into early-stage technologies, such as DACCS.
However, there are concerns that focusing on removals diverts investment from readily available technologies that cut emissions, such as electric-arc furnaces for steel plants.
In its recommendations, the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change says there should be separate targets for emissions reductions and removals. This would ensure the removals contribute to EU targets “without deterring emission reductions”, it says.
Finally, the commission’s proposal also includes a vague mention of “enhanced flexibility across sectors, to support the achievement of targets in a cost-effective way”.
Linda Kalcher, executive director of the thinktank Strategic Perspectives, tells Carbon Brief that this is “alluding to the fact that we might see weakening of some laws”.
Michael Forte, a senior policy advisor at thinktank E3G, expands on this, noting that it could mean member states adjusting emissions targets between different parts of the EU climate architecture, depending on where they were over- or underperforming.
“I would infer that this means letting member states transfer a greater share of their mitigation efforts between these different instruments,” Forte tells Carbon Brief.
Kalcher notes that such changes cannot be regulated in this law, but instead would need to be part of the expected 2040 framework or other pieces of law:
“They are more alluding to future changes, instead of making them now. So that…gives confidence to the countries that have concerns [about the 2040 target] that something will happen.”
Climate campaigners and left-leaning politicians were highly critical of the “flexibilities” included in the commission’s proposal, in particular the use of international carbon credits.
The options proposed were described by civil-society groups as “creative accounting” and a “dangerous new precedent” that relies on “outsourcing Europe’s responsibility” to other countries.
The European parliament’s centre-left Socialists and Democrats coalition issued a statement warning that “the inclusion of international carbon credits as a means to meet the target carries considerable risks”.
Critics also noted that using such flexibilities contradicted the official advice offered by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change.
Yet the proposal, presented as a “new way to get to 2040”, is widely viewed as an attempt to find a political compromise against a tricky geopolitical backdrop.
It allows the EU to aim for the target set out by its scientific advisers, albeit at the lower end of the “90-95%” emissions reduction that had been proposed. This is in spite of a strong political pushback from some member states.
A statement released by Peter Liese and Christian Ehler, German members of the European parliament’s centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) group, explained:
“We think it’s very dangerous to criticise the European Commission because they intend to include flexibility in their proposal on the 2040 target. We don’t see a majority in parliament nor council for any 2040 target without flexibility.”
Some member states, including Spain and Denmark, supported the 90% target without asking for major concessions. Others, including Poland and Italy, have argued for a less stringent headline goal.
Meanwhile, others pushed for some kind of compromise during discussions of the new target.
Notably, the newly elected, right-leaning German government gave qualified support for the 90% goal in its coalition agreement, subject to conditions such as the inclusion of international carbon credits. Other influential nations have also increasingly stressed the need for “flexibility” around the target.
Meanwhile, according to Politico, France has been part of a push – alongside “climate laggards” Hungary and Poland – to separate discussions of the EU’s domestic 2040 target from its international 2035 NDC pledge.
According to the news outlet, such decoupling could result in a weaker 2035 target, compared to the 2035 target that is expected to be derived from the 90% reduction 2040 goal.
The commission says its 2040 proposal goes “hand in hand” with its clean industrial deal strategy, its affordable energy action plan and its “competitiveness compass” plan.
Alongside tabling its 2040 climate goal, the commission issued a new “communication” on “delivering on the clean industrial deal”. (The deal was first announced in February.)
The communication says that “decarbonisation and reindustrialisation are two sides of the same coin” and reaffirms that the aim of the deal is to “enable the EU to lead in developing the clean-technology markets of the future”.
The commission says delivery of the deal is “already underway”. It points to the adoption of the clean industrial deal state aid framework on 25 June, an €85bn ($100bn) state-aid package for helping member states transition their economies.
Environmental law charity Client Earth said a draft version of the framework risked “entrenching support for fossil gas and fossil based low-carbon gases”.
The clean industrial deal communication also notes that the commission this week published recommendations on tax incentives for speeding up the energy transition.
On 18 June, the European parliament and council agreed on a commission proposal to simplify the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a policy for taxing carbon-intensive imports at levels equivalent to the EU ETS.
The agreement introduces a new exemption threshold of 50 tonnes for CBAM goods, meaning small and medium-sized companies that do not exceed this weight of imports per year will now be exempt from the measure.
EU climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra described it as a “win for both climate policy and competitiveness of our companies”, with the new measure meaning 90% of companies will now be exempt from the CBAM, but 99% of emissions will still be covered.
Previous analysis has found that, in isolation, the CBAM will have a limited impact on global emissions.
Before the target can be adopted, it must be agreed by member states and pass through the European parliament.
Once the parliament and national ministers have agreed on their separate positions, three-way “trialogue” negotiations between them and the commission can begin with the aim of finalising the 2040 legislative proposal.
All nations were asked to submit new 2035 climate pledges, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), to the UN by February of this year (see: What has the European Commission proposed?). The EU was among the vast majority of parties to miss the deadline.
UN climate chief Simon Stiell has now asked all parties to submit their NDCs “by September”. This is to allow time for the preparation of a report on the collective ambition of all nations’ pledges before COP30 in November.
The EU’s NDC will include an “indicative 2035 figure” derived from the bloc’s 2040 climate target, according to the commission.
The commission says it will work with the Danish presidency of the EU council and member states to finalise its NDC.
It is expected that the EU will aim to finalise both its 2035 NDC and its 2040 climate goal ahead of the next UN general assembly, which starts on 9 September in New York.
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ROADLESS RULE NO MORE: The US agriculture department announced last week that it plans to “rescind a decades-old rule that protects 58.5m acres [236,741km2] of national forestland from road construction and timber harvesting”, the Los Angeles Times reported. The “Roadless Rule” has been in place since 2001 and “established lasting protection for specific wilderness areas within the national forests”, the outlet continued. US agriculture secretary Brooke Rollins called the rule “outdated”, while environmental groups “condemned the decision and vowed to take the administration to court”, according to the Washington Post.
PUBLIC LANDS PRESSURE: Amid Republican opposition, Utah senator Mike Lee pulled his “controversial proposal” to sell off public lands for housing developments from the “sprawling” domestic policy bill known as the “Big Beautiful Bill”, the Salt Lake Tribune reported. According to Politico, Lee blamed “misinformation” for the provision’s lack of support, even though, “in reality, he faced stiff opposition from western Republicans from states with large public land holdings”. On Tuesday, the Senate “narrowly approved” the bill, which now has to return to the House – where “many members have balked at the Senate’s changes to the measure” – for further approval, the Washington Post said.
BACK ONLINE: The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) is back online following a “months-long shutdown” due to the Trump administration’s “slash[ing]” of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) budget, Devex reported. The publication called the site’s restoration a “welcome development for aid agencies around the world” and noted that FEWS NET is “widely regarded as the world’s most reliable early-warning system for food insecurity”. Updated data is “expected to be available by October 2025”, said a spokesperson for FEWS NET.
FOOD-CLIMATE NEXUS: While “agenda fights”, finance and threats to multilateralism dominated the narrative at Bonn climate talks that concluded last week, food discussions were “potentially productive”, observers told Carbon Brief. The meeting featured the first of two workshops under the Sharm-el-Sheikh joint work on climate action, agriculture and food security – the only dedicated forum for agriculture in UN climate talks. Action Aid’s Teresa Anderson told Carbon Brief: “Agriculture negotiations are now reaping the bitter harvest from Baku. After initial resistance, negotiations resulted in more targeted and potentially useful guidance to at least help identify finance gaps in agriculture.”
SECOND CHANCES: A Down to Earth comment by Indian agricultural economist Smita Sirohi described the workshop as “a “second chance to reframe the debate” around agriculture and climate to ensure more focus on adaptation, not just mitigation. While countries shared their experiences with “systemic and holistic approaches” to integrating climate into national food plans, finance for these approaches was still a sticking point. Anderson added that many governments “[came] to the conclusion that agroecology is the most effective way to achieve multiple climate and development goals”. (For more, read Carbon Brief’s in-depth summary of the meeting.)
ENDS WITHOUT MEANS: Adaptation was at the forefront in Bonn. Before the start of the conference, countries “miraculously” narrowed down a list of “indicators” for the global goal on adaptation (GGA) from 9,000 to 490. Key divisions emerged between developed and developing countries on whether to include indicators on “means of implementation” (MOI) – shorthand for finance – as well as language around “transformational” adaptation. The final text invited experts to continue refining GGA indicators to a manageable 100, it included MOI indicators that developing countries viewed as a win.
FOREST FUND: More countries and private-sector groups supported Brazil’s Tropical Forest Forever Fund during London Climate Action Week, a statement said, but there is currently no funding estimate available ahead of its launch at COP30. Brazil is aiming for “$4-5bn per year for the investment in forests, 20% of that being destined for Indigenous [peoples] and local communities”, the country’s environment and climate minister, Marina Silva, told Carbon Brief at an event last week at the Brazilian embassy in London. Silva added: “It is not donation, it is not charity…We can have a fund that will be remunerating those who protect their forests – be they communities or private owners.” Elsewhere, Brazil and the UN held the first “global ethical stocktake” in London to hear from civil society before COP30.
This week, Cropped’s Mumbai-based reporter Aruna Chandrasekhar spoke to a union leader fighting to hold delivery-app companies accountable for protecting millions of India’s food delivery workers from extreme weather.
Driven by increasing urbanisation, smartphone usage and home-based lifestyles further entrenched by the Covid-19 pandemic, food delivery platforms continue to boom in India.
On any given waterlogged day of the week, Mumbai residents can order iPhone chargers with their okra, or apples from New Zealand, even well after midnight.
But India’s 7.7m delivery workers are having to brave extreme heat and high water in India’s crowded cities – whether on electric mopeds, cycles or horseback – to bring India such items direct to the doorstep.
It begs the question: are food delivery platforms effectively outsourcing climate adaptation to informal gig workers with fewer social protections?
A Nature Cities study published in January found a “significant surge” in lunchtime orders on the hottest days of the year in China’s cities, “reveal[ing] the transfer of heat exposure” from consumers to delivery riders.
Similarly, a study published in Sage last week found that digital technologies are “reshaping food practices in urban India in ways that reinforce existing caste, class and gender hierarchies”.
As temperatures touched 44C this summer, the Telangana state gig and platform workers union (TGPWU) urged citizens to offer a “glass of water” to the thousands of delivery workers battling extreme heat to bring them their food.
According to the International Labour Organisation, delivery workers in India can work up to 82 hours a week, with apps increasingly racing to offer consumers delivery in under 10 minutes.
“Is 10-minute delivery even possible? Can we look at humans as humans and not as robots?” says Shaik Salauddin, TGPWU founder and general secretary of the Indian Federation of App-Based Transport Workers (IFAT), speaking to Carbon Brief. He continues:
“As unions, we can tell workers to rest, but who’s going to pay for their daily bread? But if the aggregators are telling workers to carry hot parcels of biriyani in 46C, bag between their shoulders, wearing a dark uniform: can you imagine the heat and mental stress? And then buildings with 10-15 floors don’t give them access to the lift, when they have less than 10 minutes to deliver.”
Salauddin, who worked as a taxi driver for 10 years, has been fighting for the impact of extreme weather on food delivery workers to be better recognised. Two weeks ago – well into the monsoon – India’s National Disaster Management issued guidelines to recognise delivery workers “as one of the most vulnerable” to heatwaves and to create separate sections for informal workers in city and state heat action plans.
This week, Salauddin is sending out extreme rain alerts on WhatsApp and Telegram. He tells Carbon Brief that he is “tired of the PR” and “superhero” praise heaped on riders risking their lives in record floods by the same delivery platforms that offer little accountability or transparency. He says:
“I tell workers there’s a red alert for extreme rain, open drains are overflowing, your EVs won’t make it, please don’t go out there. In 10 minutes, the apps say: ‘Please come online, we’ll pay you 30% extra as part of rain mode.’ Who do I fight with now?”
To Salauddin, climate change and “just transition” are “big words” that have to be linked to livelihoods and need a far-reaching vision: whether it is subsidies for marginalised castes to buy or retrofit EVs, more charging stations, or even just restrooms for exhausted workers. Governments must engage with unions every three months, he says, not just at the height of summer or monsoon. With the exception of a few states, India’s many gig workers are not formally recognised for social security benefits.
The biggest change, Salauddin says, must come from food delivery apps themselves. He concludes:
“Simply saying that ‘we’re a broker between companies and people, we take our commission and nothing else’ is not a good model. They need to take responsibility for livelihoods, for climate impacts and their emissions. In our nature of work, we should be looking at the future of work – and the future is already here.”
COUNTING CONTROVERSY: The European climate commissioner, Wopke Hoekstra, may allow EU member states to “count controversial carbon credits from developing countries towards their climate targets”, the Guardian reported. Hoekstra told the outlet that “developing countries were keen to gain EU financing through carbon credits” and that the “possibility of allowing this was ‘potentially very attractive’”. However, the Guardian noted, “green groups are furious” and insist that the EU must “meet its targets domestically”, without the use of overseas carbon offsets.
FUELLING FOOD: Around 40% of petrochemicals are used by food systems around the world, mostly through synthetic fertilisers and plastic packaging, according to a new report. The research, from the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food), noted that food production and processing accounts for at least 15% of global fossil-fuel use. Action on food systems is “missing” from global agreements to transition away from fossil fuels, the report said. IPES-Food expert, Prof Raj Patel, said in a statement: “Delinking food from fossil fuels has never been more critical to stabilise food prices and ensure people can access food.”
PLANT FUEL: Efforts are underway in Chad to switch to “green charcoal” – a fuel made from plant waste, such as sesame stalks or palm fronds – to prevent further “rampant deforestation”, Agence France-Presse reported. The central African country has lost more than 90% of its forest cover since the 1970s and is “steadily turning to desert”, the newswire said. “Green charcoal” is intended for household uses, such as cooking, as an alternative to cut-down trees. An initiative to produce this fuel, which allegedly emits less CO2 than ordinary charcoal when burned, is backed by the World Bank and the UN refugee agency, added AFP.
G&T DANGER: “Volatile” weather, made “more likely by climate breakdown”, may impact the flavour of juniper berries – the “key botanical” in gin – according to a new study covered by the Guardian. The research, published in the Journal of the Institute of Brewing, looked at berries from seven European countries taken across different harvests. “A wet harvest year can reduce the total volatile compounds in juniper by about 12% compared to a dry year. This has direct implications for the sensory characteristics that make gin taste like gin,” the lead study author Dr Matthew Pauley, an assistant professor at Heriot-Watt University, told the newspaper.
TREE TROUBLE: The UK missed its tree-planting targets by an area of forest equivalent to the size of the Isle of Wight over the past five years, according to Carbon Brief analysis. New figures showed that 15,700 hectares of trees were planted across the UK in the last year – roughly half of the annual 30,000 hectare target set by the previous government. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have repeatedly not met national targets since 2020, previous data showed. These missed goals amount to more than 36,000 hectares of unplanted forest.
ASIA IMPACTED: According to the World Meteorological Organisation’s State of Climate in Asia 2024 report released last week, Asia is warming twice as fast as the global average, reported the Times of India. Extreme summer heat and reduced winter snowfall “accelerated glacier mass loss” in 23 of 24 glaciers in the central Himalayas and Tian Shan, Down to Earth wrote, with drought in China affecting more than 4.8 million people. Per the report, marine heatwaves “gripped a record area of the ocean”. The north Bay of Bengal region recorded the “second fastest rate” of sea level rise globally after the South China Sea, wrote the New Indian Express.
BLEACHING POINT: Kenyan marine ecologist Dr David Obura spoke to the Guardian about coral reefs that are “flickering out across the world”.
SHADOWY BROKER: The Financial Times looked at the life and death of Samuele Landi, an Italian “telecoms entrepreneur turned fraudster” and carbon-credits broker.
HORNBILL HOUR: The Some Like it Wild Podcast spoke to Dr Aparajita Datta about her research on the “secret life” of hornbills and valuing community knowledge in conservation research.
WOMEN’S WORK: For LitHub, Dr Sarah Boon wrote about “trailblaz[ing]” women scientists who carried out fieldwork in the 1900s.
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
The latest figures from Forest Research show that only 15,700 hectares of trees were planted across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland over the past year.
This is roughly half the annual target of 30,000 hectares by 2025 that was set by the previous Conservative government.
After the 2019 general election, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) laid out a planned trajectory for England from 2020 up to 2025.
Tree-planting is a devolved issue, so Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have had their own annual targets.
The chart below shows how, collectively, the nations have repeatedly missed these goals.
The cumulative impact of missed tree-planting targets over the past five years adds up to 36,429 hectares of unplanted forest, equal to nearly the size of the Isle of Wight.
This gap has grown since last year, when Carbon Brief analysis showed that the missed targets equated to a 22,129-hectare – or “Birmingham-sized” – forest.
As the location of most UK tree-planting, Scotland has also been the biggest contributor to the shortfall.
Shortly before the latest figures were released, government advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC) pointed to the UK’s “highest planting rate in two decades” in 2023-24. However, it noted its “concerns that recent reductions in funding for woodland creation in Scotland could reverse this trend”.
As the CCC predicted, just 8,470 hectares of trees were planted in Scotland in 2024-25, down from 15,040 hectares the previous year.
The nation had been targeting 18,000 hectares of annual woodland creation that year, although this was scaled back to 10,000 at the end of 2024 following a 41% cut to forestry grants.
Tree-planting rates across the other nations have steadily increased, but they have still not been on track to achieve their internal goals.
While the 30,000-hectare goal has not been formally abandoned, Labour did not mention it ahead of their election win last year.
Instead, the new government only committed to “establish[ing] three new national forests in England, whilst planting millions of trees and creating new woodlands”.
(Since winning the election, Labour has announced a tree-planting “taskforce”, in part to help meet a legally binding target of raising England’s tree cover to 16.5% by 2050.)
This followed repeated warnings from industry sources and independent analysts, over the course of the previous government, that the 30,000-hectare target was slipping out of reach.
Nevertheless, the CCC urged the new Labour government last year to move quickly to meet the goal. Earlier in 2025, the committee said it remains “vital” that tree-planting more than doubles to 37,000 hectares per year by 2030 to remain on track for the UK’s net-zero target.
Such rates are necessary because trees are needed to absorb carbon dioxide (CO2) and balance out remaining emissions from sectors that are not able to completely decarbonise by the 2050 net-zero date, the CCC says.
Around two-thirds of the trees planted last year were broadleaves rather than conifers, which grow faster and, therefore, absorb more CO2 in the short term. This is likely due to the decline in tree-planting across Scotland, which is home to most of the UK’s commercial conifer plantations.
This article is an update of Carbon Brief analysis published ahead of the general election last year, which assessed progress towards tree-planting goals in the UK and the devolved administrations.
During the 2019 election campaign, the Conservatives committed to a UK-wide goal of creating 30,000 hectares of new woodland a year by the end of parliament, which was pegged for 2024-25. (Annual tree-planting figures are reported for the period between 1 April in one year and 31 March in the following year.)
Within this, England had a planned trajectory set out by Defra, Scotland had annual tree-planting goals, Wales targeted “at least” 2,000 hectares a year from 2020 and Northern Ireland set out annual goals in its “forest service business plans”.
For the final year, Carbon Brief compared the 2024-25 tree-planting rates recorded in Forest Research data to the overall UK-wide target of 30,000 hectares. For the previous four years, the comparison is with the combined annual targets set by the devolved administrations.
The research, published in Nature Cities, uses keyword searching and machine-learning methods to produce a database of studies on climate change and cities published over 1990-2022.
The authors find that small, fast-growing cities – especially in Africa and Asia – are underrepresented in their database.
“While cities like London, New York and Berlin are extensively studied, fast-growing cities such as Goma (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Surat (India) and Huế (Vietnam) are barely visible in the literature,” one study author tells Carbon Brief.
Inhabitants of these cities have collectively contributed very little to global greenhouse gas emissions, but face the greatest impacts from the warming planet, the authors say.
The paper finds that literature on climate change and cities is growing “exponentially”, with 84% of studies on this topic published over 2012-22.
The new analysis is published as scientists from around the world start work on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on climate change and cities, which is due for publication in March 2027.
The study finds that, in its most recent set of headline reports, the IPCC captured “only” 5% of the total available literature on climate change and cities.
One study author tells Carbon Brief that the study is a “call to action” for the IPCC and broader research community “to synthesise more, to look beyond familiar places and to take seriously the diversity of urban realities that will define the future of climate mitigation and adaptation”.
More than half of the world’s population live in cities. These densely populated areas are responsible for the majority of global emissions and are also hotspots for climate extremes, including heatwaves and flooding.
Research about climate change and cities is a fast-growing field that encompasses, among other topics, the impacts of climate change on city infrastructure, adaptation measures that city-dwellers are taking and technological measures to limit emissions from cities.
The IPCC’s upcoming assessment report will feature its biggest overview of research on cities to date, as the organisation has commissioned a special report on climate change and cities as part of its upcoming assessment cycle. The report’s outline has already been agreed and the final document is scheduled for publication in March 2027.
However, the new study argues that, without a dedicated effort to “pre-aggregate the underlying literature by the entire research community”, the IPCC “may struggle to deliver a balanced and comprehensive review”.
The new analysis is the “first global stocktake of literature” on climate change and cities, according to a press release from the University of Sussex. The research was produced in-part to help advise the authors of the IPCC report about the current landscape of literature on climate change and cities, the study authors tell Carbon Brief.
Author Dr Tim Repke is a researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. He tells Carbon Brief that he hopes that the new study “can serve as a starting point of searchable, clean data” to help the authors of the upcoming IPCC special report to “do their work more efficiently”.
The amount of literature on climate change in cities is “much larger than previously estimated”, the paper says.
Moreover, the analysis points to “rapid, exponential growth” in literature on climate change and cities over the past three decades.
The graph below shows the number of studies about climate change and cities published each year over 1990-2022 (dark blue) and the subset of studies that focus on specific city case studies (light blue).
The plot also shows how many studies were published during the writing periods of each IPCC assessment report. For example, 37,539 studies on climate change and cities were published in time to feature in the IPCC’s sixth assessment cycle (AR6).
The authors find that 84% of studies in their database were published over 2012-22.
Literature on climate change and cities is currently growing 4.5 times faster than literature on climate change alone, they add.
Dr Simon Montfort is a postdoctoral researcher at Switzerland’s École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and lead author of the study. He tells Carbon Brief that the rapid growth in literature on climate change and cities is “not really surprising” because population growth in cities means that these areas are “becoming more and more important”.
The data can be explored further in their interactive online tool.
There is a well-established skew in climate change literature towards wealthy nations in the global north. The new study finds that this skew is highly evident in literature on climate change and cities.
The map below shows the locations of the 20,000 “case study” papers. Darker colours indicate more highly researched areas. The map shows cities that were researched in one study (pink), between one and five studies (orange) and in more than five studies (red). The graph in the bottom left shows this information broken down by continent.
The authors identify more than 4,000 studies in Europe and 3,000 in North America. According to the authors, half of cities in these continents are covered by more than one study.
However, the map reveals a lack of research focused on cities in central and South America, Africa, the Middle East and south and south-east Asia.
The authors identify more than 8,900 studies focused on cities in Asia. One-third of these focus on Chinese cities, they find. The authors identify more than 1,500 studies on Beijing alone, most of which focus on mitigation, rather than impacts or adaptation.
Meanwhile, they find that 92% of cities in Africa are researched in no more than one study. Nigeria is the most highly studied country on the continent, with almost 400 studies – half of which focus on Lagos.
The authors identify a bias in their research database towards large cities with high emissions. Meanwhile, they find that small, fast-growing, non-coastal cities are underrepresented in the literature.
Prof Felix Creuztig is the head of the working group on cities at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. He is an author on the study and on the upcoming IPCC special report.
He tells Carbon Brief:
“While cities like London, New York and Berlin are extensively studied, fast-growing cities such as Goma, Surat and Huế are barely visible in the literature. These smaller and rapidly urbanising cities in Africa and Asia are precisely where climate risks and emissions are increasing fastest, yet they are strikingly underrepresented.”
To identify all existing literature on climate change and cities, the authors conducted their search using the open-access research database OpenAlex.
They first used a long list of keywords to search the abstracts of every paper on OpenAlex for research focused on cities and climate change. Keywords for literature on cities included “urban” and “built-up”, while key words for climate change ranged from “changing climate” to “carbon taxes”.
They then checked these papers using a “machine learning classifier”, which filtered out any research that was unsuitable.
The authors used a machine-learning approach to scan the abstracts of studies in their database, to determine which topics are most frequently covered.
More than half of the papers in the database were focused on mitigation, the authors found. The impacts of climate change on cities was covered in around 15,000 papers, and the rest covered adaptation and “cross-cutting” topics.
Lead author Montfort tells Carbon Brief that the database of 50,000 articles is “quite a precise sample, meaning that it includes few irrelevant articles”.
However, he adds that there may be “many relevant articles missing from our sample”. For example, the authors find that their database does not completely capture literature from the “physical sciences”, such as smart energy grids or radiative cooling methods.
Language is another notable bias, as the database only includes research published in English.
Dr Doan Quang Van is a researcher at Japan’s University of Tsukuba and a lead author on the upcoming special report. He praises the study, but notes that the English-only database likely leads to an “underappreciation of non-English regions”.
He also notes that Indigenous knowledge, which is “not necessarily contained in ‘official documents’ like papers or reports” is not included in the database.
The authors compare the tens of thousands of studies cited by the IPCC in its most recent assessment cycle – AR6 – to their own database of literature on cities and climate change. They estimate that the IPCC cited almost 2,500 studies from the database in AR6, representing around 5% of the total.
They find that the IPCC’s choices about which studies to include further deepens the skew towards “large and mega cities” in the global north that is already evident in the literature.
Lead author Montfort tells Carbon Brief that the case studies are a “rich-evidence base” of “nuanced, case-specific knowledge”.
He says that it is important to expand the evidence base to less well-studied cities, but acknowledges it is “highly infeasible to conduct a study for every single city”. As such, he suggests that researchers should “look for ways to generalise findings from the more than 20,000 city-specific case studies already available”. He adds:
“If cities can learn from each other’s experiences, the existing evidence could go much further in informing city practitioners.”
To do this, the authors suggest that scientists should develop a data-driven method of grouping cities based on size, location and language, to enable “cross-city transfer learning from successful climate solutions”.
Dr Tamara Janes is a member of the climate information for international development team at the UK Met Office and an author on the upcoming IPCC special report. She was not involved in the new research.
She tells Carbon Brief that the study is “useful and timely”, adding that it “will undoubtedly help the ongoing special report by providing a solid foundational understanding for the current state of urban research worldwide”.
Janes adds that “this type of study is not only useful for researchers to design their research questions, but also for donor agencies as gaps in research can then be prioritised through flexible funding initiatives”.
Study author Crueztig says:
“For the IPCC and the broader research community, this is a call to action: to synthesise more, to look beyond familiar places and to take seriously the diversity of urban realities that will define the future of climate mitigation and adaptation.”
IPCC working group two co-chair, Dr Winston Chow, tells Carbon Brief that the “voluminous literature on climate change today presents challenges in its assessment”. He adds:
“Our experts are aware of these challenges towards developing reliable findings in informing our assessments and the IPCC is formally discussing this issue in a forthcoming expert workshop on methods of assessment.”
The authors add that they hope their interactive map, which is available online, will update automatically in the future to provide a “searchable, interactive, living database” of literature on climate change and cities.
Since then, he has seen the organisation through the Covid-19 pandemic, the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis.
In January, it was announced that Brearley will continue in the role until 2030, the target date for the UK’s electricity system to run on clean power.
This gives him an important position in overseeing the country’s electricity and gas networks, as well as the energy markets, retailers and consumer prices during a period of huge transition.
Carbon Brief sat down with Brearley to discuss the energy network, “zonal” pricing, the Spanish blackout and what is next for protecting customers from high energy prices.
Carbon Brief: How do you think the UK’s energy system will look in a decade and what will it mean for consumers?
Jonathan Brearley: So, I might answer that by just stepping back and thinking about how it’s already changed, and therefore how it might change in the future.
If you go back to 10 years ago when we started this low-carbon transition journey really, it was all about growing energy at the back end. So different forms of power generation, in particular, and to be honest, my life, your life, everyone’s life, has not really changed much in the way we use energy. Most of us still heat our homes using the same kind of heaters, usually gas heaters. We still use electricity in the same way we did, frankly, in the 70s and 80s.
But if you fast forward to 10 years’ time – and you’re beginning to see this already, actually increasingly – our energy is going to come from lots of different places. So it’s going to come, for example, from solar panels, which we may have on our roofs. We may be using our cars both for sourcing their fuel from electricity, but also being used to help us manage our own energy within our homes.
So I think this is all going to become very real and very visible for families and for businesses.
I think the question for me is, how do we make sure that that transition is a positive one, and how can we make sure that people get the benefits of that? And I think the benefits could be really big.
CB: Sort of implicit in what you just said is a bit of the fact that we thought a lot about the generation, we thought about the renewables, but the networks for something that feels like it’s only really become a focus in the last couple of years.
Do you think that we should have paid more attention to that sooner? Or do you think lots of people were, but it just wasn’t getting the sort of media attention that renewables were?
JB: So I think, without a doubt – and I’ve said this many times with hindsight – we should have built the network faster. You know, it’s clear that we now need to build fast to meet the ambition of renewables that we have.
Now, some of that is about how those ambitions change over time. But quite frankly, we’ve got a huge task now to get our networks in place. And you know, in a system where the place we generate is going to change, the type of generation we have is going to change, we need the network to match. And that’s really what Ofgem’s focus has been for a number of years now, to try and get that going. And quite frankly, I think it is going quite fast.
CB: Do you think that Ofgem’s scope and focus have changed an awful lot, in even just the last five years or since the energy crisis?
JB: Hugely. I mean, I think it’s changed hugely. Even if I think back to when I was CEO in 2020, I don’t think I’d have imagined how fast we would change the things that we do.
So take that network’s kind of piece. Even in 2020, we were still running price controls pretty much in the way we’ve run them before, [whereas] right now, our network regulation is starting from the understanding that pace is important. The speed at which we move, the speed at which we get investment in the system, is the best way we are going to protect customers.
So with something we called ASTI, the accelerated strategic transmission investment program. We have a whole programme now focused on making sure that, as far as possible, our kind of regulation of the money doesn’t get in front of project development.
Now, quite frankly, we’re about to come out with RIIO, our price control settlement. I think what we will say to the industry, to ourselves, to industry and to government, is, “look, there’s a massive challenge now. We’re making this money available, but we have to deliver, and that means making sure we get that network on time so that this new system we’re building works for the whole country.”
CB: How’s RIIO going to change from previous price framework periods?
JB: Well, I think there are two elements for me. First of all, we have to make sure that we invest in the system that we have. So all infrastructure regulators, in my opinion, need to learn the lessons from the last 10 years to make sure that the system we have maintains high [level of] security of supply and delivers high-quality services to customers.
But also, we are sort of embarking on this big build program to make sure that we are ready to take on all of this new generation.
Now, if we get that right, if we get that infrastructure on time, then that takes the country to a much more stable and secure place, which is something that I think in today’s world that customers will value extremely, hugely.
CB: With talking about the networks and how much is changing, you previously said you would support a shift to zonal pricing. Given how fraught the debate is, could you give me some of the core reasons behind backing such a shift?
JB: So look, I’ve shared my personal view on this and, quite frankly, that’s a Jonathan Brearley view, not a view of the whole organisation. And the reason I say that is because this is a really balanced argument.
So the problem we will all have is how to make sure we can run this new system as efficiently as possible. So, how do we minimise payments to generators to switch off because we simply can’t move their power around? And how do we make sure that the operation of our batteries, our interconnectors and our generators all fit together?
There are basically two options. There’s zonal pricing, which I prefer, because I think when you get there – even though it’s a long journey – this adapts more organically and more easily.
But there is a path you take where you adapt the national system that we have. You probably have to change your transmission charging and probably have to do more planning of infrastructure that could take you to somewhere near the same place.
Now I know the secretary of state is balancing those two things together. The argument is fairly simple in my mind: there are benefits, economic benefits, from single pricing, but it brings uncertainty. The question is, does that uncertainty drive up the cost of capital so much that it actually outweighs the benefits that you might get? And that’s what he’ll be grappling with.
Either way, we’ll support him in that delivery. I’ve given my view, but it’s a balanced judgment. It’s not just a slam dunk.
CB: You mentioned within that, that zonal pricing is a long journey. Do you think that the timeframe within which it could be implemented could potentially jeopardise [the government’s target of] clean power by 2030?
JB: So I think the interaction between zonal and clean power is this question of cost of capital and uncertainty. That’s the same trade-off I’ve just laid out and that’s where I think will be on the secretary of state’s mind when he makes that decision.
CB: In the shorter term, we’ve already touched on how things have changed since the energy price crisis and that being driven by surging gas prices in particular.
How much can Ofgem do to protect customers and consumers from similar situations in the future, given that gas still has such a role in setting wholesale market prices?
JB: Well, look, I mean I think that’s our mission. We’ve all got to learn collectively from the last few years. When you distill it back – all the regulatory detail, all of the conversations about how we manage technically – we found ourselves in a situation where this country’s energy needs were, in the vast majority, being provided by an international gas market that we don’t control.
Now, we saw the impact when we had to withdraw from Russia as a major supplier and we saw the price spikes we saw in 2022-24. What all of us want to do is build a system where we never face that kind of situation again.
So the thing about building the infrastructure we’re talking about, both through networks and through the upcoming auctions for offshore wind and onshore wind, is that we will have a system that is much more stable.
So there’s some very early analysis that we’re doing that I don’t have sort of full figures for, that asks the question, “Well, imagine we had a gas crisis in 2030 when this is all built”. And the early indications from that analysis are actually [that] we would be a lot better off as a country.
The main thing we are trying to do is have a stable system, a system that’s more within our domestic control, not totally within our domestic control, but one that allows us to manage this international volatility that, quite frankly, no government or regulator can control.
CB: Talking about international volatility, we’ve had the report this week from the Spanish government into the causes of the blackout. Then we’ve also had [grid operator] Redeia sort of pushing back against certain elements of it.
What is Ofgem taking from that situation, to learn about how it could manage potentially similar situations in the UK?
JB: Well, I think it’s still early days. We’re still digesting the report and we will make sure that we, the system operator and the network companies and indeed, the generators learn from what happened in Spain.
I guess, stepping back from the specifics, there are some reasons to take comfort. I think we have thought a lot about things like system inertia and some of the problems you might get when you see thermal generation declining, but I think we’ll all have to be vigilant. This is a big change and we’ll have to make sure the system works in all scenarios.
And look, the thing about incidents such as what happened in Spain is that they are great ways for us to make sure our system is more resilient. But there’s nothing I’ve seen from the reports yet that makes me think that there’s something we’re absolutely missing in the UK. But as I say, early days and much more work to do to get through that.
CB: With Britain being an islanded grid, it strikes me as being very different from the one in Spain.
Are there any particular countries that Ofgem can look at, sort of learn lessons from, or do you always sort of have to take a step back and go, but we are an island, we don’t have the level of interconnection that other places do, and we do need to be slightly more independent because of that.
JB: Well, that’s an interesting question. I suppose that as we look at our interconnection program, we’re going to build out up to roughly around 18 gigawatts (GW) of interconnection. So I don’t think we are going to be an island in 10 years’ time, coming back to sort of where we started.
There is always a question, if you are more separate from another market, as to how you manage, particularly looking back at the gas crisis. If you look at our gas market and how we connect to Europe, and what we might need from them. But I don’t think we’re so different that we can’t take lessons from European countries either.
And actually, I think when you look at Spain, Portugal and their interaction with France, one of the things I hear is a question that’s being asked is, should you have more interconnection for Spain, because, actually, there weren’t many outlets to begin to share some of these sorts of factors that play.
CB: That’s interesting, because I think lots of the focus has just been on how Spain was interconnected with Portugal, and that was almost a problem for Portugal.
JB: Well, that’s right, but if you look at the two of them together and how they connect to the rest of Europe, I don’t know the numbers, but I would imagine it’s a million miles away from where we are.
CB: With Britain expected to have periods of zero-carbon electricity generation for the first time this year, what are the biggest challenges Ofgem is facing in facilitating this transition?
JB: Well, I think it’s a really positive step. Now, let’s be clear, we will all be vigilant. And I imagine Fintan [Slye] and the system operator will be super vigilant, to make sure they understand how the system will work and how they’ll manage some of the changes that a zero-carbon system brings.
But it’s a great step forward and I think as we gradually get into this, the job for all of us is to be really careful about the security of supply, to remember that that is always the customer’s number one concern, and to begin to learn the lessons.
The thing for me is this great change that Ed Miliband is instituting through 2030, the new generation, the new network. For me, it’s all now about the efficiency of that. Making sure that’s efficient, economic and delivers what customers need.
Now the other thing, I think from the gas crisis is, although there are still tensions between the trilemma – I think we can’t pretend the trilemma has completely gone away – they are much lower than when I started 10 years ago, where we had a real sort of trade off between very high cost renewables and very low cost thermal.
So I think there’s a lot of work for us to do, but look, I’m glad we’ve made that step, and I hope it continues to do so.
CB: Do you think there needs to be work to rebalance the levies on electricity bills to sort of continue to tackle some of these core imbalances in the cost to consumers?
JB: So another trilemma is levies on electricity, what you might put on gas and what a taxpayer might take. You know, as a regulator without a fiscal mandate, of course I would love the taxpayer to take more of the burden, but I don’t face the challenges that the chancellor faces.
I think there is always going to be a question in the current system as to how, if you want people to take up electricity as their option for heating and for transport, how you make that economic, particularly through heating. But the thing we’ll all have to be mindful of is the distributional consequences of any change.
So what we think broadly is actually what you’ve got to do is step back and think about those customers that are really struggling. So, if you have low-income customers that are finding it hard in today’s market as is, how are you going to protect them through any transition?
And I think that goes beyond the question about levies actually. I think systemically, we need to do more for affordability, to give ourselves flexibility, to make changes like that that might make the system more efficient.
CB: Do you think the energy industry as a whole is doing enough to ensure that everyone is brought along with the transition? That everyone gets the benefits of being able to charge an EV at home and stuff like that, even if it requires quite a big upfront cost. Are we doing enough overall?
JB: So the thing I want to recognise is that, particularly for suppliers, but actually across the industry, people have worked really hard to protect vulnerable customers. You know, we’ve had things to work through, like prepayment meters, but most companies now have really focused on trying to make sure they understand customers in difficult financial circumstances, for example.
Now there’s always more we can do, and as a regulator, we’re always going to be pushing to make that response better. So [things like a] quick response to people in debt, making sure that you get them onto an affordable repayment plan and you work hard with those families to get them back in a more stable position.
I’m really pleased with the government’s announcement today [19 June 2025] that there’s more people going to get the “warm home discount”, and we’re going to play our part in that. We’re going to introduce debt relief initiatives that tackle the stock of debt that’s been left over since the crisis. So things are beginning to move.
In the short term, I think that as we make this transition, there’s a really big challenge for all of us, which you’ve highlighted, which is how are we going to get some of this kit into people’s homes, for people that aren’t able to finance that themselves? So I’m looking to the “warm homes plan”. I was pleased to see that was money allocated in the spending review [for the warm homes plan], where we will actually be [able to] support some of the most vulnerable customers to benefit from this.
And look, there’s a myth out there that I think we should challenge, that poorer or lower-income households and vulnerable customers don’t want to engage with this market.
I mean, interestingly, I’ve talked to a lot to [EV] charging companies for example, and they’ll point out to me, they’ll point out to me that a lot of EV users are people who’ve got those through disability payments and are engaging in a more flexible market and are seeing those benefits.
So the more of that we can create, the better I think it will spread the benefits of the change.
CB: It’s interesting. Why do you think there is less awareness that people who are considered sort of lower income aren’t as engaged?
JB: So there is some evidence, actually. So some of the consumer work we’ve done does say that, in general, if you have vulnerabilities, you might engage less with things like switching. But I think we’ve got to be imaginative about this. And if you have policy and policy funding, then there must be a much better way to get people involved.
Like I say, when you see people getting electric vehicles, for example, through personal independence allocations, things like that, then you can see people do engage. So there’s plenty of scope there to do more.
CB: Do you think there’s a greater awareness of what goes into energy bills than there was five years ago or before the energy crisis? And does that change how consumers then interact with you and what they call for from Ofgem?
JB: Well, I’ll tell you one thing that I’ve done now for three or four years, which is, I’ve phoned customers up individually. And so my teams find me someone – they do pre-warn them – and I phone them up and ask very general questions.
So I don’t go in there with a series of specifics, I just say, “how do you feel about your energy company? How would you feel about your energy provision? And what would you change?”
And I guess that the change that I am noticing, for understandable reasons, is that it’s much more front of mind than it’s ever been before.
So I think back to sort of when I started in Ofgem in 2015, I told people what I did, there was sort of moderate interest, put it that way. Now, everybody has an opinion about what should happen and the way we should configure the system.
So I think there’s, there’s greater awareness, and I think greater importance in people’s lives. You know, people have seen the impact of high prices, and most people have the question, well, how do I help myself get out of that?
CB: From Ofgem’s point of view, are there any specific areas where you think there’s mis- or disinformation that’s particularly harming your work, particularly in the media?
JB: So, you know, there is [currently] a much wider debate now about net-zero, and I think that is a shift. So right the way back when we developed the Climate Change Act in 2006/7, we had a House of Commons that I think had five dissenting votes out of the whole House – something like that, certainly less than 10. [Five Conservative MPs voted against the bill.]
So we are seeing a much more vigorous debate about what we should do. Now my view is we should also welcome that we all need to test our plans and test what we’re doing, but I think we have to be careful to ground that, as far as possible, in the analysis.
What we do, when we talk about the impact of what we do, we try and ground that as best we can within the economics we have within this building and the things that we see outside of there. I think that’s hard when the debate becomes more emotional, but that is, we see part of our job as being that sort of authoritative voice, basing things as far as we can on the evidence that we see.
CB: Do you think it would be useful if there was a clearer presentation of things like curtailment costs in the media?
JB: So the system operator does do work on sharing the curtailment costs, so they do and will share their analysis around this. I think the question is, how those might change over time, and being clear on the range of possibilities there.
The problem we have – and look, I’ve been around this very long time, is that projections are just projections. So I was looking back at some projections on constraint costs from 10 years ago, and put it this way, they were way out.
You know, I also always talk about my time in the department in the early sort of 2010s we thought the idea that solar was going to take off in the UK to be completely mad, because it was six times the market price and we have no sun in Britain. That was a kind of general statement. And both of those things have turned out to be wrong.
So one of the things I think we’re all going to have to get used to is understanding that the range of possibilities is still quite wide, and it’s how you have the debate within that, how you talk about how you manage risks.
The thing that we focus on as a result of that is to say, “look, let’s have a look at our portfolio of energy”. As I say, it’s majority gas. What we’re doing, I think, through the infrastructure bill that we’re putting in place, is really moving to a place that’s more stable.
There’s not going to be no gas in 2030, there’s plenty of gas in both our heating system and indeed, there’ll still be gas in our electricity system. But it’s about diversifying that so that were a shock to hit, we would be in a much more attenuated place. And I think that’s better for all customers.
CB: So I know I asked you what the UK energy system will look like in the next 10 years, but what’s on Ofgem’s plate for the near future? What’s next for you? What’s your biggest focus?
JB: Well, our big thing in the next couple of weeks will be RIIO. Now that is on network price control.
To be open, when I first came into Ofgem in 2016, that was a large part of my job. I came as networks director at that point, or networks partner, I think it was called.
And what we’re going to see, I think again, is the regulator moving fast to unlock the investment we need to build this system. So we’ve worked very hard for the companies, now we are always, unashamedly going to challenge them on the amount of money they need and the returns that they get, but equally, we are thoughtful about the pace at which we need to put this infrastructure in place.
As I say, coming out of this will have an impact on customers’ bills, because we have to fund the infrastructure that we are paying for. But we do think that is offset, really, by two things.
First of all, a reduction in those constraint costs, because the best way to avoid constraint costs is to have the network to transport the electricity, but also to get out of this volatility, so to be away from a place where we are as vulnerable as we were in 2022. So that’s what’s on our mind in terms of the conclusions that we’ll come out with.
But it’s a big challenge. The challenge is to us, to industry, to government. Now, what do we need to do? We need to unlock the money as those projects progress. The government needs to make sure that planning permission is there, that we have nothing in terms of the sort of wider regulatory landscape that gets in the way. And the network companies need to deliver, [as] we are giving them a vast amount of money on behalf of customers. This would be fantastic for customers if those projects get in the ground, but if they’re delayed, then I think customers have a right to be asking the question why.
CB: Is there anything else you like to add? Anything you think more people should talk about that no one ever asks you about?
JB: Oh, that’s a very good question. What should people talk about that they don’t ask about? I’ll tell you what we should talk about is – almost going back to the first question – I think there is a really interesting discussion we should have publicly, about how customers are going to see this change.
You know, how is it going to look and feel? Where regulators are terrible is in thinking about the shape of services. You know, how do you design something that people really want? You’ve got some great companies out there doing it. A lot of the retailers are now getting involved in this conversation. You’ve got a lot of small startups.
But I do think, once we continue the debate about the investment that we need, the next question is, “well, how does this work for people?” So I’m really excited by things like the government’s “warm homes plan”, because I think that is a really good way to get a conversation about what infrastructure do we need, how do we best use it, and how do we change all of our lives for the better?
The interview was conducted by Molly Lempriere at Ofgem’s head office in Canary Wharf, London, on 19 June 2025.
]]>However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that more than £500m of this sum comes from controversial changes in the way the UK calculates its climate aid for developing countries.
By leaning on private-sector investment and including existing aid projects in the total, the government is able to inflate its figures without providing as much new climate funding.
Including this money puts the UK on track for its five-year goal of providing £11.6bn by 2026 to support climate action in developing countries, even as it cuts the overall aid budget.
Climate aid – which is often referred to as “international climate finance” (ICF) – will likely still need to rise above £3bn in 2025, if the UK is to achieve its target over the next year.
The new data, released to Carbon Brief via freedom-of-information (FOI) requests, covers provisional 2024-25 spending across the three major government departments that fund climate projects overseas.
This analysis is the latest in a series of articles by Carbon Brief documenting the UK’s ICF contributions since 2011.
Key findings from the most recent year include:
After it was elected last year, Labour confirmed that it would honour the previous government’s pledge to provide £11.6bn of climate finance over the five-year period ending in 2025-26.
This money is the UK’s contribution, under the Paris Agreement, to help developing countries cut emissions and protect themselves from the threat of climate change.
Since the goal was first announced in 2019, experts have regularly voiced doubts that it can be achieved due to major cuts to the foreign-aid budget by successive governments.
More uncertainty followed the announcement in February that the Labour government would cut aid further – from 0.5% of gross national income to 0.3% – ostensibly to fund defence spending. (The government insisted that the remaining aid would “prioritise” climate.)
Despite these changes and uncertainty, the figures provided to Carbon Brief via FOI reveal that the UK is, in fact, on track to meet its £11.6bn target.
Climate-finance spending reached a record high of just under £3bn in the financial year 2024-25, more than £700m higher than the previous year.
(Note that these figures are “provisional” and subject to revision. Due to methodology changes, the final figures for UK climate finance in 2023-24 were much higher than those provided to Carbon Brief via a previous FOI. See the Methodology for more details.)
Assuming the provisional figures for 2024-25 are accurate, the UK would still need to raise its climate finance to £3.1bn in 2025-26 in order to meet the £11.6bn target, as shown in the figure below.
This level of climate finance would need to be maintained, even as the government scales back its overall aid budget in 2025.
When asked at a recent committee hearing whether there would be any new money for the £11.6bn goal, international development minister Baroness Chapman spoke frankly:
“I think the search for new money at the moment is going to be pretty fruitless…Is there going to be any new money for climate in a world where we have just gone from 0.5% to 0.3%? I think you can probably work that out.”
Instead of new funding, the upward trajectory of climate aid has been largely driven by the UK expanding what it counts towards the total. These changes were initially made under the Conservatives, but Labour has retained them.
By relabelling existing funding for multilateral development banks (MDBs), humanitarian aid and private-sector investments via BII as “climate finance”, the UK has inflated the figures without allocating genuinely new funds, making the £11.6bn goal easier to achieve.
Based on data acquired through successive FOIs, Carbon Brief estimates that £528m, or 18% of climate finance provided in 2024-25, can be linked to these accounting changes.
Since 2021, the running total of climate finance resulting from these changes is more than £1.3bn, Carbon Brief analysis suggests, amounting to nearly a sixth of spending to date.
Experts have pointed out that this amounts to a real-world cut in climate aid, as it means less additional funding than was originally pledged.
Without the accounting changes, UK climate finance would only have reached around £2.5bn last year, as the chart below shows.
To achieve the £11.6bn goal from this position, climate finance would have needed to increase by 78% this year, nearly doubling from a year earlier. In comparison, the accounting changes mean it only has to increase by 2%.
The government says that its accounting changes merely brought it in line with other countries. A Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) spokesperson tells Carbon Brief:
“We will continue to account for all of our international climate finance using internationally agreed OECD guidelines. Meeting our £11.6bn commitment by March 2026 remains our ambition and it is only right that we accurately reflect the funding going to support this aim.”
In response, NGOs and aid experts have argued the UK should have retained its former position as a leader in climate-finance accounting standards, rather than aligning with the looser methodologies used by many others, such as Germany and France.
Moreover, the £11.6bn goal was meant to be a doubling of the government’s previous £5.8bn target, which was based on the original accounting methodology. If the previous target had also been based on a broader definition of climate aid, then the current £11.6bn target would have needed to be higher to represent a doubling.
As the UK nears the end of its third five-year ICF target, it is expected to announce another goal covering the period 2026-27 onwards. This will feed into the $300bn global climate finance target that nations agreed at the COP29 climate summit last year.
Amid the aid cuts, climate NGOs say that the accounting changes should be reversed and the UK should turn to “polluter-pays” measures to generate the required public funds. Catherine Pettengell, executive director of Climate Action Network UK, tells Carbon Brief:
“Our main concern is that we now have the spending review, but there is still no clarity – or vision – on current or future climate finance from the UK.”
The UK is now leaning heavily on private-sector investments to achieve its climate-finance goals, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis.
By far the largest climate-finance input last year was a £482m contribution to the UK’s development finance institution, BII.
This is the biggest climate-finance contribution the UK has ever made in a single year, according to the data that Carbon Brief has collected in recent years.
It also amounted to nearly a fifth of the total climate finance last year and almost three times more than the UK has ever channelled into BII before.
BII is a publicly owned, for-profit company that largely supports itself with its £7.3bn portfolio of investments in developing countries, but it also receives regular injections of aid money.
The surge in BII climate finance last year can be attributed to two things.
First, the government now counts more of its BII investments as climate finance than it did previously, following the accounting changes. It argues that this more accurately reflects BII’s expanding focus on investing in clean-energy projects overseas.
The government also decided to invest an extra £400m – largely from underspending on housing asylum seekers in the UK – into BII, bringing its total budget for the year up to £881m.
Prior to these changes, the government expected BII climate finance to be worth £126m in 2024-25, according to forecasts previously obtained by Carbon Brief.
It has, therefore, added an extra £356m to BII’s contribution. Carbon Brief estimates that £218m of this can be attributed to the accounting changes, rather than the increase in funding. (See: Methodology.)
Critics argue that BII, which focuses on loans and equity finance rather than grants, is not capable of supporting climate action in the poorest and most climate-vulnerable nations. (Separately, it has also been criticised for continuing to support fossil-fuel developments.)
Last week’s spending review provided the FCDO with at least £300m annually out to 2029-30 for BII and similar organisations, even as billions are cut from its aid budget. In this context, Ian Mitchell, a senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, tells Carbon Brief:
“BII looks set to become the government’s main climate-finance vehicle. Though, whether this is compatible with its historic focus on Africa and the poorest countries remains to be seen.”
Meanwhile, the biggest single project to receive funding from the UK last year was the World Bank initiative titled: “Scaling Climate Action by Lowering Emissions (SCALE).” The government provided it with an initial contribution of £154m.
SCALE aims to help around 20 countries generate carbon credits that can be sold by companies on the voluntary offset market or internationally via Article 6 carbon markets.
According to the UK government, one aim is to “maximise the mobilisation of additional finance through the sale of carbon credits”.
Selling carbon offsets has long been touted as a way to channel climate finance into developing countries, but the practice has faced intense scrutiny and accusations of “greenwashing” in recent years.
Other large portions of funding in the UK’s 2024-25 climate-finance budget can also be attributed to changes in the government’s accounting methodology.
For example, as of 2023, the UK started counting portions of its “core” payments into MDBs as climate finance, significantly inflating its climate-aid total.
This money is used by the banks to issue loans and – to a lesser extent – grants for projects in developing countries. While many of these projects will be climate-related, relabelling some of the UK’s contributions as “climate finance” does not result in any additional funds being distributed.
In 2024-25, this relabelling accounted for at least £103m of the total climate finance, including £84m for the African Development Bank (AfDB), £11m for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and £8m for the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Special Development Fund.
In terms of bilateral aid from the UK, several of the projects with the largest share of climate finance last year were in nations facing war, famine and natural disasters.
This can partly be attributed to accounting changes that mean 30% of all humanitarian funding in the most climate-vulnerable countries – including Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia – is now automatically counted as climate finance within government accounting.
Some of these nations have, therefore, risen to be top recipients of bilateral “climate aid” from the UK – as shown in the figure below – through programmes such as Sudan Humanitarian Preparedness and Response.
(Such programmes tend to involve the UK supporting NGOs rather than providing funds to governments. For example, FCDO has two “flagship” humanitarian programmes in Afghanistan – both with an ICF component – but does not provide funds to the Taliban.)
This accounting change was viewed by the previous Conservative government as a way to avoid a “trade-off” between climate and humanitarian projects, amid aid budget cuts.
As the map above shows, Ethiopia remained the largest recipient of UK climate finance via single-country projects last year, with £92.3m in total. This has been the case for more than a decade.
The finance largely comes from two programmes, which aim to improve climate resilience in regions of Ethiopia that have been afflicted by drought and flooding. The country has faced years of regional conflicts that have been exacerbated by climate shocks.
Rather than directly supporting individual projects in individual countries, most UK climate finance is distributed to international bodies and initiatives that serve many countries.
Some of the biggest payments are to well-established international grant providers. These include £227m for the Green Climate Fund, £64m for the Global Environment Facility and £26m for the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF).
Other large payments went to long-running initiatives to help “build financial markets and institutions” in Africa and “mobilise private investment in infrastructure” in developing countries.
This analysis is the latest part of Carbon Brief’s efforts to assess the UK’s ICF contributions by financial year. Detailed data underpinning these contributions is not released publicly, but is required to track progress towards the UK’s ICF targets.
Total ICF figures for the years 2011-12 to 2023-24 are based on summary public statements made by the government. Ministers have quoted different figures on different occasions, but Carbon Brief is using a March statement from FCDO minister Stephen Doughty for the 2011-12 to 2023-24 period, as this is understood to be the most up-to-date.
The figures for 2024-25 are based on FOI responses from the three major departments responsible for the UK’s overseas climate-related aid projects: FCDO, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Around 80% of climate finance provided by the UK is overseen by the FCDO.
All three of these departments provided the data for 2024-25, stressing that it is provisional. This means it is “subject to year-end accounting and audit adjustments, which are still being processed”. Carbon Brief also received the final (i.e. non-provisional) figures for 2023-24, having been given the provisional figures last year.
(The provisional figures released to Carbon Brief in 2023-24 last year were significantly lower than the final figures – amounting to £1.8bn rather than £2.3bn. This is almost entirely due to the provisional data not factoring in most of the accounting methodology changes described in this article. The provisional figures for 2024-25 appear to have factored in these methodology changes already.)
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) also oversees a small number of ICF projects overseas. Unlike the other departments, DSIT rejected Carbon Brief’s FOI requests. Carbon Brief understands that its projects were worth £42m in 2023-24, roughly 1% of the total. For the sake of this analysis, Carbon Brief assumes that this amount remained the same in 2024-25.
Carbon Brief relied on previous FOI results to calculate how much of the UK’s climate finance derives from accounting changes in recent years:
Together, these changes add up to £528m. The actual figure may be higher, as these are provisional figures.
Carbon Brief’s estimate of the cumulative impact of the accounting changes by 2024-25 – some £1.3bn – aligns with an estimate of £1.72bn for the entire five-year period out to 2025-26, made by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). The final figure may be higher, as ICAI’s calculation was based on government documents that did not, for example, include the increased capital contribution to BII in 2024-25.